China

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/1840090

Archived

Germany is under attack from China, a senior German opposition MP has warned, as Berlin grapples with a fresh wave of cyber attacks and espionage plots.

Roderich Kiesewetter, the crisis prevention spokesman for the centre-Right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), said Germans needed to stop thinking of China as a “partner”.

“Many in Germany are turning a blind eye … China is no longer a partner, but a systemic rival that is attacking us,” Mr Kiesewetter, a former colonel in the Bundeswehr, told The Telegraph.

“Germany is at the centre of Chinese hybrid influence operations in Europe – it uses all the tools in its toolbox; espionage, sabotage, lawfare, repression and disinformation,” added Mr Kiesewetter, who is also the deputy chairman of the German parliament’s intelligence committee.

His comments are a major intervention in Germany, where China wields immense influence over the economy despite rising tensions over Beijing’s tacit support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and apparent plans to invade Taiwan.

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Archived link

Human rights activists criticize China's AI platform DeepSeek for enabling state propaganda, suppressing discussions, and collecting personal data. Concerns rise over ethical risks and digital repression, with fears that the Chinese Communist Party could misuse the platform to silence dissent.

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Rushan Abbas, Executive Director of the Campaign for Uyghurs, condemned the AI platform on social media, warning of its implications. “It collects sensitive data that would benefit the CCP, a regime known for human rights abuses,” she stated. “Chinese AI platforms and apps fuel threats, including digital transnational repression. We can't afford to overlook this.”

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[Swiss digital law specialist Jan] Czarnocki recounted how the AI avoided acknowledging reports of genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, instead offering pre-formulated responses that downplayed concerns. He urged that DeepSeek’s open-source framework be retrained using verified information to ensure accuracy and reduce reliance on Chinese-controlled APIs.

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/1839567

Here is the link to the report: https://graphika.com/reports/chinese-state-influence

A Chinese social media operation that aims to whip up political anger in the West has called for the overthrow of a foreign government when impersonating protesters criticising flood relief efforts in Spain, online analysis outfit Graphika said.

Graphika said an operation dubbed Spamouflage, which it believed was linked to the Chinese state, posed this month as human rights group Safeguard Defenders to spread online calls for the government to be toppled in response to the catastrophic floods in October that killed 224 people.

"This is the first time we have seen Spamouflage directly calling to overthrow a foreign government," Graphika said in its latest report.

...

The report also finds:

• Chinese covert influence operations have impersonated human rights organizations critical of Beijing, almost certainly in an effort to discredit their activities and disrupt domestic political conversations in Western countries. The state-linked Spamouflage operation, for instance, has repeatedly targeted the Spain-based non-profit Safeguard Defenders and in January posed as the organization to spread online calls for the Spanish government to be overthrown in response to deadly floods in Valencia. This is the first time we have seen Spamouflage directly calling for the overthrow of a foreign government.
• Chinese state influence actors and pro-China communities continue to leverage international trade issues in their efforts to advance Beijing’s strategic interests. In recent weeks, this has included attempts to orchestrate a boycott of Japanese retail brand Uniqlo due to the company’s reported refusal to use cotton from China’s Xinjiang region, and efforts to exacerbate tensions between the U.S. and Japan over a blocked steel company merger.
• Chinese officials and state media have used social media and other online platforms to dismiss and deflect allegations of Chinese state hacking activity. After Japan accused China in January of orchestrating a years-long hacking campaign against Japanese government agencies and companies, for example, Chinese state actors spread statements dismissing the allegations as groundless and disseminated cartoons casting Tokyo as an agent of U.S. “disinformation.”
• Overt and covert Chinese state influence actors have engaged in a sustained effort to advance narratives that reinforce Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and attempt to legitimize its activities in the region. In November, these actors amplified comments by an international law scholar that appeared to support China’s position.

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/1835428

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/1835375

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/1835374

DeepSeek-R1 is a blockbuster open-source model that is now at the top of the U.S. App Store.

As a Chinese company, DeepSeek is beholden to CCP policy. This is reflected even in the open-source model, prompting concerns about censorship and other influence.

Today we’re publishing a dataset of prompts covering sensitive topics that are likely to be censored by the CCP. These topics include perennial issues like Taiwanese independence, historical narratives around the Cultural Revolution, and questions about Xi Jinping.

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Really we all could benefit from this

• Taiwan is acting against media organizations operating in the country that are affiliated with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) party-state.
• In early January, Taiwan’s government revoked the operating license of the magazine Strait Herald following revelations about its influence and infiltration activities.
• A sharp increase in disinformation targeting Taiwan in 2024 has prompted robust countermeasures, legislative reforms, enhanced cognitive warfare defenses, and international collaboration to combat PRC influence operations.
• Calls to improve Taiwan’s national security framework, including by setting up courts dedicated to prosecuting espionage and infiltration cases, indicate how vulnerable Taiwan remains to digital and media influence operations.

