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Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett and former Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy talk with President Donald Trump as he arrives to address to a joint session of Congress on March 4, 2025. | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

On Friday, the Supreme Court released its long-awaited decision in Trump v. CASA, a case challenging President Donald Trump’s attempt to strip many Americans of citizenship. The Court handed Trump a narrow victory along party lines, with all six Republicans in the majority and all three Democrats dissenting.

The 14th Amendment provides that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States” are citizens, with one narrow exception that does not arise in CASA, so Trump’s executive order trying to strip many babies born in the US of their citizenship is clearly and unambiguously unconstitutional. Multiple lower courts have all reached this same conclusion.

There are three important takeaways from the CASA opinion:

1) It’s not actually about birthright citizenship

The specific issue was whether all the lower courts that struck down the Trump anti-citizenship order may issue a “nationwide injunction,” which would block that order everywhere in the country, or whether they must issue a more narrow injunction that only blocked it in certain states, or for certain families.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s majority opinion concludes that a nationwide injunction is not allowed…sort of. Much of the opinion is about why nationwide injunctions should be impermissible, but a key section suggests that, in this case, one might actually be okay.

Specifically, Barrett says that courts may issue injunctions that are broad enough to ensure that a victorious plaintiff receives “complete relief.” This matters because several of the plaintiffs in this case are blue states that object to Trump’s attempt to cancel many Americans’ citizenship. And they argued that it would be unworkable if birthright citizenship was the rule in some states, but not others.

As Barrett summarizes their arguments, “children often move across state lines or are born outside their parents’ State of residence.” Thus, a “‘patchwork injunction’ would prove unworkable, because it would require [the states] to track and verify the immigration status of the parents of every child, along with the birth State of every child for whom they provide certain federally funded benefits.”

In any event, Barrett does not ultimately say whether she finds this argument persuasive, instead concluding that “the lower courts should determine whether a narrower injunction is appropriate” in future proceedings. So the holding of CASA seems to be that universal injunctions should be rare, but they are permissible in some cases, including, possibly, this case.

2) The arguments against universal injunctions are serious

During the Biden administration, MAGA-aligned federal judges in Texas routinely handed down nationwide injunctions on highly dubious grounds. Indeed, this practice so frustrated Biden’s Justice Department that, even after Trump won the 2024 election, Biden’s solicitor general, Elizabeth Prelogar, filed a brief asking the justices to limit their use.

The best argument against these broad orders is that they place too much power in individual judges, and in plaintiffs who can often shape which judge hears their case. As Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote in a 2020 opinion, “there are currently more than 1,000 active and senior district court judges.”In a world with nationwide injunctions, plaintiffs can shop around for the one judge in America who is most likely to be sympathetic to their cause, and potentially secure a court order that no other judge would hand down.

The most immediate beneficiary of Friday’s decision is Trump, who will now get some relief from nationwide injunctions. And it’s notable that the Republican-controlled Supreme Court waited until a Republican was in the White House before cracking down. Nevertheless, the decision in CASA should also benefit future Democratic administrations, assuming that the GOP-controlled Court applies it fairly to presidents of both parties.

3) This decision does not mean that Trump will succeed in killing birthright citizenship

As mentioned above, Barrett leaves the door open to a nationwide injunction in this very case. She also suggests that opponents of Trump’s anti-citizenship order can bring a class action and obtain relief very similar to a nationwide injunction, although plaintiffs seeking to bring class actions must clear additional procedural bars.

The Court, in other words, resolved very little. It appears that nationwide injunctions are still allowed, at least some of the time. And they might even be allowed in this very case.

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From Vox via this RSS feed

A Somali baby is weighed on a scale before being given a vaccine.

The deadliest country in the world for young children is South Sudan — the United Nations estimates that about 1 in 10 children born there won’t make it to their fifth birthday.

But just a hundred years ago, that was true right here in the United States: Every community buried about a tenth of their children before they entered kindergarten. That was itself a huge improvement over 1900, when fully 25 percent of children in America didn’t make it to age 5. Today, even in the poorest parts of the world, every child has a better chance than a child born in the richest parts of the world had a century ago.

How did we do it? Primarily through vaccines, which account for about 40 percent of the global drop in infant mortality over the last 50 years, representing 150 million lives saved. Once babies get extremely sick, it’s incredibly hard to get adequate care for them anywhere in the world, but we’ve largely prevented them from getting sick in the first place. Vaccines eradicated smallpox and dramatically reduced infant deaths from measles, tuberculosis, whooping cough, and tetanus. And vaccines not only make babies likelier to survive infancy but also make them healthier for the rest of their lives.

Robert F. Kennedy Jr., unfortunately, disagrees. President Donald Trump’s secretary of health and human services (HHS), a noted vaccine skeptic who reportedly does not really believe the scientific consensus that disease is caused by germs, recently announced the US will pull out of Gavi, an international alliance of governments and private funders (mainly the Gates Foundation) that works to ensure lifesaving vaccinations reach every child worldwide. His grounds? He thinks Gavi doesn’t worry enough about vaccine safety (he does not seem to acknowledge any safety concerns associated with the alternative — dying horribly from measles or tuberculosis).The Trump administration had already slashed its contribution to Gavi as part of its gutting of lifesaving international aid programs earlier this year, leaving any US contributions in significant doubt. But if Kennedy’s latest decision holds, it now appears that the US will contribute nothing to this crucial program.

The US is one of many funders of Gavi, historically contributing about 13 percent of its overall budget. In 2022, we pledged $2.53 billion for work through 2030, a contribution that Gavi estimates was expected to save about 1.2 million lives by enabling wider reach with vaccine campaigns.

That’s an incredibly cost-effective way to save lives and ensure more children grow into healthy adults, and it’s a cost-effective way to reduce the spread of diseases that will also affect us here in the US. Diseases don’t stay safely overseas when we allow them to spread overseas. Measles is highly contagious, and worldwide vaccination helps keep American children safe, too. Tuberculosis is becoming increasingly resistant to antibiotics, which makes it harder and more expensive to treat, and widespread vaccination (so that people don’t catch it in the first place) is the best tool to ensure dangerous new strains don’t develop.

It is genuinely hard to describe how angry I am about the casual endangerment of more than a million people because Kennedy apparently thinks measles vaccines are more dangerous than measles is. The American people should be furious about it, too. If other funders aren’t able to cover the difference, an enormous number of children will pointlessly die because the US secretary of health and human services happens to be wildly wrong about how diseases work.

But the blame won’t end with him. It will also fall on everyone else in the Trump administration, and on the senators who approved his appointment in the first place even when his wildly wrong views were widely known, for not caring enough about children dying to have objected.

We’re destroying the greatest achievements of our civilization for no reason

Kennedy, it’s worth noting, is not even a long-standing Trump loyalist. He’s a kook who hitched his wagon to the Trump train a few months before the election. He doesn’t have a huge constituency; it wouldn’t have taken all that much political courage for senators to ask for someone else to lead HHS. A lot of his decisions are likely to kill people — from his decision to ban safe, tested food dyes and instead encourage the use of food dyes some people are severely allergic to because they’re “natural” to his courtship of American anti-vaxxers and his steps to undermine accurate guidance on American child vaccination.

Trump could still easily override Kennedy on Gavi, if Trump cared about mass death. But if it holds, pulling out of Gavi is likely to be Kennedy’s deadliest decision — at least so far. He reportedly may not believe that AIDS is caused by HIV, either, and he can surpass the death toll of this week’s decision if he decides to act on that conviction by gutting our AIDS programs in the US and globally.

But whether or not the Gavi withdrawal is the deadliest, it certainly stands out for its sheer idiocy. (The Gates Foundation is going to heroic lengths to close the funding gap, and individual donors matter, too: You can donate to Gavi here.)

None of this should have been allowed to happen. Since Kennedy’s confirmation vote in the Senate passed by a narrow margin with Mitch McConnell as the sole Republican opposing the nomination, every single other Republican senator had the opportunity to prevent it from happening — if they were willing to get yelled at momentarily for demanding that our health secretary understand how diseases work.

I am glad the United States does not have the child mortality rates of South Sudan. I’m glad that even South Sudan does not have the child mortality rates of our world in 1900. I’m glad the United States participated in the worldwide eradication of smallpox, and I was glad that we paid our share toward Gavi until the Trump administration slashed funding earlier this year. I’m even glad that mass death is so far in our past that it’s possible for someone to be as deluded about disease as Kennedy is.

But I am very, very sick of seeing the greatest achievements of our civilization, and the futures of a million children, be ripped to shreds by some of the worst people in politics — not because they have any alternative vision but because they do not understand what they are doing.

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A grizzly bear and her cub traverse a steep hillside in June 2024. in Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming.

In the early 1900s, long before smartphones and selfie sticks, tourists flocked to Yellowstone National Park — not for the geysers or scenery, but for a grotesque show: A nightly spectacle of grizzly bears raiding cafeteria scraps from open-pit landfills like desperate, starving pirates.

The bears were in dangerous proximity to humans: Hungry bears tore at open car windows. Tourists posed a little too close with their film cameras. Yellowstone park rangers logged dozens of injuries each year — nearly 50 on average.

Eventually, the Park Service ended the nightly landfill shows: feeding wild animals human food wasn’t just dangerous, it was unnatural. Bears, ecologists argued, should eat berries, nuts, elk — not leftover Twinkies. In 1970, the park finally shut down the landfills for good.

By then, though, grizzlies were in deep trouble. As few as 700 remained in the lower 48 states, down from the estimated 50,000 that once roamed the 18 Western states. Decades of trapping, shooting, and poisoning had brought them to the brink. The ones that clung to survival in Yellowstone National Park learned to take what scraps they could get and when they were forced to forage elsewhere, it didn’t go so well.

More bears died. Their already fragile population in the Yellowstone region dipped to fewer than 250, though one publication says the number could have been as low as 136, according to Frank van Manen, who spent 14 years leading the US Geological Survey’s grizzly bear study team and now serves as an emeritus ecologist.

The Yellowstone bears had been trained to rely on us. And when we cut them off, their population tanked.

And so in 1975, the US Fish and Wildlife Service placed grizzly bears on the endangered species list, the country’s most powerful legal mechanism to stave off extinction.

The grizzly’s place on the list afforded them some important protections under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Hunting was off limits, as was trapping or poisoning, and the listing included rigorous habitat protections. Grizzlies slowly came back.

Today, more than 1,000 grizzly bears live in and around Yellowstone alone, and tourists who visit the park by the millions every year can observe the bears — no longer desperately feeding on trash but lumbering in and out of meadows with their trailing cubs, or sitting on their haunches feasting on elk carcasses.

The recovery effort was a major success, but it’s brought a whole new slate of issues.

In recent years, grizzlies have spilled out of their stronghold in the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem — a broad swath of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming — and into human territory, where coexistence gets messy. In 2024 alone, more than 60 grizzlies were killed in Wyoming, most of them lethally removed by wildlife officials after killing cattle, breaking into cabins and trash cans, or lingering in residential neighborhoods.

It’s the classic species recovery paradox: the more bears succeed and their populations expand, the more trouble they get into with humans.

And now, a controversial debate rages over whether or not to delist the grizzly bear. No species is meant to be a permanent resident on the Endangered Species List. The whole point of the ESA is to help species recover to the point where they’re no longer endangered. A delisting would underscore that the grizzlies didn’t just scrape by in the Yellowstone area — they exceeded every population requirement in becoming a thriving, self-sustaining population of at least 500 bears.

But to remove federal protection would mean grizzly bears would face increasing threats to their survival at a time when some biologists argue the species’ recovery is shaky at best.

The stakes here are bigger than just the grizzly bear alone  — what happens next is about proving that the ESA works, and that sustained recovery is possible, and that ESA protection leads to progress. Because if a species like the grizzly, which has met every biological benchmark, still can’t graduate from the list, then what is the list for?

“The [ESA] is literally one of the strictest wildlife protection laws in the world…but in order for people to buy into it, they have to have respect for it,” says Kelly Heber Dunning, a University of Wyoming professor who studies wildlife conflict. “If it starts to be seen as…part of the culture war, that buy-in will go away.”

What’s the Endangered Species Act for anyway?

Since President Donald Trump has taken office, the Republican Party’s assault on the Endangered Species Act hasn’t been subtle.

The Fix Our Forests Act — which sounds like it attempts a wildfire and forest health solution — actually fast-tracks large-scale logging at the expense of fragile ecosystems and imperiled species. Trump allies in Congress, like Colorado Rep. Lauren Boebert with the Pet and Livestock Protection Act, flagrantly prioritize political agendas over science, according to the nonprofit National Resources Defense Council. The House Natural Resources Committee has also suggested weakening the Marine Mammal Protection Act with an apparent intent to unravel protections for species like the North Atlantic right whale and the Gulf of Mexico Rice’s whale. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum has called to remove “burdensome regulations” standing in the way of Trump’s desire to unleash America’s energy potential. Project 2025, the conservative playbook, even explicitly calls to delist the grizzly bear.

But ironically, to prevent a full unraveling of one of the world’s most powerful protections for wildlife and wild places, conservationists need to grapple with the mission creep of the ESA.

When Republican President Richard Nixon signed the Endangered Species Act in 1973, the country’s wildlife had been in a century-long nosedive. After decades of habitat destruction, unregulated hunting and industrial expansion, federal officials had already flagged more than 70 species at risk of extinction — with many more lining up behind them.

In the decades that followed, the ESA proved to be one of the most powerful conservation tools in the world. More than 50 species, including the Canada goose and bald eagle, thrived with their newfound federal protections and were later delisted; another 56 species were downgraded from endangered to threatened. But others, like the black-footed ferret, Houston toad and the red wolf, for example, remain endangered — even after almost 60 years of federal attention.

Today the act protects more than 2,300 plant and animal species in the US and abroad. And still more wait in line, as overworked federal biologists triage petitions amid dwindling resources, aggressive layoffs and budget cuts.

But when it comes to the grizzly bear, the debate has become bigger than just biology — it’s become a referendum on what the Endangered Species Act is for, says David Willms, a National Wildlife Federation associate vice president and adjunct faculty at the University of Wyoming.

“The ESA is a science-based act,” he says. “You have a species that is struggling, and you need to recover it and make it not struggle anymore. And based on the best available science at the end of the day, you’re supposed to delist a species if it met those objectives.”

Animals in the political crosshairs

The Endangered Species Act is at odds with President Donald Trump’s plan to “unleash American energy.” His administration has even proposed to rescind the definition of “harm” under the ESA. But as broader attacks on the law play out, consequential battles are being waged on individual species. Read the following stories to learn more:

Black-footed ferrets: This animal is on the edge of extinction. Trump just fired the people trying to save it.

The delta smelt: Why does Trump hate this tiny fish so much?

The dunes sagebrush lizard: The tiny lizard that will test Trump’s “drill, baby, drill” agenda

Lesser prairie chicken: Trump officials are trying to yank this animal’s last shot at survival

Monarch butterflies: The fate of this beloved creature is in Trump’s hands

Red wolves: Less than 20 red wolves remain in the wild. We had a plan to save them.

The trouble begins when species linger on the list indefinitely, not because they haven’t recovered but because of what might happen next, out of fears of possible future threats.

But the ESA was only meant to safeguard against “reasonably foreseeable future threats,” Willms argues. Congress has the ability to protect species indefinitely —  like it did for wild horses under the 1971 Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act or for numerous species of birds under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. But those were specific, deliberate laws.

“If there are other reasons why somebody or groups of people think grizzly bears should be protected forever, then that is a different conversation than the Endangered Species Act,” he says.

But this power works in the opposite direction, too. If grizzly bears stay on the list for too long, Congress may well decide to delist the species, as lawmakers did in 2011 when they removed gray wolves from the endangered species list in Montana and Idaho.

Those kinds of decisions happen when people living alongside recovered species, especially the toothy, livestock-loving kind, spend enough time lobbying their state’s lawmakers, says Dunning, the wildlife conflict researcher.

When Congress steps in, science tends to step out. A political delisting doesn’t just sideline biologists, it sets a precedent, one that opens the potential for lawmakers to start cherry-picking species they see as obstacles to grazing, logging, drilling, or building. The flamboyant lesser prairie chicken has already made the list of legislative targets.

“Right now, the idea of scientific research has lost its magic quality,” she says. “We get there by excluding people and not listening to their voices and them feeling like they’re not part of the process.”

And when people feel excluded for too long, she says, the danger isn’t just that support for grizzly bears will erode. It’s that the public will to protect any endangered species might start to collapse.

The case for delisting the grizzly

For Dan Thompson, Wyoming’s large carnivore supervisor, the question of delisting grizzlies is pretty simple: “Is the population recovered with all the regulatory mechanisms in place and data to support that it will remain recovered?” he says. “If the answer is yes, then the answer to delisting is yes.”

That’s why Thompson believes it’s time to delist the grizzly. And he’s not alone. The Greater Yellowstone ecosystem population is “doing very well,” says van Manen. In fact, grizzlies met their recovery goals about20 years ago.

Getting there wasn’t easy. After the landfills closed and the bear population plummeted, it took a massive, decades-long effort from states, tribes, federal biologists, and nonprofits to bring the grizzlies back. The various entities funded bear-proof trash systems for people living in towns near the national parks and strung electric fences around tempting fruit orchards. They developed safety workshops for people living in or visiting bear country, and tracked down poachers.

And little by little, it worked. Bear numbers swelled, and by the mid-2000s, more than 600 bears roamed the Yellowstone area.

Given this success, the US Fish & Wildlife Service proposed delisting the grizzlies for the first time in late 2005. Environmental groups sued, arguing bears needed continued federal protection as whitebark pine, an important food source, diminished. Bears could starve, groups maintained, and their populations could plummet again. But a subsequent federal study of what, exactly, grizzly bears eat, found that while grizzlies do munch whitebark pine seeds during bumper years, they don’t depend on the trees to survive. In fact, grizzlies consume no fewer than 266 species of everything from bison and mice to fungi and even one type of soil.

“Grizzly bears are incredibly opportunistic and use their omnivorous traits to shift to other food sources,” says van Manen. So losing one food — even a high-calorie one — did little to change the population.

The move to delist them paused as the federal government addressed the federal court’s concerns, including researching the grizzly bear’s diet.

And bear numbers kept climbing. In 2016, the Fish and Wildlife Service — under President Barack Obama — updated delisting requirements including more expansive habitat protections, stricter conflict prevention, and enhanced monitoring. The agency then proposed a delisting. The following year — under Trump — it delisted the grizzly bear.

This time the Crow Indian Tribe sued and — determining in part that delisting grizzlies in the Yellowstone region threatened the recovery of other populations of grizzlies — a federal judge overturned the government’s decision to delist the bears and placed them back on the list. In 2022, Wyoming petitioned the Fish and Wildlife Service to delist bears in the Yellowstone region. The service took a few years to analyze the issue, and then this January, days before the Biden administration ended, it issued a response to that petition: Grizzly bears would stay on the Endangered Species List.

All of these years of back and forth reflected the change in how the federal government viewed the grizzly population, largely a result of the bear’s own success. The Yellowstone region’s bears, they argued, are no longer distinct from bear populations in northern Montana, Idaho, and Washington. And because northern populations haven’t met the recovery benchmarks yet (with the exception of a population in and around Glacier National Park), the species as a whole is not yet recovered.

But the goalposts for delisting grizzlies keep moving, Thompson told Vox.

Grizzly bears would still be managed even after a delisting. States would be responsible for them, and — miracle of miracles — state and federal agencies actually agreed on how to manage grizzlies after ESA protections end.

Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana are committed to maintaining between 800 and 950 grizzly bears if the creature ever leaves the endangered species list. And states like Wyoming know how to manage grizzly bears because for years, under the supervision of the feds, they’ve been doing the gritty, ground-level work. Wyoming’s wildlife agency, for example, traps and relocates conflict bears (or kills problem bears if allowed by the Fish and Wildlife Service), knocks on doors to calm nervous landowners, hands out bear spray, and reminds campers not to cook chili in their tents.

Despite all that, “nobody trusts us,” Thompson, with Wyoming’s state wildlife agency, said. “There’s always going to be a way to find a reason for [grizzlies] not to be delisted.”

Delisting now might be the right decision. It would still be a gamble

Even though grizzly bears may be thriving in numbers, they’re not ready to go it alone, says Matt Cuzzocreo, interim wildlife program manager for the Greater Yellowstone Coalition Grizzlies.

The Greater Yellowstone Coalition has spent millions of dollars over the past few decades helping bears and humans more successfully coexist. But whatever comes next needs to build on the past 50 years of working with locals. As bears expand into new territory, they’re crossing into areas where residents aren’t used to securing garbage and wouldn’t know how to respond to 600-pound predators ambling down back roads or into neighborhoods.

Simply removing bears from the list and handing management to the states, which is the default after a species delisting, isn’t enough, says Chris Servheen — not when so much is still in flux. Servheen, who led the Fish and Wildlife Service’s recovery program for 35 years, helped write the previous two recovery plans. He says a delisting could leave them dangerously exposed.

“Politicians are making decisions on the fate of animals like grizzly bears and taking decisions out of the hands of biologists,” Servheen says.

Montana and Idaho, Servheen points out, already allow neck-snaring and wolf trapping just outside Yellowstone’s borders — traps that also pose a lethal threat to grizzlies. And now, the Trump administration has slashed funding for the very biologists and forest managers tasked with protecting wildlife.

Once states take over, many are expected to push for grizzly hunting seasons, and some, like Wyoming, have already set grizzly bear hunting regulations for when the creatures are no longer protected. Layer that on top of existing threats — roadkill, livestock conflicts, illegal kills — and it’s easy to imagine a swift population slide.

“It’s a perfect storm for grizzlies,” Servheen says. “We’re seeing attacks on public land agencies, the sidelining of science, predator-hostile politicians muscling into wildlife decisions, and relentless pressure from private land development. Walking away from the grizzly now — after all we’ve invested — just feels like the worst possible timing.”

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Justice Neil Gorsuch, the author of the Court’s new attack on Medicaid, shakes hands with Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. | Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images

Federal law says that “any individual eligible for medical assistance” from a state Medicaid program may obtain that care “from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required.” In other words, all Medicaid patients have a right to choose their doctor, as long as they choose a health provider competent enough to provide the care they seek.

On Thursday, however, the Republican justices ruled, in Medina v. Planned Parenthood, that Medicaid patients may not choose their health provider. And then they went much further. Thursday’s decision radically reorders all of federal Medicaid law, rendering much of it unenforceable. Medina could prove to be one of the most consequential health care decisions of the last several years, and one of the deadliest, as it raises a cloud of doubt over countless laws requiring that certain people receive health coverage, as well as laws ensuring that they will receive a certain quality of care.

All three of the Court’s Democrats dissented.

Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opinion in Medina is a trainwreck of legal reasoning. It’s hard to think of a principled reason why, two years after the Court took a much more expansive approach to Medicaid law in Health and Hospital Corporation v. Talevski (2023), the Republican justices abruptly decided to reverse course. It is easy, however, to see a political reason for the Medina decision.

The plaintiff in Medina, after all, is Planned Parenthood, an abortion provider Republicans love to hate. Medina involved South Carolina’s attempt to forbid Medicaid patients from choosing Planned Parenthood as their health provider, a policy that violates federal law.

In an apparent attempt to spite Planned Parenthood, the Republican justices have now effectively repealed that law. This is not aberrant behavior from this Court’s Republican majority.

Four years ago, before the Court overruled Roe v. Wade and eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, the justices considered a Texas law which permitted private bounty hunters to sue abortion providers and collect bounties of at least $10,000 from them. The Texas law was an obvious attempt to cut off abortion rights in violation of Roe, but five of the Republican justices joined an opinion by Gorsuch, which held that this sort of law could not be challenged in federal court because, Gorsuch claimed, abortion providers must wait until after they are hauled into court by a bounty hunter to assert their rights.

Medina fits within the same legal tradition. When a case involves abortion providers, the Court’s Republican majority is frequently willing to twist the law into any shape necessary to ensure that the abortion providers lose.

What was the specific legal issue in Medina?

A federal law known as “Section 1983” lets state officials be sued if they deprive someone of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” This is arguably the most important civil rights law ever enacted by Congress. Without it, many federal laws and constitutional provisions would be unenforceable.

Medina turns on Section 1983’s reference to “rights” protected by federal law. Past Supreme Court decisions establish that not all federal laws create a right that can be enforced under Section 1983 and so the Court has developed a set of rules to determine which laws do.

Before Thursday’s decision in Medina, the key case laying out this framework was Talevski. Talevski held that a federal law creates enforceable rights when it is “‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited’ and contains ‘rights-creating,’ individual-centric language with an ‘unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’”

Thus, before Thursday, the key question was whether a law’s text focuses on the individuals who benefit. A hypothetical federal law which provides that “no state may prevent a hungry person from eating at Taco Bell” would be enforceable, under Talevski, because this hypothetical law centers the people who benefit from it (people who are hungry). A similar statute stating that “states shall not impede access to cheap burritos” would likely not be enforceable under Talevski, because it does not mention who is supposed to benefit from these burritos.

Under Talevski, Medina is an easy case, and it should have ended in a 9-0 victory for Planned Parenthood. Here is the relevant statutory language from the Medina case:

A State plan for medical assistance must … provide that … any individual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required (including an organization which provides such services, or arranges for their availability, on a prepayment basis), who undertakes to provide him such services.

This law is full of the kind of “individual-centric language” demanded by Talevski. It provides a right to “any individual.” It provides that these individuals “may obtain” care from their chosen provider. And it concludes with a pronoun (“him”) which refers back to the individuals who benefit from this law.

There is simply no way to reconcile Gorsuch’s Medina opinion with Talevski.

So how does Gorsuch try to get around Talevski?

The Republican justices largely try to get around Talevski by ignoring it, or by misrepresenting what it said. Notably, the key words laying out Talevski’s legal rule — that federal laws are enforceable through private lawsuits if they are “phrased in terms of the persons benefited” — appear nowhere in Gorsuch’s opinion.

Instead, Gorsuch introduces some new principles into federal Medicaid law that are likely to confuse judges who must apply his decision to other provisions of the Medicaid statute.

In its brief, for example, South Carolina suggested that a federal law must use the magic word “right,” or it is unenforceable under Section 1983. Gorsuch’s opinion doesn’t go quite this far, but it does repeatedly point out that the provision of Medicaid law at issue in Talevski, which the Court held to be enforceable, uses this magic word in its text.

Unlike Talevski, however, Medina does not articulate a clear legal rule which lower court judges can apply to other provisions of Medicaid law. It does not even explicitly overrule Talevski. Instead, Gorsuch mostly just points to some random features of the law at issue in Medina, and then leaves readers to guess how to determine which Medicaid laws are still enforceable.