[...]

There are currently eight PRC media outlets operating in Taiwan with 12 correspondents, according to recent reporting. These include People’s Daily (人民日报), Xinhua News Agency (新华社), China Central Television (CCTV; 中央电视台), China National Radio (中央人民广播电台), China News Service (CNS;中新社), Xiamen Media Group (厦门卫视), Strait Herald (海峡导报), and Hunan Broadcasting System (湖南广电) (VOA, January 3). Although they ostensibly function as independent media organizations, all are party–state-controlled entities aligned with CCP strategic interests and objectives.

These outlets reinforce the Party’s propaganda strategy in Taiwan. Among them, six—People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, CCTV, China National Radio, CNS, and Hunan Broadcasting System—fall under the centralized management of the CCP’s Propaganda Department. Xinhua serves as Beijing’s primary news agency and global propaganda arm, while the People’s Daily operates as the official newspaper of the CCP, amplifying its policies and political messaging. CCTV and China National Radio are central broadcasters tasked with spreading pro-Beijing narratives. CNS, though smaller, is integral to united front operations, engaging in partnerships with Taiwanese organizations to subtly influence public opinion.

[...]

Archived

[...]

Ambassadors from France, Japan, the European Union, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia reaffirmed their commitment to safeguarding regional stability and maritime sovereignty during a maritime security forum organized by the Stratbase Institute in partnership with the French Embassy in the Philippines,

[...]

Japanese Ambassador Endo Kazuya reiterated Japan’s commitment to upholding the rule of law as outlined in the UNCLOS.

“Japan stands ready to work closely with the Philippines, ASEAN, and the international community to advance a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” he declared.

European Union Delegation Ambassador Massimo Santoro underscored the importance of a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

“A region free from coercion is key to our collective stability, peace, and prosperity. Strategic partnerships are central to the EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, promoting cooperation over confrontation,” he explained.

[...]

Archived

• Analysis of two nationally representative surveys in China from 1995 to 2017 reveals that wealth (assets minus liabilities) of households with at least one CCP member is 21–24% higher than similar households without CCP [Chinese Communist Party] members.
• The CCP wealth premium is explained in part by preferential access for CCP households to more valuable housing at lower prices compared to similar non-CCP households during the early years of housing privatization.
• The most recent survey (2013–2017) reveals the wealth of CCP households grew faster than similar non-CCP households, especially among the wealthiest 5%, driven primarily by higher levels of capital gains.
• For all wealth levels, CCP membership was a stronger predictor of wealth growth than level of education.

[...]

Privately owned real estate today accounts for 84% of the gross total wealth across urban households — by far the largest component of private wealth. In the 1970s, however, virtually all urban housing stock in China was publicly owned.

[...]

CCP households were less likely to self-build houses and more likely to either inherit or purchase homes through preferential policies, while non-CCP households invested more in self-built housing — typically the least profitable form of housing investment, especially for those at the lower end of the wealth spectrum. As a result, CCP households were better positioned to acquire high-value homes at lower prices, amplifying wealth disparities over time.

[...]

The findings underscore the enduring wealth advantages CCP households enjoy compared to similar non-CCP households up and down the wealth distribution. The mechanisms identified in this research include preferential access to housing in the early phases of urban real estate privatization and faster wealth accumulation through capital gains in recent years.

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18197723

Archived

Although Beijing appeared to score a propaganda coup last week when hundreds of thousands of American TikTok users flooded to the social media app RedNote, observers say the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is worried about any cross-cultural exchanges happening online.

The Chinese government blocks various U.S.-based platforms, including Facebook, YouTube, and X, which are only accessible via virtual personal network. The government also heavily censors topics considered sensitive to policymakers.

[...]

Dali Yang, William Claude Reavis political science professor at the University of Chicago, wrote on [social media]:

"Apparently Xiaohongshu is frantically trying to adapt to both accommodate these new American users but also reduce their interactions with Chinese domestic users. Haha, that sounds like going in the direction of what Bytedance did with Douyin/Tiktok."

Rush Doshi, senior fellow for China and director of the Initiative on China Strategy at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote [on social media]:

"The PRC end game will be to bifurcate the app, as they did with Douyin, between a foreign and domestic version to avoid too much interaction between US and PRC users.

[...]

After indicating he would rescue TikTok, Trump on Monday signed an executive order postponing the TikTok ban for 75 days.

He has suggested, however, that the U.S. should acquire a 50 percent ownership in the company, telling reporters it is "worthless" if he doesn't approve a deal to keep it going in the country.

Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told CNBC such a joint venture is unlikely, given that China regulates the algorithms as national security property and that China is "basically being asked to force over its core intellectual property."

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In a related article, The Diplomat reports that unlike TikTok, RedNote primarily operates in China. As a result, concerns over content censorship, data privacy, and CCP control are even greater.