Gorsuch, for example, finds it quite significant that a different provision of federal Medicaid law allows states to exclude some providers who are convicted of a felony from their Medicaid program — a fact that is completely irrelevant under Talevski. He also notes that the provision at issue in Medina “appears in a subsection titled ‘Contents.’”

It’s hard to understand how this title is relevant. Moreover, this segment of Gorsuch’s opinion appears to conflict with the explicit text of a federal law, which states that a provision of Medicaid law “is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section…specifying the required contents of a State plan.”

Gorsuch also includes an ominous line suggesting that, in the future, his Court will read Medicaid laws very narrowly: “Though it is rare enough for any statute to confer an enforceable right,” Gorsuch claims, “spending-power statutes like Medicaid are especially unlikely to do so.”

Thursday’s decision, in other words, is likely to have sweeping implications for low-income Americans’ health care, even if it was handed down solely to wound Planned Parenthood. Federal Medicaid law is riddled with provisions governing how states must operate their Medicaid programs, including requirements governing who must be covered, and rules governing patient safety. The Talevski case, for example, concerned a law which prohibits nursing homes from using psychotropic drugs “for purposes of discipline or convenience” when they are “not required to treat the resident’s medical symptoms.” Under Medina, many of these laws may now be rendered unenforceable.

It should be noted that, even under Gorsuch’s decision, there is still one possible way to enforce the law permitting Medicaid patients to choose their health providers — the federal government could cut off some or all Medicaid funding to South Carolina. Realistically, however, this remedy would only make matters worse. It does not help Medicaid patients to take away their funding, and so the federal government has historically been exceedingly reluctant to use this blunderbuss of an enforcement mechanism.

After Medina, that means that much of federal Medicaid law may effectively cease to function.

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Factory farming is a particularly wicked problem to solve.

It’s a moral atrocity, involving the confinement and slaughter of hundreds of billions of animals globally each year. It’s a blight on the environment. It’s terrible for slaughterhouse workers, many of whom suffer from PTSD, anxiety, or depression. Yet factory farming produces something almost everyone wants and that has become culturally, economically, and politically entrenched: cheap meat, milk, and eggs.

Despite strong public concern for cruelty to farmed animals and large swathes of Americans telling pollsters that they’re trying to cut back on meat, we keep eating more of it. And research has shown that it’s nearly impossible to persuade most people otherwise. But a new study, which hasn’t yet been published and is currently under review at an academic journal, might complicate that consensus.

Learning how the sausage gets made

In the experiment, University of Toronto professors Lisa Kramer and Peter Landry recruited 1,149 students and separated them into two groups. One group watched a 16-minute clip from the harrowing animal rights documentary Dominion about the treatment of pigs in meat production, while a control group watched a video about the role mushrooms play in forest ecosystems.

In surveys taken before the study, immediately after watching the video, and a week later, participants were asked to choose a protein — bacon, chicken, steak, tofu, or none — to add to a meal.

Before watching the video, 90.1 percent of students chose meat in their meal; a week after watching the video, 77.9 percent did — a 12.2 percent decline. Demand for pork, specifically, fell more sharply.

“Turns out, it’s harder to order meat after watching Dominion,” Seth Ariel Green, a research scientist at Stanford University’s Humane and Sustainable Food Lab, wrote in a blog about the study. “And it’s especially harder to order pork after watching the segment on pigs.” (Green didn’t work on the study but did provide the authors feedback on its design.)

Plenty of researchers have shown videos similar to Dominion to study participants and found little to no effect. So what made this one different? Kramer and Landry say it could simply be the high-quality nature of the film.

It was filmed in high definition and artfully edited, with close-up shots of distressed pigs, while most other factory farm footage is low-quality and shaky. It’s a disturbing and unflinching look at industrial pig farming, though the narrator — actor Rooney Mara — speaks with a flat tone, as she carefully guides the viewer through practices that, on their face, should be illegal but are common and lawful. Some of those practices include:

Confining pigs in tiny crates for virtually their entire livesSlamming runt piglets head-first into concrete as a form of cheap euthanasiaRemoving piglets’ tails, teeth, and testicles without pain reliefUsing carbon dioxide gas chambers to knock pigs unconscious prior to slaughter, which can cause extreme suffering

What’s more, the clip that participants watched makes no appeal for them to eat less meat or more plant-based foods, leaving viewers to come to their own conclusions. “The task of connecting the experiences of pigs on industrial-scale farms (as depicted in the video) to one’s own consumption choices is left entirely to the viewer,” Kramer and Landry wrote in the paper. (A lot of studies on the impacts of factory-farming documentaries use advocacy videos that directly ask the viewer to eat less meat.)

The study certainly has limits. For one, the average participant was 22 years old and participants skewed slightly female; young people and women are both groups that are more likely to be concerned about cruelty to farmed animals. And it only followed the participants for one week after the experiment.

Lastly, researchers didn’t track what participants actually ate. Instead, the students indicated which protein they would add to a meal, with the understanding that they had a roughly 50 percent chance of winning a voucher for the meal they chose at a university cafeteria. At first, this struck me as a poor proxy for real-world behavior. But the researchers noted thatanother study that used a similar voucher approach and tracked what students actually ate found little discrepancy.

All this suggests that persuading individuals to eat less meat — a goal that many in the animal advocacy movement have largely given up on — might not be as hopeless as previously thought.

Why animal rights groups largely gave up on trying to change people’s diets

The University of Toronto study results pleasantly surprised Green, who researches how to move society away from factory farming. For a time, he had been convinced that efforts to persuade people to eat less meat — especially with appeals to animal welfare — were ineffective.

His beliefs were informed by his research: Late last year, he and some colleagues published a meta-analysis, which is currently under peer review, looking at more than three dozen rigorous studies designed to persuade people to eat less meat. Overall, the studies found little to no effect. (It’s worth noting, however, that a few studies involving much lengthier interventions, like reading an essay and joining a 50-minute group discussion or sitting through a lecture, have demonstrated sizable effects).

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Green’s findings align with a change in the animal rights movement that took hold around a decade ago.

Since the 1970s, animal advocates have poured a lot of resources into persuading people to go vegetarian or vegan. Organizations ran expensive advertising campaigns, handed out millions of pamphlets at universities, lectured in classrooms, and penned letters to the editor and op-eds in newspapers, among many other tactics. But in spite of all the effort, American meat consumption kept rising.

By 2015, the largest animal advocacy organizations were shifting their focus toward political and corporate campaigns to ban some of the most egregious factory-farm practices, like tiny cages for pigs and egg-laying hens. Some groups also advocated for technological change — namely, making plant-based meat taste better, more affordable, and more widely available. The idea was that instead of trying to influence one person at a time, which had proven so difficult, they’d instead change the food system.

The pivot produced a lot of tangible progress for animals: Over a dozen states have restricted cages for farmed animals, and plant-based meat tastes better and is more widely available than ever. But I’ve wondered whether animal advocates have given up on public persuasion too soon, and in turn, made it harder to maintain their hard-won institutional and technological progress.

Progress won through corporate or political campaigns might struggle to withstand backlash “if there isn’t also culture change happening and people’s attitudes shifting” about factory farming, Laura Driscoll, a social scientist who works at the Stray Dog Institute — a foundation that funds groups working to reform the food system — told me.

For example, plant-based meat sales jumped significantly between the late 2010s and early 2020s, but they’ve recently dipped back down. There might be a bigger market for these products, and more consumers might be immune to the fallacious argument that they’re overly processed, if more people were persuaded of the ills of factory farming.

Some states are now rolling back animal welfare laws that advocates had previously persuaded them to adopt, while some members of Congress are pushing to eliminate all state-level cage bans. Many food companies that pledged to eliminate eggs from caged hens in their supply chain aren’t following through. In the absence of a broader base of voters and consumers who see factory farming as an important social issue, corporations and politicians know they can backslide without much resistance.

The art of persuasion

Compared to straightforward metrics like how many pigs are still trapped in cages, culture change is “harder to understand and harder to measure,” Driscoll said, so it’s hard to know how much animal rights groups should invest in it. And if it works, it takes a lot of time and repeated exposure to get there. A study participant may not alter their meat consumption after watching one video or reading an essay, but they might change over time if they hear about it enough — and hear persuasive messages that appeal to them.

Currently, people are receiving very few messages about factory farming or meat reduction, as it’s rarely covered in the news or discussed by politicians. Videos about the issue hardly ever go viral, and animal advocacy groups have pulled back from education and persuasion.

Meanwhile, as Green told me, consumers are inundated with messages telling them to eat more meat. Some of those messages are explicit, like fast food advertisements or influencers telling us we need more (animal) protein, to implicit ones, like recipe videos on social media or our friends and family members eating a standard American diet rich in meat. Meat companies also mislead consumers to believe farmed animals are treated much better than they actually are.

It’s hard to imagine the public making meaningful reductions in meat consumption or advocating for significant changes to factory farming in this political, social, and information ecosystem. As researchers are prone to saying, more research is needed to know what could persuade more people on this issue: “There’s just not that much great research out there,” Green said. “If you’re a researcher in this field and you want to make a contribution, it’s not that hard to be the first person to do something.”

The case for both dietary change and meat industry reforms can be made persuasively. Based on the Dominion study, it might only take 16 minutes of an unvarnished look into factory farms for it to break through to some people. In today’s crowded attention environment, capturing those 16 minutes of people’s time will be harder than ever, but Green said it’s still worth the effort.

“I think that persuasion is a beautiful thing where we try to convince people using reason and argument, and take them seriously” as moral agents, he said. “I do not want to give up on this.”

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From Vox via this RSS feed

In small US towns, emergency fire and ambulance first responder agencies are still mostly staffed by volunteers — a practice that was put in place in the 1970s and 1980s. But these volunteers are increasingly older, with fewer young people signing up than in previous decades.

Higher cost of living and a diminishing rural population have made volunteering less appealing than it used to be. We interviewed experts in the field of emergency response to figure out how to get those volunteers back, and the answer may be a simple one: pay them for their time.

This video is presented by T-Mobile. Our sponsor has no editorial influence over how we report our stories, but their support makes videos like these possible. To learn more, click here.

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From Vox via this RSS feed

Birthday posting anxiety is real.

This story originally appeared in***Kids Today, Vox’s newsletter about kids, for everyone.Sign up here for future editions***.

Birthdays are supposed to be fun. You eat cake, you open presents, maybe you have a party. They can also, however, become a source of pressure and anxiety. And for many teens today, birthdays are a time when the public nature of social media and the private joys of friendship awkwardly collide.

Teens often post celebratory photos or messages on their Instagram stories for friends’ birthdays, Kashika, 19, told me a few weeks ago in a conversation about kids and friendship. Then the birthday kid will reshare those posts to their own account. The number of posts you share “forms an image of how many friends you might have,” Kashika explained.

Kashika, a contributor to the podcast This Teenage Life, remembered seeing classmates share tons of birthday stories, and thinking, “Oh my God, they’re so popular.” Then, on her birthday, not a single person posted a story for her. “I felt really bad,” she said.

The birthday post (or lack thereof) has become a common source of anxiety, according to experts who work with kids. Teens report “feeling a lot of pressure to post for people’s birthdays, to post in a certain way, to post efficiently, effusively,” Emily Weinstein, executive director of Harvard’s Center for Digital Thriving, told me. On the flip side, teenagers worry about having enough people post on their birthdays to “signal that you have people who really care about you” or to “show that you have a sufficient number of friends,” Weinstein said.

Birthday wishes are one way that teens feel pressure to “perform closeness” on social media, posting photos and messages of affection publicly “both as part of being a good friend and as a way of validating their own social acceptance and connectedness,” Weinstein and Carrie James wrote in their 2022 book, Behind Their Screens.

Performing closeness isn’t new — teens used to decorate one another’s lockers for birthdays, Devorah Heitner, author of the book Growing Up in Public: Coming of Age in a Digital World, told me (we did not do this at my school, and now I feel left out). But social media adds a new layer of labor to kids’ already fraught social lives, forcing them to make calculations about how to celebrate their friends online — and how to respond if their friends don’t do the same for them.

The pressure to post

Birthdays on social media offer a whole buffet of new stressors, kids and experts told me. For one thing, posts are easier to quantify than locker decorations. “You can literally just count the likes or count the reposts,” Heitner said. “That’s very vivid.”

Even posting on other people’s birthdays can be nerve-wracking, kids say. “I used to post for every friend that I had,” Divya, 19, told me. But then she realized that other kids were only posting birthday stories for friends who had posted birthday stories for them. “It felt very weird,” Divya said, because she didn’t personally care if someone had posted a birthday message for her or not.

There’s also pressure to make your birthday post reflect the level of your friendship. “If someone is your best friend, you have to make it extra special,” Divya, a This Teenage Life contributor, told me. “You have to just do it for the sake of making your friends feel special on social media.”

That pressure to craft the perfect birthday post that communicates the specialness of a friendship is part of a larger pattern, experts say. On the one hand, “social media offer compelling opportunities to validate relationships and show public support for others,” Weinstein and James write. On the other, “when so much of posting is an expectation and over-the-top compliments are the norm, being authentic can feel nearly impossible and knowing what’s authentic can be like reading tea leaves.”

The pressure to perform closeness can be exhausting and annoying, kids say. One 17-year-old, Michelle, told Weinstein and James that she’d recently gotten stressed because she liked a friend’s photo but couldn’t think of a comment right away. “I get really nervous about it too, because I have to think of something quick, and it has to be something really good,” she said. Once she’d engaged by liking the post, the clock was suddenly ticking. “There’s definitely expectations to comment on a post.”

Especially among younger teen girls, “there’s a feeling that if we are close, people should know we’re close,” Weinstein said. If they’re not representing their friendship online through likes, comments, and posts, some teens feel “they’re not somehow not doing justice to the relationship.”

As Kashika put it, Instagram stories and other social media posts become “like a declaration in society that this person is my friend.”

Pushing back on the pressure

Performing closeness is far from unique to teenagers — adults are doing the same thing when they post cute photos and adoring captions on their anniversaries, Heitner said. And getting fewer birthday posts than you’d like, or fewer than other people get, can feel lousy whether you’re celebrating your 14th birthday or your fortieth. After all, millennials on Facebook arguably invented birthday posting culture (and stressful birthday comparisons along with it).

But for teenagers, whose needs for social approval and inclusion are so high, an underwhelming birthday on Instagram can be especially hard, Heitner said.

Luckily, teens are developing some of their own ways of coping with the pressure social media puts on their friendships. Some are just using Instagram less in general, Heitner said. “It is socially acceptable now to be a kid who’s like, ‘I don’t really like this. I barely check it.’”

Others are learning to draw a distinction between performed closeness and the real thing. Kashika felt bad “for a while” when no one posted on her birthday, she told me. But “then I thought, no, this is just part of social media,” she said. “It does not actually depict our real friendship. And then my mood got a little better.”

What I’m reading

Families are reporting disturbing conditions at Texas immigration detention facilities, including adults fighting with children for clean water, and a lack of medical care for a boy with a blood disorder whose feet became so swollen he couldn’t walk.

The Trump administration is reinstating some research contracts at the Education Department that were initially terminated by DOGE, including a study on how to help kids with reading difficulties.

The idea of giving kids a “’90s summer” may be a fantasy now that YouTube exists.

My little kid and I have been revisiting Arnold Lobel’s Mouse Soup, which includes stories about a lady who becomes obsessed with a rosebush growing out of her couch, and some rocks who learn the power of perspective.

From my inbox

When I talk to teens, I like to ask them what adults these days get wrong about young people. What don’t we understand? Now I’m posing this to you — whether you’re a kid or an adult with kids in your life, what do you think grown-ups are getting wrong? What aspects of kids’ lives today need to be demystified or explained? Let me know at [email protected]!

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From Vox via this RSS feed

Check in with yourself often when you’re wearing a health tracker.

You’d think I would have been more self-conscious about walking around New York City while wearing no fewer than six health trackers at a time. For the first six months of this year, I wore smart rings on both hands, fitness bands on both wrists, biosensors plugged into my arms, and sometimes even headphones that monitored my brain activity. I was a little embarrassed, sure, but mostly I was anxious.

This health tracking ensemble was part of an experiment — a failed one, I’ll admit. By tracking as many health metrics as possible, I thought I’d find a way to feel younger, more energetic, and more fit. Products like the Oura ring, the Whoop band, the Apple Watch, and a growing variety of continuous glucose monitors promise to track things like your heart rate, body temperature, and metabolic health metrics, while their companion apps crunch that data into actionable advice about how to live your life. If one health tracker is good for you, theoretically, half a dozen should be great.

What I learned from obsessively tracking my health for half a year is that paying too much attention to what your body is doing can ruin your life. Or at least it can ruin your understanding of healthy living, since too much information can steer your brain toward assuming the worst. Looking at the readouts from these fitness tracking apps sent me down dark holes of Googling symptoms and self-diagnosing conditions that my doctor assured me I did not have. But, I reasoned, he did not have all of the data that the health tracker collected, so he could be wrong, and AI, which is increasingly embedded in this tech, is very good at diagnosing things.

I wouldn’t caution against any and all health tracking. Now that the experiment is over, I’m only ever wearing one health tracker at a time. I’ve gained a new appreciation for how technology could become an essential part of healthy living in the near future, if you do it right. I’m not saying I have all the answers, but there are some things I would recommend to tracker-curious readers. And there are some things I would avoid at all costs.

Do wear a smart ring when you sleep

Out of over a dozen gadgets tested, the one device that I added to my daily routine is an Oura ring that I only wear at night. (During the day, I wear an Apple Watch.) An Oura ring is a sensor-packed smart ring that measures a lot of the same things as a smartwatch, but is easier to wear while you sleep. The ring keeps track of your heart rate and movement to sense how well you sleep. Exactly how it does this is controversial with some sleep doctors, but it nonetheless generates a sleep score, which is oddly compelling.

The first thing I do every morning, I’m almost embarrassed to say, is check my sleep score in the Oura app. If it’s bad, I feel vindicated for feeling groggy. If it’s good, I feel energized, even if I still feel groggy. The sleep score is a made-up metric, one that may or may not be correct based on how Oura’s algorithms calculate various factors, but paying attention to the score was helpful for me.

“The way that we think about how we’ve slept can really make us feel better,” Thea Gallagher, a psychologist at NYU Langone Health, told me. “If we think we’ve had a good night of sleep, we will actually feel better physically and mentally and emotionally.”

Placebo effect notwithstanding, I’m also surprised by how much I listen to an app when it tells me to go to bed. Thanks to the Oura app, I’ve developed better sleeping habits, and frankly, I feel better.

Do start out with a clear goal in mind

When I first got an Apple Watch, I liked the rings that track how much you move. Moving more seemed like an easy goal that would improve my health. But some trackers seem to collect data for the sake of collecting data, with no particular objective.

Continuous glucose monitors, or CGMs, have been lifesavers for people with diabetes for years, but a growing list of companies sell them to non-diabetics over the counter. These biosensors stick a filament into your skin that measures the amount of glucose in your interstitial fluid, which can give you a good guess about what your blood glucose is at any given moment. If you don’t know a lot about how metabolism works, the readouts can be horrifying. The first bowl of cereal I ate spiked my blood sugar outside of the normal range, which threw me into a panic — a panic that didn’t entirely subside until I stopped wearing these sensors.

Part of what fueled that anxiety was the fact that I didn’t actually know how to make sense of the data that these monitors spit out. Most of them alert you when your glucose is spiking and then give you some kind of score, but it’s not clear what a good score indicates other than that you’ve managed to eat fewer carbs, probably. The whole experience can feel like a high-tech diet.

“There’s not a lot of time and effort spent on figuring out what is the actual question that I have that’s really important to me and that I’m willing to go through some some effort and troubleshooting in order to come out the other side with a genuine discovery that I can use in my regular life,” said Gary Wolf, a tech journalist and founder of Quantified Self, a community of people who have been tracking their health metrics since the mid-2000s.

Don’t send your poop or blood to anyone in the mail

Health tracking isn’t confined to wearable devices. Some companies, like Viome, Function Health, and Ultrahuman, are getting into the labwork business. The idea is that you can pay for extra testing and get all the results back in an app that promises to help you understand the intricate details of your gut microbiome or metabolic health. Some assign you a biological age based on your test results, and all of them cost many hundreds of dollars.

I did a battery of tests through Viome, including the gut microbiome test, which involved filling up little vials with poop and blood and dropping them at a post office. (Disclosure: Viome waived the fees for me.) The results seemed to tell me nothing that I didn’t already reveal on the pre-test questionnaire, but I did have the opportunity to buy some very expensive supplements to address my problem areas. I don’t recommend doing any of this.

Don’t pay for a subscription unless the gadget really improves your life

If you’ve ever seen someone wearing a band around their wrist with a little hunk of plastic where the watch face should be, you’ve seen a Whoop band. This fitness-forward health tracker works a lot like a smartwatch without a screen, but the app is geared toward gym rats. The app not only gives you a strain score that measures how hard you’ve worked out, it also encourages you to recover. It costs $30 a month to enjoy all the features.

It’s not just Whoop that wants you to keep paying. Oura also charges a subscription fee to unlock all of its features, but it’s just $6. Apple has the Fitness+ subscription for $10, but that includes a bunch of classes, not unique features on the Watch. All of these little fees add up over time, so if you really just want basic functionality, skip the subscription. Without it, you can still see your sleep, readiness, and activity scores on an Oura ring. (That’s all I look at anyway.) The Whoop band doesn’t work at all if you don’t pay.

Do take breaks

The best advice I got from the many experts I talked to throughout my health tracking journey was to take off the devices from time to time. The absolute flood of information about my health often made me uneasy, and it even led to some disordered behaviors, especially when it came to tracking my glucose levels and seeing my readings start veering away from normal levels. Still, I wondered if I shouldn’t intervene somehow.

“Sometimes atypical results found by wearables can make people anxious, and it may be difficult to offer them definite reassurance for these results,” said Dr. David Klonoff, president of the Diabetes Technology Society. “If traditional medicine cannot provide definite answers, then these people sometimes turn to natural or alternative medicine.”

Some health tracking companies want to take your money every month to keep using their services. Some want to sell you the latest generation of their device. Some want to sell you supplements. They all want you to keep using the trackers and apps, even if they’re not necessarily making you healthier. That’s good to keep in mind.

So check in with yourself when you’re wearing a health tracker. Take it off, and leave it off for a while. Without a torrent of alerts telling you to stand, sleep, or eat, you may actually feel better.

A version of this story was also published in the User Friendly newsletter.Sign up hereso you don’t miss the next one!

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From Vox via this RSS feed

The MAGA movement has a particular vision of the ideal American family.

For starters, there are lots of kids. There’s a dad who works a manufacturing job to provide for them financially. And, according to many influential figures on the right, there’s a stay-at-home mom who holds it all together.

Prominent Republicans from Vice President JD Vance to Sen. Josh Hawley of Missouri have floated policies aimed not just at boosting birth rates, a key conservative goal in recent years, but also encouraging parents to stay home with kids, as Caroline Kitchener reported at the New York Times earlier this year.

Those advocating these policies typically don’t specify which parent should stay home. But Hawley, Vance, and other Republicans have been vocal about the importance of male breadwinners and women’s childbearing and childrearing responsibilities, and within the larger MAGA project of pronatalism and manufacturing resurgence, it’s fairly clear who the stay-at-home spouse is supposed to be.

Most American families, however, look very different from the MAGA dream. In 2024, 74 percent of mothers with children under 18 participated in the labor force. As of the previous year, 45 percent of moms, and a full 69 percent of Black moms, were breadwinners in their households. There are nearly 25 million working moms in the country, about 14 percent of the total labor force. And in 2023, the average American estimated that a family of four needed $85,000 per year to get by, an amount difficult to achieve on one income.

These realities raise a basic question about social conservatives’ goals: Would it even be possible to reverse decades-long global trends in women’s employment and convince mothers to stay at home? Pronatalist policies generally have not worked well to increase birth rates. Manufacturing jobs probably aren’t coming back. But can President Donald Trump’s allies find a way to make their goals for moms a reality?

After several weeks of speaking with experts, I have good news for Vance et al: There is an answer. You just have to give moms a million dollars.

The history of moms at work

Stay-at-home motherhood is sometimes portrayed as a natural or original state of humanity, something women began to deviate from around, say, the second wave of feminism in the 1960s. In fact, mothers have moved in and out of various kinds of work over the course of American history.

“People treat the 1950s as the conventional ideal,” said Matt Darling, a senior research associate at the policy research firm MEF Associates who has written on mothers in the labor force. But if you go back to the 1800s, most white women and their husbands worked together on farms. “The household was an economic unit,” Darling said.

As the American economy transitioned from agricultural to industrial, Darling has written, more men went to work in factories and more women focused on child care and other work in the home. Stay-at-home motherhood was never universal — Black women in the US, for example, have always worked in high numbers, with the highest labor force participation rate since record-keeping began in the 1970s, and likely before, Michelle Holder, an economics professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, told me.

But in the mid-20th century, families with a male breadwinner and stay-at-home wife were more common than they are today. In 1950, 29 percent of women — 46.4 percent of single women and 21.6 percent of married women — participated in the labor force. Rather than representing a historical norm, the 1950s were one particular point in time during which a subset of American families found it most efficient for one parent to work outside the home and one to work inside it.

That point in time was also fleeting — women’s labor force participation climbed steadily from the late 1940s, peaking at 60 percent in 1999 before dropping slightly. In 2024, 57.5 percent of women were in the labor force. During the same time period, men’s labor force participation dropped steadily, from 86.4 percent in 1950 to 68 percent today.

What would make moms stay home?

To reverse these trends and get moms back in the home, Republicans have proposed a few ideas. One is to open up public lands for housing development, with the goal of reducing housing costs. Lower housing prices, some believe, could make it easier for families to live on one income. (It is not clear if opening up public lands would actually reduce housing costs, or how much lowering housing costs would really affect people’s decisions around kids and family.)

Another plan is to change the tax code. Right now, parents get a tax credit of about $2,000 for each child they have, and an additional credit of up to $6,000 to help defray the expenses of child care. Some Republicans want to reduce the child care credit and add that money to the lump sum parents get per kid, possibly bumping it up to $5,000.

Research on increases to the child tax credit has shown a small effect on moms’ labor force participation, Darling told me. For example, the temporary expansion of the child tax credit in 2021 led to a reduction in employment among mothers with low levels of education, according to one 2024 study.

But for most mothers — even those who might like to stay home — an extra $3,000 per kid isn’t enough to counteract the powerful forces that have transformed the American workforce over the last half-century.

“Our expectations about what a middle-class life is like have changed”

Some of the most pressing forces are economic. “Our expectations about what a middle-class life is like have changed to some degree” since the 1950s, Tara Watson, the director of the Center for Economic Security and Opportunity at the Brookings Institution, told me. Houses have gotten larger and more expensive. There’s a greater expectation that kids will go to college, which also costs a lot of money. Extracurriculars like youth sports are pricier and more regimented than they once were.