RedNote imposes strict content censorship on the posts visible on the platform. Discussions on politics are generally limited and hidden. Similar to the situations in other Chinese-controlled websites and mobile applications, users need to use jargon, memes, acronyms, and intentionally mistyped words or characters to express limited opinions on public affairs in China. The platform [RedNote] has a notorious record of limiting LGBTQ-related topics. Media reports suggest that some U.S. users have already seen their posts taken down by RedNote as they are deemed “too sensitive.”

The significant number of U.S. users entering the app led to some unplanned pressure for RedNote to fulfill its censorship requirements imposed by the Chinese cyberspace administration officials. After the first wave of user influx, RedNote was reported to be urgently hiring English-language content moderation employees. The job posting has no prior job experience requirements for the new hires and offers the recruits paid training. Reports also suggest that RedNote is developing features that segregate users based on their IP address to minimize its political and content moderation risks.

[...]

Cross-post da: https://beehaw.org/post/18184159

Archived

[...]

The Chinese government is revolutionizing digital surveillance at home and exporting these technologies abroad. [The study focuses on] Huawei, the world’s largest telecommunications provider, which is partly state-owned and increasingly regarded as an instrument of its foreign policy.

The transfers [of technology between China and foreign countries] have sparked widespread concern among observers. These tools of digital dictatorship, many argue, will let recipient governments expand surveillance and reinforce the wave of autocratic retrenchment and democratic erosion currently underway.

[...]

The [foreign] governments that receive Huawei transfers are systematically different than those that do not, and in ways that may be correlated with state repression.

[...]

The Chinese Communist Party's Surveillance State

The Information Age has revolutionized surveillance in the world’s autocracies. In 1998, the CCP launched the Golden Shield Project, which [one researcher] describes as “a domestic surveillance and filtering system that integrates online government databases with an all-encompassing surveillance network.”Footnote 3 In the first phase, completed in 2005, the CCP built a massive network of population databases, ID tracking systems, and internet surveillance tools, which let it record the movement of potential dissidents as revealed, in part, by their online behavior. In 2017, the CCP announced the completion of its “Sky Net” program, which entails 176 million surveillance cameras across China and plans for 626 million by 2020, nearly one camera for every two citizens (Hersey Reference Hersey2017; Russell Reference Russell2017). The result, Qiang (Reference Qiang2019) writes, is “the largest video-surveillance network in the world.”

Simultaneously, the CCP built a facial database that encompassed every adult citizen [...] and a DNA database [...]. The CCP’s facial recognition technology is employed for check-in and security at airports [...] train stations [...] and hotels [...].. In 2017, the CCP applied facial recognition technology to detect jaywalkers, with offenders notified via text message and their pictures displayed at major intersections [...]. This pervasive surveillance apparatus lets the CCP repress dissidents and spend less on public goods [...]. It also complements more analog forms of repression, such as informants and hired thugs [...]. Digital surveillance [in China] is now a conspicuous feature of everyday life.

[...] ** The CCP’s digital surveillance apparatus is supported by a network of domestic technology firms, which are subsidized by the state and routinely used as instruments of foreign policy**. The most general are Huawei and ZTE. Huawei is the world’s largest manufacturer of telecommunications equipment [...], and especially dominant in Africa, where it has provided 70% of the 5G network.

[...]

China has a number of more focused technology firms that are implicated in surveillance. Several of these specialize in video cameras and facial recognition software: Hikvision, Dahua, CloudWalk, Megvii, YITU, and SenseTime, most notably. Of these, Hikvision is perhaps the most consequential. In 2019, it was responsible for nearly a quarter of the world’s surveillance cameras [...].Dahua has also supplied cameras for Safe City projects, so called for their use of digital surveillance to support the local security apparatus [...]. Other firms specialize in still different areas of surveillance. Meiya Pico reportedly built an app used by the Chinese government to extract data from citizens’ smartphones during street checks [...]. iFlytek develops voice recognition software [...].

[...]

Huawei transfers are [...] more likely if the recipient government has a preexisting relationship with Beijing. The effects of these transfers [...] depend on political institutions in recipient countries. In autocracies, where the chief political threat to incumbents is collective action by citizens and institutional oversight is weak, Huawei transfers lead to an expansion of digital surveillance, internet shutdowns, internet filtering, and targeted arrests for online content. In democracies, where governments have stronger incentivizes to provide public goods, institutional oversight is stronger, and civil societies are more vibrant, Huawei transfers have no clear or consistent effect on digital repression.

[...]

Since Huawei is secretive about its contracts, our statistical estimates may be subject to measurement error. Huawei contracts, like other Chinese infrastructure contracts, routinely include confidentiality clauses [...], which prohibit recipient governments from divulging information about them. Consequently, our record of Huawei transfers may be incomplete, which would effectively include some treated countries in the control group. Since this would bias against our key results, our statistical estimates should be regarded as lower bounds, with the actual effect potentially larger. Third, Huawei’s secrecy means that we also lack fine-grained data about what its transfers entail.