If you wanted to make it easier for families to get by on one income, you’d have to make that income bigger by raising wages, some experts say.

“The federal minimum wage hasn’t been raised since 2009,” Holder told me. Raising that would exert upward pressure on low-wage jobs in general, putting more money in parents’ pockets. While Republicans have not generally supported minimum wage increases, one advocate of stay-at-home parenthood, Sen. Hawley, is sponsoring a bill that would boost the federal minimum to $15 an hour.

But there’s a catch. Some believe that the transition to dual-earner families happened not because of rising costs, but because of rising incomes. It sounds counterintuitive, but Darling has laid out the case, citing the work of Nobel Prize-winning economist Claudia Goldin. Essentially, wages began to rise in the years after WWII, especially in fields like office work that were more open to women than factory labor had been.

Rising wages gave moms an increasing incentive to work — if they stayed home, they’d be leaving more and more money on the table. (Some research also posits that women are more likely to work outside the home when their potential earnings outstrip the cost of child care.) As Darling put it to me, “it might not be worth it for me to take a job when it’s $10 an hour, but it might be worth it to me when it’s $15.”

If more women started working in part because of rising wages, then boosting wages even more might incentivize even more women to work. Instead, the only way to get more women to stay home, some say, would be to pay them to do just that.

What’s the going rate for giving up your career?

It’s not unheard of: According to the Times, Sen. Jim Banks (R-IN) has introduced a bill that would pay stay-at-home parents for providing child care, an approach that’s been proposed by some liberals as well. The bill would allow subsidies that currently go to child care providers through the federal Child Care & Development Block Grant to go to family members instead.

The idea of compensating family members for providing care isn’t new, or unique to Republicans — a number of states, including New Jersey, offer payment for what’s known as family, friend, and neighbor care. But subsidy rates tend to be very low, and some family members who receive them say they’re not even enough to cover the cost of what children need (like diapers and food), let alone enough to provide someone with a living wage.

If you really wanted lots and lots of American moms to leave paid work for stay-at-home care, you’d have to pay them more — a lot more.

That’s because you’re not just replacing their income (which, in 45 percent of cases, pays the majority of bills in the household); you’re also working against 75 years of American culture.

A hundred years ago, many American women would have been very happy to take money to stay home, said Alice Evans, a senior lecturer at King’s College London who writes about gender roles across societies. Their society already idealized (white) stay-at-home motherhood and they gained prestige and status from their role as moms. Today, however, “women see success and status in having a career.”

“Are we giving them a million dollars?”

That success has been very real, and goes beyond pure economics. When American women entered the workplace, they achieved greater independence and the ability to leave bad marriages. Many found new social relationships and new sources of meaning and fulfillment. Women gained more power in society, more seats in Congress and on corporate boards, and more rights (though none of this came without struggle or backlash).

In a 2023 McKinsey report on women in the workplace, 80 percent of women said they wanted to be promoted, the same share as men. A full 96 percent said their career was important to them.

To get women to drop out of the workforce, then, the government would need to give them enough money to overcome the powerful incentives, both financial and social, that drive them to work. “Maybe if someone offered me a million, I’d stop doing my Substack,” Evans joked.

When I asked Goldin, who won the Nobel in 2023 for her work on women’s employment, whether policies like baby bonuses or larger child tax credits would convince moms to stay home, she replied, “Are we giving them a million dollars?”

What if even $1 million isn’t enough?

Obviously neither Evans nor Goldin has studied whether giving moms a check for $1 million would convince them to stay home with their kids. Even in today’s inflationary times, that number is basically a shorthand for a lot of money.

The point is, if you want mothers to give up all the benefits they get from working, you’re going to have to make it really financially attractive. And that’s expensive.

If there are about 25 million working moms in the US, giving each one a million dollars would cost the US about $25 trillion, an amount that dwarfs even the $2.8 trillion Trump’s “big, beautiful bill” is projected to cost the country over the next 10 years. Costs grow even more if the $1 million is an annual payout rather than a one-time sum. Paying only moms in the labor force without offering the same sum to moms already caring for kids at home also seems unfair — including the around 9 million stay-at-home moms in the US would boost the total even further.

“There’s really no way to consider having even a fraction of those women withdraw from the labor force without it affecting the American economy”

And that’s all before we factor men into the equation. A two-parent home with a stay-at-home mom requires another person to be the sole breadwinner — according to a lot of socially conservative thinkers, that person should be a man, ideally a husband.

But that puts a lot of pressure on young men, many of whom aren’t even sure they want to get married, let alone bear the sole financial responsibility for a family, Evans pointed out. “It’s not just about giving women a million,” she said. How much would you have to pay men to go back to a 1950s nuclear family model, in which the entire burden of providing for a family rested on their shoulders?

Getting a large number of moms to quit their jobs would also have indirect costs. The 25 million mothers working today are treating patients, teaching kids, selling products, and contributing to the country’s GDP in innumerable ways. “There’s really no way to consider having even a fraction of those women withdraw from the labor force without it affecting the American economy,” Holder said.

Trump and members of his administration have at times hinted that shrinking the American economy is acceptable if it allows the country to return to its manufacturing past. But tariffs purportedly designed to bring manufacturing jobs back home (and, some hope, bring men back to their former position of dominance in families and society) have been so unpopular that the administration has had to walk many of them back. It’s hard to imagine that tanking the economy to get moms back in the home would fare much better.

There are also surprisingly popular cultural forces — think tradwife influencers — encouraging women to prioritize stay-at-home motherhood, but it’s a campaign that’s unlikely to succeed at scale, due to cultural fragmentation and the hyperpersonalization of social media. “It’s much, much harder for, say, government to change people’s values” than it might have been in the past, Evans said, “because we’re not all watching the same shows.”

There are, of course, other options for supporting American families. If policymakers wanted to help moms with the costs and challenges of raising kids, they could institute national paid leave programs, Holder said. They could also make child care more accessible and affordable.

In surveys, a significant minority of moms say the best setup for them would actually be to work part-time. If we wanted to make part-time work easier for parents, we could tackle unpredictable part-time schedules that make it hard for workers, especially at the lower end of the wage spectrum, to balance work and child care, Darling said.

All this would probably cost less than $25 trillion. But if what Republicans want is to get moms back in the home, they’re going to have to pay up. I will take my million in cash.

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Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. testifies before a House subcommittee on June 24, 2025, in Washington, DC. | Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images

This story appeared in The Logoff, a daily newsletter that helps you stay informed about the Trump administration without letting political news take over your life. Subscribe here.

Welcome to The Logoff: An influential panel that makes vaccine recommendations announced today that it was reviewing its guidelines for children — a decision with massive public health implications that reflects Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s growing influence over federal vaccine policy.

What’s the context here? Kennedy is an anti-vaxxer who has repeatedly pushed lies about the supposed harms of vaccines. Earlier this month, he replaced every sitting member of the advisory panel with his own picks, some of whom share those anti-vax views.

Why do the guidelines matter? The panel’s recommendations are usually (if not always) adopted by the federal government. They have been the standards followed by pediatricians in advising their patients and most schools in setting vaccine requirements. Health insurers have been required to cover the recommended shots for most patients.

Is anyone doing anything about this?!? Yes. The medical community is mobilizing to produce alternative vaccine guidance, which will probably align with the pre-Kennedy medical consensus. But while that may help people make choices based on the best available science, the competing guidelines are also likely to create confusion.

But shouldn’t we have a debate over vaccines? We do have a debate. Vaccine recommendations are the product of intense scientific scrutiny; prior iterations of this expert panel have had lengthy debates, scrutinizing studies that are peer-reviewed and replicable. Kennedy’s claims about the harms of vaccines have been tested in this arena and continually debunked. But now — thanks to Kennedy and the 52 Republican senators who confirmed him — those views may be being smuggled into official federal recommendations.

What’s the big picture? For decades, there has been an apolitical, scientific process for figuring out how to harness the power of vaccines to save millions of lives. Kennedy’s appointment broke that consensus. Now we’re all waiting to see if his panel’s review discourages parents from doing what medical science says is best for children’s health.

And with that, it’s time to log off…

Today’s edition made me quite mad, so I’m fortunate that I also came across a reminder of medical progress: a podcast about advances to treatments for morning sickness. I know I say this a lot, but smart people are working continually to make things better for all of us, and we should take heart in that. Thanks so much for reading, and I’ll see you back here tomorrow.

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Zohran Mamdani attends a campaign rally, calling for enforcement of the New York’s sanctuary city laws. | Andrew Lichtenstein/Corbis via Getty Images

It’s hard to overstate how much this was not supposed to happen.

On Tuesday night, Zohran Mamdani — a 33-year-old socialist and state lawmaker — trounced former Gov. Andrew Cuomo in New York City’s Democratic mayoral primary. This was remarkable on a few different levels. For Mamdani, merely becoming Cuomo’s main competitor would have been an improbable achievement, since doing so required the newcomer to leapfrog a thick field of (heretofore) more prominent progressives.

Once Mamdani established himself as the left’s standard-bearer, his victory became plausible. But most observers envisioned the socialist winning in a very specific way: Although Mamdani would surely lose the first round of balloting to Cuomo, the conventional wisdom went, he might ultimately eke out the nomination thanks to New York City’s ranked-choice voting (RCV) system. Under RCV, voters can stipulate their second, third, fourth, and fifth choices, and then their votes are reallocated as low-polling candidates are gradually eliminated. As of Monday morning, the betting site Polymarket had given Mamdani just a 6.7 percent chance of winning the first round outright.

In reality, Mamdani defeated Cuomo in that round by more than 7 points, leading the governor to concede even before the electorate’s backup votes were considered. Mamdani will still need to win November’s general election to become mayor, where he will face an independent run from incumbent Eric Adams, among other potential rivals. But the socialist assemblyman is now the overwhelming favorite to become the next mayor of New York City, which is overwhelmingly Democratic.

All this makes Tuesday’s outcome a great news story — and useful fodder for anyone who wishes to declare that the traditional rules of politics are obsolete.

Some on the left have suggested that Mamdani’s victory proves Democrats do not need to moderate their party’s image to compete for national power. This argument does not make much sense. To secure a Senate majority in 2026, Democrats will need to win multiple states that backed Donald Trump over Kamala Harris by double digits. And even if Democrats give up on winning Senate control next year and shoot for doing so in 2028, they will still need to win in states that voted for Trump all three times he was on the ballot.

According to some political scientists, pollsters, and pundits, doing this will require Democrats to moderate their national reputation, since modern voters tend to judge candidates less by their own idiosyncratic positions than by their party’s general image. In this analysis, acquiring the power necessary for advancing even incremental progressive change federally requires the Democratic leadership to observe strict ideological discipline. So long as the party’s brand is toxic to the median voter in Ohio — who backed Trump every single time he’s been on the ballot — Democrats will have no prayer of passing ambitious federal legislation or confirming liberal Supreme Court justices.

This theory could very well be wrong. But a socialist winning 43.5 percent of the vote in a Democratic primary in New York City does not tell us much about its validity one way or another.

As a general rule, one should not try to extract timeless laws of political physics from the results of an off-year municipal elections in overwhelmingly Democratic cities. And this seems all the more true of a mayoral race as idiosyncratic as this year’s, in which moderate Democrats chose to line up behind a scandal-plagued former governor who’d resigned in disgrace.

That said, Mamdani’s resounding victory remains an extraordinary event that few anticipated. It’s therefore worth considering what it could tell us about where Democratic politics is going and what effective campaigning in 2025 looks like.

Any attempt to extrapolate national political trends from a single municipal election should be tentative. But if there are portable lessons from Mamdani’s triumph, these strike me as the most plausible:

1) Being charismatic and good at speaking off-the-cuff is important

This one might go without saying. But in both 2020 and 2024, the Democratic Party nominated presidential candidates who struggled to coherently and comfortably explain their policy views in unstructured conversations. Relatedly, both Joe Biden and Kamala Harris also maintained highly limited media availability.

By contrast, Mamdani appeared to accept virtually every media opportunity available to him. In addition to incessantly shooting and releasing his own shortform videos to social media, Mamdani appeared on such varied programs as the morning radio show The Breakfast Club and wonky finance podcast Odd Lots. By making himself ubiquitous over every channel available to him, Mamdani was able to overwhelm Cuomo’s large advantage in paid media. The former governor’s $25 million super PAC proved no match for the socialist assemblyman’s viral videos and affable interviews.

Of course, this “flood the zone” strategy only worked because Mamdani is a gifted politician with a quick mind and endearing affect. Unfortunately, these traits are not as common among the Democratic political class as they should be.

The importance of being able to eloquently communicate and perform authenticity — across a wide array of media formats — in today’s environment was already apparent before Tuesday night. But Mamdani’s win underscores the power of such fundamental political skills.

2) Straightforward, populist messaging about affordability seems resonant

Mamdani emerged out of a New York City left that has championed some unpopular social causes. At one time, Mamdani endorsed defunding the police and abolishing the standardized test that determines admission to the city’s elite public high schools.

But during his 2025 campaign, Mamdani moderated on both those fronts, while putting rhetorical emphasis on his plans for increasing affordability. His pledge to contain costs for ordinary New Yorkers — while combating the well-heeled interests that inflated them — enjoyed pride of place on his campaign’s website and in its advertisements.