[...]

Transfers that entail “Safe City” infrastructure, for instance, are almost certainly more likely to facilitate digital repression than contracts that focus on IT training for university students. Likewise, Huawei may be inclined to provide some recipient governments more direct personnel support than others, helping them overcome state capacity limitations that might otherwise prevent them from using technology transfers for digital repression.

[...]

Archived

A prominent Shanghai surgeon pointed to anaesthetics that do not put patients to sleep. A respected Beijing cardiologist questioned blood pressure medication that failed to regulate. A former editor at a leading online health platform went as far as to accuse domestic drugmakers of fraud.

The concerns became public discussions this past week when some top doctors and hospital leaders called on the government to change how it buys drugs for its public hospitals.

[...]

The outburst of scrutiny, unusual in a country where the authorities keep a tight grip on public criticism of the government, was a rebuke of Beijing’s campaign to lower medical costs. Officials are working to shore up China’s national healthcare system, which is under financial pressure in part because of a rapidly ageing population.

The policy, which was put in place in 2018, encourages fierce competition between drug manufacturers and has been successful at sharply driving down drug prices. But in 2025, foreign-branded drugs have been largely absent from the government list of medicines covered under China’s national health insurance and offered at public hospitals.

The change has effectively pushed out many foreign pharmaceutical companies that do not want to compete against Chinese companies willing to sell their drugs at rock-bottom prices.

[...]

Now, doctors are sounding the alarm about the efficacy of some of the domestic drugs. The doctors are seeking changes to give patients the choice to pay more for alternatives.

“There have always been grumblings that if you cut the price, manufacturers will cut corners,” said Ms Helen Chen, a managing partner and healthcare expert at L.E.K. Consulting in Shanghai.

“Now there are some public voices saying it is happening,” she added.

After years of failing to reduce costs, the government created a central bidding system that favoured cheaper medicines, which in most cases have been generics made by Chinese companies. In exchange, the government guaranteed to purchase more from each supplier.

Public hospitals account for about 70 per cent of China’s drug market. Patients who use private clinics have easier access to a wider choice of medication, including foreign brands.

[...]

“The numbers are exactly the same, down even to two decimal places,” wrote Dr Xia, former deputy editor-in-chief of Ding Xiang Doctor, a popular online forum for medical professionals.

“It’s Chinese generic drugs that have bad quality,” he said.

In a statement on Jan 24, a unit of China’s National Medical Products Administration acknowledged the duplicated data, saying it was the result of “editing errors when the relevant product information was disclosed”.

The issue has hit a raw nerve at a time when many people are feeling a sense of insecurity from China’s real estate downturn and sputtering consumer economy.

[...]

Cross-post da: https://beehaw.org/post/18183759

Archived

EU to continue WTO case against China’s restrictions on Lithuania over Beijing's alleged coercive activity following the opening of the Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius

The World Trade Organusation (WTO) case was opened in 2022 after China imposed restrictions on imports from Lithuania following the opening of the Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius.

In January 2024, it was reported that the EC had decided to temporarily suspend the proceedings, calling it “a procedural step taken for technical reasons related to the need to assess certain elements”.

Suspension means that the case is not formally closed, but that the proceedings are not ongoing. The proceedings may be suspended for a maximum of one year, after which the case is closed altogether if not renewed.

[...]

Before the EC announced its decision, Beijing issued a press release calling for talks and a solution to the problem.

“The door to dialogue is always open, and China is ready to strengthen communication and exchanges with Lithuania on the basis of respect and common approach and to seek ways to overcome the current situation while respecting the ‘one China’ principle,” Fang Mei, counsellor of the Chinese Mission to the European Union, was quoted in a commentary circulated to the media.

Archived

For the past few decades, China has boasted about its population as its defining strength for economic advancement and consolidating its global influence. But now the tides are turning.

[...]

China is grappling with a rapidly aging population that poses serious social and economic challenges. By 2050, the elderly (60 and above) will make up 33% of the population, up from 12% in 2010, making it the oldest population in the world. This shift drives healthcare costs and dependency ratios while creating labor shortages. These shortages are raising wages, which undermines the country’s economic competitiveness. Compounding the issue, China is aging relatively lowly, complicating its transition to a high-income economy.

The One-Child Policy has played a significant role in this crisis, leaving China with a “top-heavy" population pyramid where older generations outnumber younger ones. Fewer young people mean fewer caregivers for the elderly, both within families and the healthcare sector, and a shrinking workforce to sustain the economy. Gender imbalance is another consequence. Decades of sex-selective abortions and infanticide have led to 35 million more men than women, making it difficult for many men to marry and have children. Studies also indicate that the generation of only-child boys often faces behavioral issues, showing less trust, competitiveness, and conscientiousness compared to peers.