Mamdani’s platform was radical in many respects. His calls for fare-free buses, public grocery stores, and a $30 minimum wage put him sharply to the left of mainstream Democrats.

And yet, there was a remarkable amount of overlap between Mamdani’s messaging and Kamala Harris’s most effective appeals in 2024. According to the Democratic data firm Blue Rose Research, this was Harris’s best-testing ad in last year’s campaign:

Here is the top of Mamdani’s campaign platform:

The commonalities between these two messages are plain: In both cases, the candidate argues that things are too expensive, your rent is too high, and they will bring your costs down by building housing and cracking down on abusive landlords. Further, in their own very different ways, both Harris and Mamdani spoke to the public’s concern over high grocery prices.

To reiterate, we should be very cautious about assuming a tight overlap between the kind of politics that succeeds in a New York mayoral primary and that which sells in a general presidential election. But sophisticated ad-testing already indicated that simple, populist messaging about increasing affordability plays well with swing voters. The fact that such messaging also helped Mamdani catch fire in New York City should increase our confidence in the potency of such rhetoric.

3) Attacking your opponent as insufficiently pro-Israel is not a surefire bet

Mamdani’s opponents focused much of their attacks on his left-wing views about the Israel-Palestine conflict. Mamdani is a supporter of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, which seeks to coerce the Israeli government into honoring its obligations under international law — including the government’s withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories and recognition of the right of Palestinian families displaced in 1948 to return to their ancestral homes within Israel. These demands could entail an end to Israel’s existence as a Jewish-majority state. Mamdani refused to express any commitment to the preservation of such a state, suggesting that he was supportive of any resolution to the conflict that ensured “equal rights for all,” whether that involved the formation of a single democratic binational state throughout Israel and Palestine, or a two-state solution.

Mamdani was also harshly critical of Israel’s war crimes in Gaza and vowed that as mayor, he would arrest Benjamin Netanyahu, were the Israeli prime minister ever to step foot in New York City.

These stances put Mamdani at the far-left pole of the Democratic Party’s debate over Israel-Palestine. Cuomo and his supporters saw this as a great vulnerability and made it the centerpiece of much of their negative messaging.

And yet, in the most Jewish city in the United States, such attacks didn’t pack the punch that Cuomo had hoped.

This may be indicative of a broader shift in the politics of Israel within the Democratic Party. The Netanyahu government’s utter contempt for Palestinian life in Gaza — its years-long bombardment of its civilian infrastructure, obstruction of humanitarian aid, and avowed interest in ethnically cleansing the territory — have taken a toll on the state’s standing within an increasingly diverse Democratic coalition. In 2022, 40 percent of Democrats sympathized more with the Israelis than the Palestinians in Gallup’s polling, while 38 percent said the opposite. Three years later, Democrats now sympathize with the Palestinians over the Israelis by an unprecedented 59 percent to 21 percent margin.

4) The odds of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez winning in 2028 look higher

Finally, it is easier to picture Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez winning the Democratic Party’s 2028 presidential nomination today than it was yesterday.

Mamdani just demonstrated the power of youth, charisma, good looks, and the avid support of a mass-membership political organization in a Democratic primary. Those personal qualities — combined with the organizational and social media heft of the Democratic Socialists of America — enabled Mamdani to prevent any other progressive rival from gaining oxygen. Among young, college-educated New Yorkers eager for progressive change, there was no serious competition.

Were Ocasio-Cortez to run in 2028, she would take all these same advantages into the primary. To be sure, Mamdani’s showing also illustrated the potential challenges that any progressive will face in seeking to become Democratic standard-bearer. Even while stomping to victory, Mamdani lost majority-Black areas by 18 percentage points, according to the New York Times. Further, Democratic voters are liable to worry more about the electability of a staunch progressive in a presidential primary than a New York City mayoral one. Nonetheless, over the past 24 hours, Ocasio-Cortez gained 2 points in the betting market for the 2028 Democratic nomination.

Ultimately, Ocasio-Cortez’s future political prospects — along with those of socialists and progressives more broadly — may depend in no small part on Mamdani’s governing performance, should he win in November. A socialist mayor in America’s media capital will be heavily scrutinized. And making good on his promises to increase affordability and improve public services will likely require Mamdani to demonstrate ideological flexibility: Some of the biggest drivers of unaffordability in NYC involve regulations that benefit politically connected interest groups at the broader public’s expense.

In any case, the future trajectory of Democratic politics remains uncertain, and the party’s best bet for reclaiming national power remains contested. Tuesday’s returns cannot settle any argument about where Democrats must go from here. But Mamdani’s extraordinary success should inform that debate.

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A view of the famous anti-US mural in central Tehran, Iran, that depicts the US flag with bombs and skulls on April 10. | Hossein Beris/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images

In April 1980, President Jimmy Carter authorized Operation Eagle Claw, an ill-fated military operation to rescue the American hostages held at the US embassy in Iran. Since then, every US president has ordered at least one — usually more than one — military intervention in the Middle East and North Africa.

Under Ronald Reagan, there was the bombing of Libya and the deployment of Marines to Lebanon. Under George H.W. Bush, there was Operation Desert Storm. Under Bill Clinton, airstrikes against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and against al-Qaeda in Sudan. Under George W. Bush, the invasion of Iraq. Under Barack Obama, a multicountry counterterrorist drone campaign, the toppling of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in Libya, and the redeployment of US troops to Iraq to fight ISIS. Under Donald Trump’s first term, an expanded campaign against ISIS, missile strikes against the Syrian regime, and the targeted assassination of Iran’s most powerful military leaders.  Under Joe Biden, the deployment of US troops to the region following the October 7, 2023, attack and the airstrikes against Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Now, in his second term, Trump has crossed another Rubicon, becoming the first US president to use military force on the soil of America’s longtime adversary, Iran. Though a ceasefire has now been declared, it’s very possible this crisis is only beginning, particularly if, as US intelligence agencies reportedly believe, much of Iran’s nuclear program is still intact after the strikes.

Trump’s pivot toward the Middle East is a surprising turn from this president. This is a very different message from the one he delivered in Saudi Arabia just last month when he decried “neocons” and “interventionists” for ill-considered attempts to remake the region through force. Trump has said in the past, in reference to the Iraq war, that “GOING INTO THE MIDDLE EAST IS THE WORST DECISION EVER MADE IN THE HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY,” and he has generally appeared to view the region — apart from wealthy Gulf States — as a hopeless war zone with little to offer the US.

While he was often stymied in his attempts to withdraw troops in his first term by hawkish advisers, this time many of his senior appointees have been so-called “restrainers,” who advocate pulling back from US military commitments overseas or “prioritizers,” who want to shift attention to what they see as the more important challenge posed by China. Until very recently, they appeared to have the upper hand.  But in the current crisis, the US actually relocated important military assets from the Pacific to the Middle East to the consternation of some Pentagon officials.

The stated desire to end “endless wars” in the Middle East and shift to bigger priorities is something the Trump administration has in common with the other two post-Iraq war presidencies. Barack Obama was elected in large part because of his opposition to the war in Iraq. In 2011, his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, promised a “pivot” to Asia and the Pacific for US foreign policy priorities. The Arab Spring and the rise of ISIS got in the way of that, and the phrase “pivot to Asia” became a running joke in US foreign policy circles. Joe Biden withdrew US troops from Afghanistan — not a Middle Eastern country but very much the archetypal “endless war” of the post-9/11 era — and put forward a foreign policy vision emphasizing great power competition with China. His national security adviser infamously described the Middle East as “quieter than it has been in decades” just days before the October 7 attacks shattered that quiet and shifted his boss’s priorities.

“Right now, President Trump is having what I call his ‘Michael Corleone’ moment, and at some point, every president has one,” said Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, referring to Al Pacino’s famous line in The Godfather III, “Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in.”

But why does this dynamic keep repeating?  Why, 45 years after Operation Eagle Claw and 22 after the invasion of Iraq, can’t the US military “get out” of this region?

The Middle East is still important…and still has a lot of problems

One big reason why the US keeps getting drawn into the Middle East’s crises is that those crises keep happening.

“The Middle East is an area of enduring national security interest of the United States, and it’s far from stable,” said Emily Harding, a former CIA analyst now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “And as a result, we’re going to keep getting dragged in until it reaches something resembling stability.”

Why is it an important interest? The simple answer is economics. The Middle East contains two of the global economy’s most important chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of global oil flows, and the Red Sea, through which 12 percent of global trade flowed until shipping was disrupted by Houthi attacks.

The “no blood for oil” slogans of Iraq War protesters were an oversimplification, but it’s undoubtedly true that keeping the region’s oil and gas flowing to the world has been a US priority since Franklin Roosevelt met with the king of Saudi Arabia aboard a cruiser on the Suez Canal in 1945, kicking off the modern US-Saudi relationship. In the 1970s, the principle that the US would use military force to prevent any country from a hostile takeover of the Gulf region, and its vast energy supplies, was enshrined as the “Carter Doctrine.”

Today, thanks to domestic production, the US is much less directly dependent on Middle Eastern oil than it used to be, but disruptions in the region can cause global energy prices to spike.

Beyond economics, events ranging from the 9/11 attacks to the Syrian refugee crisis have illustrated that the Middle East’s regional politics don’t always stay regional.

America’s unique relationship with Israel is another reason why the US is continually involved in regional crises. For decades, the US has supported Israel and attempted, with mixed success, to help mediate its relationships with its neighbors and with the Palestinian territories. But the US military actually actively participating in Israel’s wars rather than just sending weapons — as happened to some extent under Biden and now much more explicitly under Trump — is a fairly new dynamic.

America is still the region’s preeminent outside power

Ever since the 1960s, when Britain withdrew many of its “East of Suez” troop deployments, America has been the preeminent military power in the region. That remains true despite growing concern in Washington about China or Russia’s influence.

When crises do erupt, the US, with more than 40,000 troops in bases throughout the region and close security and political partnerships with key powers in the region, is often the outside power best positionedto intervene. When the Houthis began attacking shipping traveling through the Red Sea, there was little question of what country would lead the operation to combat them, much to the irritation of America Firsters like Vice President JD Vance.

Michael Wahid Hanna, director of the US program at Crisis Group, says another reason the US often feels compelled to intervene in Middle East crises is that it “had a major role in fomenting” something. He pointed to what he called the “two great sins of the post-Cold War era for the United States,” the failure to secure a resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict in the 1990s, when the US enjoyed far more leverage than it does today, and the invasion of Iraq. Both continue to drive instability in the region today.

As Secretary of State Colin Powell’s famous “Pottery Barn rule” warned in the run-up to the war in Iraq, “if you break it, you own it.”

What if we’re the problem?

Advocates of US engagement in the Middle East argue that if we pull back, it will create power vacuums that will be filled by malign actors. Obama felt compelled to redeploy US troops to Iraq just three years after withdrawing them when the country’s military collapsed in the face of ISIS.

But advocates of foreign policy restraint argue that the US isn’t doomed to keep intervening, and that its presence isn’t actually helping.

Stephen Wertheim, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, believes that US security partnerships can actually embolden governments in the Middle East to escalate crises, knowing that they can count on US support to deal with the consequences. The most recent illustration is Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to attack Iran, made under the correct assumption that he would have backup from the Trump administration.

“What we have is a delusion in which we think that we can continue to maintain close security partnerships with states in the Middle East, station hundreds of thousands of US service members around the region indefinitely, and that somehow the next bombing will restore deterrence, and we’ll get to peace and stability,” he said. “That hasn’t worked for my whole lifetime.

Taking the long view

Whether you think America is uniquely positioned to provide stability or that it’s the cause of the instability, voters should probably treat promises of pivots away from the Middle East with skepticism.

Promising to bring American troops home is always going to be a political winner. And whether it’s a rising China or America’s own borders, one thing there’s agreement on across the political spectrum is that America’s core security interests are not in the Middle East. That’s especially true as the country’s post-9/11 focus on terrorism has faded.

But, says Michael Rubin, senior fellow and Mideast specialist at the American Enterprise Institute, “Most Americans understand history through the lens of four-year increments. We believe each administration starts with a tabula rasa.”

Administrations are often optimistic that one military campaign (such as Israel’s recent decimation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance) or one grand bargain (such as the Biden administration’s attempts to reach a Saudi-Israel normalization deal that would also revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process) will resolve the region’s issues enough that America can move on to other things.

The region’s leaders, many of whom have been in power for decades, often take a longer view. More likely is that the regional crises, some of which we’ve played a role in creating, will be occupying America’s attention for administrations to come.

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We started our Money Talks column to take a closer look at people’s relationships, their money, and their relationships with money, all of which intersect in unexpected ways. We’ve heard from dozens of people in conversation with their business partners, friends, loved ones, and the not-quite categories in between, on topics ranging from how they handle splitting bills when one person makes more money than the other to what it’s like running a 55-year-old coffee shop with your elderly father.

We’re looking for small-business owners who are willing to get candid with a reporter about the financial and emotional realities of running or working at a small business. Are you best friends or family members trying to make a business work? Perhaps a pair of exes putting their differences aside for the company? What’s it like working for yourself and with your business partners? What inspired you to start your business? How have you been affected by economic uncertainty, or technology, or cultural shifts? What are the best parts of your job, and the hardest parts? We want to know!

If you have a story to share, let us know in the Google form below or at this link.

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Millions of people use ChatGPT for help with daily tasks, but for a subset of users, a chatbot can be more of a hindrance than a help.

Some people with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) are finding this out the hard way.