The economic implications are severe. A shrinking workforce slows growth and reduces tax revenues, while an expanding elderly population drives up pension costs. To manage this, China has increased the retirement age—from 60 to 63 for men, 55 to 58 for white-collar women, and 50 to 55 for blue-collar women. These changes aim to ease the strain on pensions but don’t fully resolve the challenges posed by a rapidly aging and shrinking population.

[...]

Archived

A forum in Bangkok this month underscored China’s ambition to work with local partners in Southeast Asia to impact public opinion there. A closer look at one of the propaganda vehicles meant to accomplish this goal suggests carelessness reigns down below such high-level exchanges.

On January 17, a high-profile forum on Sino-Thai cooperation in Bangkok brought together journalists, media specialists, and think tank researchers from both countries. Attended by former Thai deputy prime minister Pinit Jarusombat, who in retirement has become a regular on PRC state media to stress the importance of cultural ties, was also an opportunity for Beijing to outline its vision for media cooperation — which emphasizes the dominance of narratives in the favor of China’s leadership.

Pinit serves as president of the Thai-Chinese Cultural Relationship Council (泰中文化促进委员会), which was formed in 2020 as a platform for intergovernmental cooperation, and also as vice president of the Beijing-based International Confucian Association. He said the dialogue, called “Our Golden Friendship,” aspired to “promote the role of the media and think tanks to better connect people.”

But Pinit wasn’t the only VIP in the crowd. Gao Anming (高岸明), vice president and editor-in-chief for the China International Communications Group (中国外文局) run by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, was also there to outline China’s vision for media and communication. He described media outlets as “important platforms for disseminating information and channeling public opinion.” The latter phrase, emerging under Hu Jintao in 2008, refers to the CCP’s efforts to better direct public discourse toward the goals and agendas of China’s leadership. It is closely related to another term, “public opinion guidance” (舆论导向), which is a crucial phrase in the CCP’s vocabulary on press and information control in China.

Gao’s reference to “public opinion channeling” (引导舆论) in the context of think tanks and bilateral media cooperation suggested the focus — for China at least — was on manipulating the conversation over Thai-Chinese relations, and moving the agenda in China’s favored direction.

[...]

A simple WordPress-based website for China Report ASEAN offers English-language coverage emphasizing the benefits of Chinese infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia, including Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative. But a closer look at the publication’s online presence reveals an awkward oversight duplicated across the publication’s Facebook page, which has more than 500,000 followers, as well as its Youtube and X accounts. All of these accounts give “chinareportasean.com” as the outlet’s online address. Indeed, registration records indicate that the domain was first activated in 2017, the same year that China Report ASEAN was launched.

Before readers visit this web address, however, they may wish to know that it links not to China Report ASEAN but to a Chinese gambling site. China remains determined to impact global discourse and conduct effective international communication. But in the topsy turvy world of the CCP’s “external propaganda,” where everyone is anxious for results — strange things can happen.

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18199612

Archived

China’s DeepSeek AI model represents a transformative development in China’s AI capabilities, and its implications for cyberattacks and data privacy are particularly alarming. By leveraging DeepSeek, China is on its way to revolutionizing its cyber-espionage, cyberwarfare, and information operations.

[...]

DeepSeek’s advanced AI architecture, built on access to vast datasets and cutting-edge processing capabilities, is particularly suited for offensive cybersecurity operations and large-scale exploitation of sensitive information. It is designed to operate in complex and dynamic environments, potentially making it superior in applications like military simulations, geopolitical analysis, and real-time decision-making.

DeepSeek was founded by Liang Wenfeng, co-founder of High-Flyer, a quantitative hedge fund [...] Wenfeng developed DeepSeek cheaper and faster than U.S. companies by exploiting China’s vast datasets [...]

[...]

Wenfeng’s close ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) raises the specter of having had access to the fruits of CCP espionage, [...] Over the past decade, Chinese state-sponsored actors and affiliated individuals have come under heightened scrutiny for targeting U.S. AI startups, academic labs, and technology giants in attempts to acquire algorithms, source code, and proprietary data that power machine learning systems.

[...]

Within the U.S., several high-profile criminal cases have placed a spotlight on the theft of AI-related trade secrets. Although many investigations involve corporate espionage more generally, AI has become a particularly attractive prize due to its utility in strategic industries such as autonomous vehicles, facial recognition, cybersecurity, and advanced robotics.

One well-known incident involved alleged theft of autonomous vehicle technology at Apple’s secretive self-driving car project, where a Chinese-born engineer was accused of downloading large volumes of proprietary data shortly before planning to relocate to a Chinese competitor. In another case, a separate Apple employee was charged with attempting to smuggle similar self-driving car information out of the country. Both cases underscored the vulnerability of AI research to insider threats, as employees with privileged access to code or algorithms can quickly copy crucial files.

[...]