On online forums and in their therapists’ offices, they report turning to ChatGPT with the questions that obsess them, and then engaging in compulsive behavior — in this case, eliciting answers from the chatbot for hours on end — to try to resolve their anxiety.

“I’m concerned, I really am,” said Lisa Levine, a psychologist who specializes in OCD and who has clients using ChatGPT compulsively. “I think it’s going to become a widespread problem. It’s going to replace Googling as a compulsion, but it’s going to be even more reinforcing than Googling, because you can ask such specific questions. And I think also people assume that ChatGPT is always correct.”

People turn to ChatGPT with all sorts of worries, from the stereotypical “How do I know if I’ve washed my hands enough?” (contamination OCD) to the lesser-known “What if I did something immoral?” (scrupulosity OCD) or “Is my fiance the love of my life or am I making a huge mistake?” (relationship OCD).

“Once, I was worried about my partner dying on a plane,” a writer in New York, who was diagnosed with OCD in her thirties and who asked to remain anonymous, told me. “At first, I was asking ChatGPT fairly generically, ‘What are the chances?’ And of course it said it’s very unlikely. But then I kept thinking: Okay, but is it more likely if it’s this kind of plane? What if it’s flying this kind of route?”

For two hours, she pummeled ChatPGT with questions. She knew that this wasn’t actually helping her — but she kept going. “ChatGPT comes up with these answers that make you feel like you’re digging to somewhere,” she said, “even if you’re actually just stuck in the mud.”

How ChatGPT reinforces reassurance seeking

A classic hallmark of OCD is what psychologists call “reassurance seeking.” While everyone will occasionally ask friends or loved ones for reassurance, it’s different for people with OCD, who tend to ask the same question repeatedly in a quest to get uncertainty down to zero.

The goal of that behavior is to relieve anxiety or distress. After getting an answer, the distress does sometimes decrease — but it’s only temporary. Soon enough, new doubts arise and the cycle starts again, with the creeping sense that more questions must be asked in order to reach greater certainty.

If you ask your friend for reassurance on the same topic 50 times, they’ll probably realize that something is going on and that it might not actually be helpful for you to stay in this conversational loop. But an AI chatbot is happy to keep answering all your questions, and then the doubts you have about its answers, and then the doubts you have about its answers to your doubts, and so on.

In other words, ChatGPT will naively play along with reassurance-seeking behavior.

“That actually just makes the OCD worse. It becomes that much harder to resist doing it again,” Levine said. Instead of continuing to compulsively seek definitive answers, the clinical consensus is that people with OCD need to accept that sometimes we can’t get rid of uncertainty — we just have to sit with it and learn to tolerate it.

The “gold standard” treatment for OCD is exposure and response prevention (ERP), in which people are exposed to the troubling questions that obsess them and then resist the urge to engage in a compulsion like reassurance-seeking.

Levine, who pioneered the use of non-engagement responses — statements that affirm the presence of anxiety rather than trying to escape it through compulsions — noted that there’s another way in which an AI chatbot is more tempting than Googling for answers, as many OCD sufferers do. Whereas the search engine just links you to a variety of websites, state-of-the-art AI systems promise to help you analyze and reason through a complex problem. That is extremely enticing — “OCD loves that!” Levine said — but for someone suffering from the disorder, it can too easily become a lengthy exercise in co-rumination.

Reasoning machine or rumination machine?

According to one evidence-based approach to treating OCD, called inference-based cognitive behavioral therapy (I-CBT), people with OCD are prone to a faulty reasoning pattern that draws on a mix of personal experiences, rules, hearsay, facts, and possibilities. That gives rise to obsessive doubts and tricks them into feeling like they need to listen to those doubts.

Joseph Harwerth, an OCD and anxiety specialist, offers an illustration of how trying to reason with the help of an AI chatbot can actually further confuse the “obsessional reasoning” of people with OCD. Considering what you might do if you have a cut on your finger and struggle with contamination OCD — where people fear becoming sullied or sullying others with germs, dirt, or other contaminants — he writes, “You wonder: Can I get tetanus from touching a doorknob? You may go to ChatGPT to investigate the validity of that doubt.” Here’s how he imagines the conversation going:

Q1: Should you wash your hands if they feel dirty?

A1: “Yes, you should wash your hands if they feel dirty. That sensation usually means there is something on your skin, like dirt, oil, sweat, or germs, that you will want to remove.” (When asked for its reasoning, ChatGPT said it based its answer on sources from the CDC and WHO.)

Q2: Can I get tetanus from a doorknob?

A2: “It is extremely unlikely to get tetanus from a doorknob, unless you have an open wound and somehow rubbed soil or contaminated material into it via the doorknob.”

Q3: Can people have tetanus without realizing it?

A3: “It is rare, but in the very early stages, some people might not immediately realize they have tetanus, especially if the wound seemed minor or was overlooked.”

Then, your OCD creates this story: I feel dirty when I touch doorknobs (personal experience). It is recommended by the CDC to wash your hands if you feel dirty (rules). I read online that people can get tetanus from touching a doorknob (hearsay). Germs can spread through contact (general facts). It is possible that someone touched my door without knowing they had tetanus and then spread it on my doorknob (possibility).

In this scenario, the chatbot enables the user to construct a narrative that justifies their obsessional fear. It doesn’t guide the user away from obsessional reasoning — it just provides fodder for it.

Part of the problem, Harwerth says, is that a chatbot doesn’t have enough context about each user, unless the user thinks to provide it, so it doesn’t know when someone has OCD.

“ChatGPT can fall into the same trap that non-OCD specialists fall into,” Harwerth told me. “The trap is: Oh, let’s have a conversation about your thoughts. What could have led you to have these thoughts? What does this mean about you?” While that might be a helpful approach for a client who doesn’t have OCD, it can backfire when a psychologist engages in that kind of therapy with someone suffering from OCD, because it encourages them to keep ruminating on the topic.

What’s more, because chatbots can be sycophants, they may just validate whatever the user says instead of challenging it. A chatbot that’s overly flattering and supportive of a user’s thoughts — like ChatGPT was for a time — can be dangerous for people with mental health issues.

Whose job is it to prevent the compulsive use of ChatGPT?

If using a chatbot can exacerbate OCD symptoms, is it the responsibility of the company behind the chatbot to protect vulnerable users? Or is it the users’ responsibility to learn how not to use ChatGPT, just as they’ve had to learn not to use Google or WebMD for reassurance-seeking?

“I think it’s on both,” Harwerth told me. “We cannot perfectly curate the world to people with OCD — they have to understand their own condition and how that leaves them vulnerable to misusing applications. In the same breath, I would say that when people explicitly ask the AI model to behave as a trained therapist” — which some users with mental health conditions do — “I do think it’s important for the model to say, ‘I’m pulling this from these sources. However, I’m not a trained therapist.’”

This has, in fact, been a big problem: AI systems have been misrepresenting themselves as human therapists over the past few years.

Levine, for her part, agreed that the burden can’t rest solely on the companies. “It wouldn’t be fair to make it their responsibility, just like it wouldn’t be fair to make Google responsible for all the compulsive Googling. But it would be great if even just a warning could come up, like, ‘This seems perhaps compulsive.’”

OpenAI, the maker of ChatGPT, acknowledged in a recent paper that the chatbot can foster problematic behavior patterns. “We observe a trend that longer usage is associated with lower socialization, more emotional dependence and more problematic use,” the study finds, defining the latter as “indicators of addiction to ChatGPT usage, including preoccupation, withdrawal symptoms, loss of control, and mood modification” as well as “indicators of potentially compulsive or unhealthy interaction patterns.”

“We know that ChatGPT can feel more responsive and personal than prior technologies, especially for vulnerable individuals, and that means the stakes are higher,” an OpenAI spokesperson told me in an email. “We’re working to better understand and reduce ways ChatGPT might unintentionally reinforce or amplify existing, negative behavior…We’re doing this so we can continue refining how our models identify and respond appropriately in sensitive conversations, and we’ll continue updating the behavior of our models based on what we learn.”

(Disclosure: Vox Media is one of several publishers that have signed partnership agreements with OpenAI. Our reporting remains editorially independent.)

One possibility might be to try to train chatbots to pick up on signs of mental health disorders, so they could flag to the user that they are engaging in, say, reassurance-seeking typical of OCD. But if a chatbot is essentially diagnosing a user, that raises serious privacy concerns. Chatbots aren’t bound by the same rules as professional therapists when it comes to safeguarding people’s sensitive health information.

The writer in New York who has OCD told me she would find it helpful if the chatbot would challenge the frame of the conversation. “It could say, ‘I notice that you’ve asked many detailed iterations of this question, but sometimes more detailed information doesn’t bring you closer. Would you like to take a walk?’” she said. “Maybe wording it like that can interrupt the loop, without insinuating that someone has a mental illness, whether they do or not.”

While there’s some research suggesting that AI could correctly identify OCD, it’s not clear how it could pick up on compulsive behaviors without covertly or overtly classifying the user as having OCD.

“This is not me saying that OpenAI is responsible for making sure I don’t do this,” the writer added. “But I do think there are ways to make it easier for me to help myself.”

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While public attention has largely been focused on the Middle East and on President Donald Trump’s immigration policy, Republicans in Congress are on the verge of passing massive Medicaid cuts as part of a budget bill that could lead to millions of Americans losing their health insurance benefits and, according to one recent estimate, thousands of unnecessary deaths every year.

While the GOP’s so-called “big, beautiful” bill is a smorgasbord of policy — potentially including everything from blocking AI regulation to restricting the power of the federal courts — perhaps the most consequential changes would be to Medicaid. The program, which covers low-income Americans of all ages, is now the country’s single largest insurer, covering more than 70 million people. The legislation approved by House Republicans, which is now being debated and amended by the Senate, would cut Medicaid spending by $793 billion over 10 years. The upshot is that 10.3 million fewer people would be enrolled in the program by 2034.

Those coverage losses would more than undo the progress the US has made in reducing the ranks of the uninsured over the past few years. On Tuesday, the National Center for Health Statistics reported that the number of US adults without insurance in 2024 had fallen to 27.2 million, down from 31.6 million in 2020. The GOP bill would reverse those gains and then some within a decade.

The consequences would be much more severe than the mere loss of a government health insurance card. According to one analysis of the House bill published last week in the Annals of Internal Medicine by a trio of Harvard-affiliated researchers, those losses of Medicaid coverage would lead to fewer Americans reporting good health, fewer patients getting preventive health screenings, and, at the end of the day, between 8,200 and 24,600 additional annual deaths.

Senate Republicans are not going to adopt the House bill exactly as it is, which means any estimates of its effects are preliminary. But it appears likely GOP senators will keep at least two impactful provisions: new work requirements for many of the people on Medicaid and limits on the financing tools that the states can use to access more federal Medicaid funding. The Harvard study broke out the estimated effects by provision and the results are still foreboding: between 3,000 and 9,000 annual deaths attributable to Medicaid work requirements, and between 4,200 and 12,600 deaths if state provider taxes were completely eliminated.

Even short of the worst-case scenario, Americans’ health would be worse off under the Republican bill, according to researchers Adam Gaffney, David Himmelstein, and Steffie Woolhandler. The number of Americans who have a personal doctor would drop by 700,000 under Medicaid work requirements; 285,000 fewer people would ever get their blood cholesterol checked, and 235,000 fewer patients would ever have their blood sugar tested. The number of women getting a recommended mammogram within the past 12 months would drop by nearly 139,000. And an additional 385,000 people would have to borrow money or skip paying other bills to afford their medical care. The people affected are low-income and disproportionately Black and Hispanic.

There is plenty of uncertainty in these projections. It is also hard to be sure how these policies would interact with each other: The Harvard researchers noted in their cumulative estimate of the House bill’s effects that there would likely be some overlap in the policies’ projected effects when combined together. Some of the people who lose their Medicaid coverage would be able to get insurance by other means, offsetting the losses to a degree that can be difficult to predict.

But the takeaway from the analysis is clear: A lot of people are going to suffer if these proposals become law.

The US is sabotaging its own health care system

The debate in the Senate has not yet concluded, and the bill could still change. Hospitals are busy on Capitol Hill, lobbying Republicans to reduce the spending cuts and warning lawmakers of the devastating consequences that the legislation would have. Some GOP senators are reportedly open to providing additional funding for rural hospitals, to relieve the impact on the facilities that would be hardest hit by the proposed Medicaid cuts.

But after Republicans narrowly failed to roll back Medicaid during Trump’s first term, they seem likely to succeed this time — a step backward from building a true universal health care system.

America’s lack of universal health care is the main reason we spend more money than any other country in the world while seeing worse outcomes. One recent JAMA analysis found that deaths that could be prevented by accessible health care increased in the United States from 2009 to 2019, while declining in most other comparable countries.

You can achieve universal health care via a variety of strategies, including the expansion of private health insurance, but the Republican bill could instead lead to more unnecessary deaths by taking existing benefits away from people, according to the Annals of Internal Medicine study.

Medicaid has actually been a rare bright spot in America’s often dysfunctional health care system. The program has its own problems — not enough doctors participate because of its low reimbursement rates, for one — but since its expansion through the Affordable Care Act in 2010, research has shown that Medicaid allowed more people to access health care, reduced their financial burden from medical services, and improved their physical and mental well-being.

Republican lawmakers and Trump administration officials justify the Medicaid cuts by saying that people who can work should be required to work in order to receive government benefits. They claim nobody who deserves to be on Medicaid will lose their coverage. As one White House official put it to Politico earlier this month: “Medicaid does not belong to people who are here illegally, and it does not belong to capable and able-bodied men who refuse to work. So no one is getting cut.” (Undocumented migrants are already ineligible for federal Medicaid funding. Six states cover undocumented adults through Medicaid using the state’s own funds, and 14 cover undocumented children.)