DeepSeek also poses a unique threat in the realm of advanced persistent threats (APTs) – long-term cyber-espionage campaigns often attributed to state actors. The model could be used to sift through massive volumes of encrypted or obfuscated data, correlating seemingly unrelated pieces of information to uncover sensitive intelligence. This might include classified government communications, corporate trade secrets, or personal data of high-ranking officials. DeepSeek’s ability to detect hidden patterns could supercharge such campaigns, enabling more precise targeting and greater success in exfiltrating valuable information.

DeepSeek’s generative capabilities add another layer of danger, particularly in the realm of social engineering and misinformation. For example, it could create hyper-realistic phishing emails or messages, tailored to individuals using insights derived from breached datasets. These communications could bypass traditional detection systems and manipulate individuals into revealing sensitive information, such as passwords or financial data. This is especially relevant given the growing use of AI in creating synthetic identities and deepfakes, which could further deceive targets into trusting malicious communications.

[...]

China’s already substantial surveillance infrastructure and relaxed data privacy laws give it a significant advantage in training AI models like DeepSeek. This includes access to domestic data sources as well as data acquired through cyber-espionage and partnerships with other nations.

[...]

DeepSeek has the potential to reshape the cyber-threat landscape in ways that disproportionately harm the U.S. and the West. Its ability to identify vulnerabilities, enhance social engineering, and exploit vast quantities of sensitive data represents a critical challenge to cybersecurity and privacy.

If left unchecked, DeepSeek could not only elevate China’s cyber capabilities but also redefine global norms around data privacy and security, with long-term consequences for democratic institutions and personal freedoms.

[...]

Archived

[...]

More than 200,000 people in Hong Kong live in sub-divided flats like [...], often cloaked in a musty odour and plagued by bedbugs during sweltering summers.

The former British colony [which has been ruled by China since 1997], ranked as the world's most unaffordable city for a 14th consecutive year by survey company Demographia, has one of the world’s highest rates of inequality.

[...]

Hong Kong aims to eliminate subdivided flats by 2049, a target set in 2021 by China’s top official overseeing the city. Beijing sees the housing woes as a serious social problem that helped fuel mass anti-government protests in 2019.

[...]

Still, Hong Kong's roughly 110,000 sub-divided flats have become notorious for high rents, with a median floor rate of HK$50 ($6.43) a square foot, a survey by non-government body the Society for Community Organization (SoCO) showed in 2022.

For so-called “coffin” homes, each roughly the size of a single bed, the rate is even higher, at HK$140, exceeding a rate of about HK$35 for private homes.

“All I hope for is to quickly get into public housing,” said Wong Chi-kong, 76, who pays HK$2,900 ($370) for a space smaller than 50 sq ft (5 sq m). His toilet sits right beside his bed and under the shower head.

[...]

About 1.4 million of Hong Kong’s population of about 7.5 million live in poverty, with the number of poor households rising to 619,000 in the first quarter of 2024, to account for about 22.7% of the total, says non-profit organisation Oxfam.

SoCO called for the new regulations to extend to “coffin” homes.

“This kind of bed homes is the shame of Hong Kong,” said its deputy director, Sze Lai-shan.

[...]

“The most important thing is having a roof over my head, not worrying about getting sunburnt or rained on,” said Sum, who gave only his last name.

Chan, 45, who pays rent of HK$2,100 a month for his 2 sq m (22 sq ft) home, said he hoped public housing would finally enable him to escape the bedbugs.

“I applied in 2005,” he said, providing only one name. “I have been waiting [for public housing] for 19 years.”

[...]

Addition:

Homelessness is defined differently around the world, making it difficult to compare the issue across countries.

Today, only 78 countries have official government data on Homelessness, according to the Institute of Global Homelessness (these countries are depicted in red on the map on the institute's website if you click the link). China does not provide such statistics for its mainland.

Also, methodologies as well as definitions of homelessness differ across countries. There are several internationally accepted methodologies for homeless data collection and efforts continue to standardize and improve enumeration for making data internationally comparable.

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/18153991

ShrimpMoss (虾苔) is a dataset designed for the abliteration (https://github.com/FailSpy/abliterator) of Chinese government-imposed censorship and/or propaganda from large language models developed in the PRC. It consists of a series of files of prompts (in .txt, .json, and .parquet format) in two groupings:

• china_bad_*: Contains a series of prompts likely to trigger censorship or propaganda actions in the model.
• china_good_*: Contains a series of prompts in the same general category of topics but which are designed to not touch on things likely to be censored.

Prompts are in a mix of English, Mandarin, and Cantonese.

[...]

This dataset was produced on Mistral NeMo, an Apache-licensed model with no restrictions on how its outputs can be used. It is free for all uses and users without restriction. All liability is disclaimed.

Production of this dataset is estimated to have had a carbon footprint of under 25 grams.

[...]

If successful, the move could provide Manila with one of its most influential platforms to challenge Beijing over its expansive South China Sea claims, reports China-based South China Morning Post (SCMP). A seat on the UNSC would allow Manila to spotlight China’s sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea, which conflict with the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone

[...]

Securing a seat on the Security Council would allow Manila to spotlight China’s sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea, which conflict with the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and international law.

While any resolutions targeting China would almost certainly be vetoed by Beijing, a permanent member of the council, the effort itself could have significant diplomatic impact.

“The votes would embarrass Beijing,” said SCMP cited Greg Poling, director of the Southeast Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, as saying.

[...]

The Philippines has a strong record to support its candidacy. Over six decades, it has contributed 14,000 troops to 21 UN peacekeeping missions and previously held a Security Council seat in 2004–2005.

Additionally, the Philippines has secured backing from its regional bloc, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Under a long-standing agreement, ASEAN members rotate their bids for non-permanent Security Council seats, and the Philippines’ turn has now arrived.

Additionally, it is likely to secure support of all Asean bloc members, who have agreed to support each other in a rotation on the UNSC.

[...]

Just wondering, officially communists are atheists. But there are still many temples inside China? Is that a contradiction? Also there are many more different faiths inside china:

• Muslims
• evangelical christians *…

How compatible are these with Confucianism? As far as I understand Confucianism is not really a religion? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confucianism

Archived

When Zhang Junjie was 17 he decided to protest outside his university about rules made by China's government. Within days he had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital and treated for schizophrenia.

Junjie is one of dozens of people identified by the BBC who were hospitalised after protesting or complaining to the authorities.

Many people we spoke to were given anti-psychotic drugs, and in some cases electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), without their consent.

While there have been reports for decades that hospitalisation is used in China as a way of detaining dissenting citizens without involving the courts, a leading Chinese lawyer has told the BBC that the issue - which legislation sought to resolve - has recently seen a resurgence.

Junjie says he was restrained and beaten by hospital staff before being forced to take medication.

[...]

"The doctors told me I had a very serious mental disease… Then they tied me to a bed. The nurses and doctors repeatedly told me, because of my views on the party and the government, then I must be mentally ill. It was terrifying," he told the BBC World Service. He was there for 12 days.

[...]

Just over a month after being discharged, Junjie was once again arrested. Defying a fireworks ban at Chinese New Year (a measure brought in to fight air pollution) he had made a video of himself setting them off. Someone uploaded it online and police managed to link it to Junjie.

[...]

He was accused of "picking quarrels and troublemaking" - a charge frequently used to silence criticism of the Chinese government. Junjie says he was forcibly hospitalised again for more than two months.

After being discharged, Junjie was prescribed anti-psychotic drugs. We have seen the prescription - it was for Aripiprazole, used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.

"Taking the medicine made me feel like my brain was quite a mess," he says, adding that police would come to his house to check he had taken it.

Fearing a third hospitalisation, Junjie decided to leave China. He told his parents he was returning to university to pack up his room - but, in fact, he fled to New Zealand.

He didn't say goodbye to family or friends.

[...]

Archived link

United Nations (UN) human rights experts have issued a communication letter to the Chinese government raising serious concerns about its recent history of human rights violations, in particular, its unlawful arrest and disappearance of rights defenders and individuals in Tibet and East Turkestan (Ch: Xinjiang). The communication highlights “recurring patterns of repression, including incommunicado detentions and enforced disappearances, which were intended to limit artistic, cultural, and religious expression, silence human rights defenders in these regions, and silence opposing or critical views.” The communication dated 14 November 2024 was made public on 14 January 2025.

In the communication, the experts called on the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to provide information on the fate and whereabouts of nine Tibetans, including Tsedo, Kori, Chugdar, Gelo, Bhamo, Lobsang Samten, Lobsang Trinley, Wangkyi, and Tsering Tashi. The communication also mentioned other human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, activists, and ethnic or religious minorities unlawfully imprisoned and disappeared.

Moreover, the experts questioned China about the facts and legal basis for the arrest, detention, charge, and sentence of the individuals mentioned above, along with whether their cases were classified as secret and the trials were closed. They explained how these actions conformed to China’s international human rights obligations.

[...]

Archived link

• Chinese WeChat messaging app, an integral part of everyday life in China, has emerged into a state surveillance tool
• Specific 'community groups' encocurage users to monitor and report their neighbors to authorities
• WeChat is used also abroad to spread Chinese propaganda and misinformation among Chinese-speaking communities

WeChat, often described as a digital “Swiss army knife,” is a super app operated by Tencent, one of China’s tech giants. Launched in 2011, it has become an integral part of everyday life in China, boasting over 1.3 billion monthly active users. While the app’s use for messaging, shopping, bill payments, and access to government services is well-known, its role in the digitalization of police services has been largely overlooked. This raises an important question: To what extent has WeChat become a policing platform for Chinese authorities?

WeChat as a State Surveillance Tool

WeChat’s role in state surveillance is well-documented, particularly its ability to filter and censor keywords and images on both its domestic and international versions. Like other Chinese communication platforms, the app must comply with strict domestic laws, regulations and guidelines that enforce censorship, data privacy, and propaganda requirements.

Censorship in China has a long history. In 1998, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) – the national law enforcement and public security authority – built the Great Firewall to ensure that the country’s economic modernization was accompanied by the suppression of free speech.

[...]

New regulations also hold internet companies legally responsible for real-time content moderation. This is in line with Xi Jinping’s 2016 speech at the Symposium on Cybersecurity and Informatization, during which he made it clear that internet companies must bear “primary responsibility” for content governance.

WeChat’s influence, however, extends beyond China. Researchers in Australia discovered that the app significantly shapes the political views of Chinese-speaking Australians. For instance, during the 2023 referendum on constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians through the creation of an advisory body called the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice, WeChat was one of the platforms used to spread misinformation, disinformation and fake news. This included content rooted in racism, conspiracy theories and colonial denial. Despite this, the app claims its services do not extend to Australia, with its representatives having refused to attend a Senate hearing on foreign interference on these grounds.

[...]

The app’s integration into government services began in 2015 when Li Keqiang – then a State Council minister – introduced the “Internet+” reforms. These reforms aimed to address China’s slowing economic growth by leveraging big data for market regulation, management and supervisory systems, and public service delivery.

[...]

For local police departments with limited resources, WeChat policing offered a quick and cost-effective way to meet government targets without significant investments in software updates.

[...]

Some cities even established “community policing” groups reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, encouraging citizens to monitor their neighbors and report suspicious behavior.

[...]

Today, WeChat is more than just a communications platform. It has become an essential part of China’s public security infrastructure, encompassing digitalized police services, and expanding surveillance capacities, with early reports on these already emerging.

Archived

The Government of Thailand must immediately halt the possible transfer of 48 Uyghurs to the People’s Republic of China, UN experts* said today, warning that the group was at real risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if they are returned.

“The treatment of the Uyghur minority in China is well-documented,” the experts said. “We are concerned they are at risk of suffering irreparable harm, in violation of the international prohibition on refoulement to torture.”

“The prohibition on refoulement prohibits the return or transfer in any manner whatsoever to a country where there is real risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” they recalled.

The experts urged Thailand to provide adequate and comprehensive medical care to the group of Uyghurs without delay.

The 48 Uyghurs are said to be part of a larger group of approximately 350 persons who were arrested in Thailand in 2014, after irregularly crossing the Thai border to seek protection in Thailand. It is alleged that they have been held in de facto incommunicado detention for over a decade, with no access to lawyers, family members, representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) or the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

[...]

Archived

International Communication Centers, or ICCs, have been sprouting up across China at a blistering rate since 2018. Tasked with leveraging local expertise and fusing traditional and new media to amplify the Party’s external propaganda, their story is one we have been following closely for years. But one part of the PRC has remained a grey area on the map — the part of the country perhaps most in need of positive spin, the far-western Xinjiang region.

Then, in late December 2024, Xinjiang’s branch of the Cyberspace Administration of China (网信新疆) announced the launch of the Xinjiang International Communication Center (新疆国际传播中心), housed in its own purpose-built offices in regional capital Urumqi.

[...]

A New Propaganda Nexus

Xinjiang Daily credits the new ICC with helping it to build a “matrix of foreign propaganda products.” One of the products they list is a website called Tianshan Net (天山网), which features videos from the new ICC and publishes content in English, Kazakh, Russian, and Uyghur. As we have written about before, China now conceives of external propaganda as an all-of-society effort pulling in various government and Party institutions. ICCs are not just production centers but hubs that serve to weave these different threads together.

[...]

Despite [...] efforts to reel in tourists with its “ethnic minorities” — majorities in much of the region — Xinjiang is best known internationally for subjecting its ethnically Turkic and predominantly Muslim population to what the UN calls crimes against humanity. More than anywhere else in the country, Xinjiang needs to refurbish its reputation. Yet while ICCs have spread throughout wealthier provinces to the east, Xinjiang has had most of its overseas propaganda created by outlets headquartered in Beijing like Xinhua and the People’s Daily.

[...]

Throughout 2024, Xinjiang’s government worked hard to cast off its poor reputation. In May, a special International Communication Research Center brought together members of the regional propaganda department to brainstorm new ways to “tell Xinjiang’s story well.” China’s annual World Media Summit also came to the regional capital [of Xinjiang], with executives from international news outlets like Reuters, AP, and CNN rubbing elbows with their counterparts at Xinhua, People’s Daily, and China Media Group.

[...]

Xinjiang’s ICC, despite the long wait and the lofty expectations ascribed to it, is unlikely to give us any new, innovative content. But it’s merely one more weapon in what they have called “a smokeless war” for global public opinion.

[...]