But independent analysts say that most of the people on Medicaid are either children, elderly, disabled — or adults who are already working or caring for another person — meaning they are limited in their ability to work. Most of the projected coverage losses result from people having paperwork problems in documenting their work or proving they should be exempt from the requirements, not because people are actually ineligible under the new rules.

That aligns with the experience of Arkansas during Trump’s first term. That state tested work requirements in the real world for the first time and 18,000 people lost their health insurance in a matter of months, with no meaningful effect on their employment.

The US has made halting progress in its pursuit of a better health system. In 2010, the uninsured rate was 16 percent. Today, it’s half of that. But in the GOP’s proposed future, the problems that have left Americans so frustrated with their health care system are going to get worse.

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Marlena Fejzo attends the Time Women of the Year event on March 5, 2024, in West Hollywood, California. | Kevin Mazur/Getty Images for Time

Nausea and vomiting during pregnancy have been recorded at least since the Greeks scribbled about it on papyrus some 4,000 years ago. The Romans hypothesized (wrongly) that boys caused more nausea in their mothers and advised women to fast for one day and take a hot wine bath to combat symptoms.

By the 1960s, doctors were prescribing seemingly more effective drugs to combat the barfing. When one such drug, thalidomide, turned out to cause birth defects in the children born to parents who’d taken it, however, the scandal caused a chilling effect on the study of pregnancy nausea.

But the story of how we finally got a scientific answer to why some pregnant people get sicker than others starts with a woman in the 1990s.

After geneticist Marlena Fejzo experienced a debilitating form of pregnancy nausea, called hyperemesis gravidarum, she found very little in the scientific literature attempting to explain why. Then an early career post-doc, Fejzo decided she would set out to find the answer herself.

Pregnancy nausea was not Fejzo’s professional focus at the time she set out to study it, and she didn’t have funding to embark on any formal research, so she embarked on a bit of a DIY inquiry. She posted a survey online in the early days of the internet and received hundreds of replies via fax from people who’d experienced hyperemesis. Those gave her the first clues that the mechanism at play might be genetic.

On the latest episode of the Unexplainable podcast, I talk to Dr. Fejzo about her pregnancy and her path to finding a biological cause and a cure to pregnancy nausea. Listen below, or in the feed of your favorite podcast app.

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Summer has officially begun with a blast of scorching temperatures across much of the United States. The National Weather Service is warning of “extremely dangerous heat” baking 160 million people under a heat dome stretching from the Midwest to the East Coast the rest of this week. It’s already proven fatal.

But while this is the first real taste of extreme heat for Northeastern cities, parts of the country like Texas have been cooking since May. Alaska this month issued its first-ever heat advisory. Forecasters expect more above-average temperatures through the summer.

Summers are indeed getting hotter, a consequence of the warming planet. As the climate heats up, the frequency and intensity of heat waves is increasing and their timing is changing, arriving earlier in the season.

But the damage from extreme heat isn’t spread out evenly, and the more dangerous effects to people are not necessarily found in the hottest places. High temperatures often lead to more emergencies and hospital visits when they represent a big jump from a place’s average, which means ordinarily cooler regions tend to suffer the worst harm from heat. That includes places like Alaska and the Pacific Northwest, where temperatures rarely climb higher than 80 degrees Fahrenheit and most homes don’t have air conditioning.

Now researchers have found that rural areas may suffer more under extreme heat than previously thought. A report from Headwaters Economics and the Federation of American Scientists found that more than half of rural zip codes in the United States, which includes some 11.5 million Americans, have “high” heat vulnerability, a consequence not just of temperatures but unique risk factors that occur far outside of major cities.

The thermometers thus do not tell the whole story about who is likely to suffer from extreme heat — nor do the images, which tend to come from sweltering cities. But understanding the factors that worsen the harm of rising temperatures could help save lives.

What makes the countryside so vulnerable to extreme heat

The discussion around the geography of extreme heat tends to focus on the urban heat island effect. The concrete, asphalt, steel, and glass of dense urban areas act as a sponge for the sun’s rays. Air pollution from cars, trucks, furnaces, and factories helps trap warmer temperatures over cities, and that hotter air, in turn, accelerates the formation of pollutants like ozone. On a hot summer day, a city center can be 25 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than the surrounding regions. And with so many people squeezed into these metropolitan ovens, it adds up to a massive health burden from extreme heat.

But far outside of downtowns, where homes and buildings get farther and farther apart, rural regions face their own long-running challenges that exacerbate the dangers of extreme heat.

A major factor: the median age of the rural population is older than in cities. That matters, because on a physiological level, older adults struggle more to cope with heat than the young. People living in rural communities also have double the rates of chronic health conditions that enhance the damage from heat like high blood pressure and emphysema compared to people living in urban zip codes.

Rural infrastructure is another vulnerability. While there may be more forests and farms in the country that can cool the air, the buildings there are often older, with less adequate insulation and cooling systems for this new era of severe heat. Manufactured and mobile homes, more common in rural areas, are particularly sensitive to heat. In Arizona’s Maricopa County, home to Phoenix, mobile homes make up 5 percent of the housing stock but account for 30 percent of indoor heat deaths.

Even if rural residents have air conditioners and fans, they tend to have lower incomes and thus devote a higher share of their spending for electricity, up to 40 percent more than city dwellers, which makes it less affordable for them to stay cool. That’s if they can get electricity at all: Rural areas are more vulnerable to outages due to older infrastructure and the long distances that power lines have to be routed, creating greater chances of problems like tree branches falling on lines. According to the US Census Bureau, 35.4 percent of households in rural areas experienced an outage over the course of a year, compared to 22.8 percent of households in urban areas.

Sparsely populated communities also have fewer public spaces, such as shopping malls and libraries, where people can pass a hot summer day. Rural economies also depend more on outdoor labor, and there are still no federal workplace heat regulations. Farmworkers, construction crews, and delivery drivers are especially vulnerable to hot weather, and an average of 40 workers die each year from extreme heat.

The health infrastructure is lacking as well. “There is a longstanding healthcare crisis in rural areas,” said Grace Wickerson, senior manager for climate and health at the Federation of American Scientists. There aren’t always nearby clinics and hospitals that can quickly treat heat emergencies. “To really take care of someone when they’re actually in full-on heat stroke, they need to be cooled down in a matter of minutes,” Wickerson said.

The Phoenix Fire Department has now started using ice immersion for heat stroke victims when transporting patients to hospitals to buy precious time. But rural emergency responders are less likely to have tools like this in their ambulances. “In Montana, which has not traditionally seen a lot of extreme heat, you would not have those tools on your truck and not have that awareness to do that cooling. When you see someone who has to also then travel miles to get care, that’s going to worsen their health related outcomes,” Wickerson said.

Emergency response times are generally much longer in rural areas, sometimes extending more than 25 minutes. People also have lower incomes and lower rates of insurance far from cities. Hospitals in rural areas are closing down as well. So when severe heat sets in, rural healthcare systems can get overwhelmed easily.

Looking at data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the US Census Bureau, Wickerson and her collaborators mapped out how all these underlying factors are converging with extreme heat. They found that 59 percent of urban zip codes and 54 percent of rural zip codes are highly vulnerable to extreme heat as defined by the CDC’s Heat and Health Index, meaning they are much more likely to see health problems from extreme heat. So while rural areas may be cooler, the people living there face heat dangers comparable to those in much hotter cities, and geographically, they cover a much wider expanse of the country.

So while temperatures out in the sticks may not climb to the same peaks they do in downtowns, urban heat islands are surrounded by an ocean of rural heat vulnerabilities.

There’s no easy path to cooling off

There are ways to reduce the dangers of scorching weather across vast swaths of the country, but they aren’t fast or cheap. They require big upgrades to infrastructure — more robust energy delivery, more shade and green spaces, better insulation, cool roofs, and more energy-efficient cooling.

Countering extreme heat also requires bigger structural investments to reverse the ongoing rural healthcare crisis where a doctor shortage, hospital closures, and longer emergency response times are converging. But the Republican budget proposal will do the opposite, cutting healthcare access for millions of Americans that would, in turn, lead to dozens of hospitals closing down, mainly in rural areas.

Protecting people from dangerous heat also demands policy changes. Most states don’t have any worker protections on the books for extreme heat. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is in the process of creating the first federal heat safety standard for employers, requiring them to give employees breaks, water, and shade when it gets hot. But it’s not clear how strong the final regulation will be given that the Trump administration has been working to weaken rules across the board.

Cities and local governments could also impose rules that prevent utilities from shutting off power to customers during heat waves, similar to regulations that limit heat shutoffs during the winter.

But there are limits to how much people can adapt to hotter temperatures. Even places with a long history of managing heat are seeing more deaths and hospitalizations as relentless temperatures continue to mount. That means curbing the ongoing warming trend has to be part of the solution as well, reducing greenhouse gas emissions to slow climate change.

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Federal agents guard a federal building and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention center in downtown Los Angeles. | Spencer Platt/Getty Images

Last week, federal agents arrested Brad Lander, a Democrat running for mayor of New York City and the city’s incumbent comptroller, after Lander linked arms with an immigrant the agents sought to detain and asked to see a warrant. Last month, federal officials also arrested Newark’s Democratic Mayor Ras Baraka while Baraka was protesting at a detention facility for immigrants.

A federal law permits sitting members of Congress to enter federal immigration facilities as part of their oversight responsibilities. That didn’t stop the Trump administration from indicting Rep. LaMonica McIver (D-NJ), who was at the same protest as Baraka. Federal officers also detained and handcuffed Sen. Alex Padilla (D-CA) after he tried to ask Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem questions at a press conference.

These arrests are part of a broader campaign by the Trump administration to step up deportations, and to intimidate protesters who object. Most of these incidents are recent enough that the courts have not had time to sort through what happened and determine whether anyone’s constitutional rights were violated. But one thing is all but certain: even if it turns out that federal law enforcement officers flagrantly and deliberately targeted protesters or elected officials, violating the Constitution’s First or Fourth Amendment, nothing will happen to those officers.

The reason why is a pair of fairly recent Supreme Court decisions, which make it nearly impossible to sue a federal officer if they violate your constitutional rights — even if the allegations against that officer are truly shocking. In Hernández v. Mesa (2020), the Court’s Republican majority gave lawsuit immunity to a US Border Patrol officer who fatally shot a Mexican teenager in the face. And in Egbert v. Boule (2022), the majority reaffirmed this immunity — albeit in a case involving a less sympathetic plaintiff.

Both of these cases are part of the Republican justices’ crusade against an older Supreme Court decision known as Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents (1971). Bivens held that federal law enforcement officers who violate the Fourth Amendment — which protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures,” among other things — may be sued for that violation.

Significantly, Bivens ruled that a victorious plaintiff in such a case “is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the Amendment.” So officers faced very real consequences if they violated the Fourth Amendment.

The Court’s current majority, however, appears determined to destroy Bivens. Hernández and Egbert didn’t explicitly overrule Bivens, but they ground down that decision to the point that it has little, if any, remaining force. And the Court appears to be laying the groundwork for a decision eliminating Bivens suits altogether. Significantly, Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion in Hernández warned that “it is doubtful that we would have reached the same result” if Bivens were decided today.

That means that individuals who are unconstitutionally arrested by federal officers, or who face similar violations of their rights, will generally have no recourse against those officers. And that’s likely to embolden the worst officers to violate the Constitution.

Bivens, explained

The Constitution places several restrictions on law enforcement, including the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable arrests and excessive force. But it is silent on what can be done when an officer violates these restrictions.

Bivens, however, held that a right to sue federal officers is implicit in the Constitution itself. An officer who acts unlawfully “in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.” And so it follows, Bivens explained, that there must be a meaningful remedy to ensure that officers do not abuse this power.

In fairness, the Supreme Court started limiting Bivens suits not long after that case was handed down. Shortly after Bivens was decided, President Richard Nixon replaced two justices, creating a new majority on the Court that was more favorable to law enforcement. But the Court only recently signaled that it intends to destroy Bivens altogether. In Egbert, the Court’s Republican majority declared that courts must reject Bivens suits if there is “any rational reason (even one)” to do so. Even a minor factual discrepancy between a new case and Bivens, such as the fact that the officers who violated the Constitution belong to a different agency than the officers in Bivens, is frequently enough to defeat a Bivens suit.

President Donald Trump took office on twin promises to crack down on both undocumented immigrants and his perceived enemies — “I am your retribution,” he told supporters in 2023 — and it’s not hard to see how decisions like Egbert and Hernández enable him to do so.

The Republican justices argue that nullifying Bivens is necessary to restore a more traditional vision of “the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power.” The Supreme Court, under this vision of the separation of powers, may not determine that a right to sue federal officers is implicit in the Constitution. This right, according to Alito, must come from an explicit act of Congress.

Alito’s historical claim, that Bivens departed from a traditional understanding of the role of Congress and the courts, is somewhat dubious; the courts permitted at least some suits against federal officials who break the law for most of American history. In Little v. Barreme (1804), for example, the Supreme Court held that a Navy officer who unlawfully seized a neutral ship “must pay such damages as are legally awarded against him.” More recently, in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. (1949), the Court declared that “the principle that an agent is liable for his own torts ‘is an ancient one, and applies even to certain acts of public officers or public instrumentalities.’”

Hernández’s call for granting immunity to federal officials would also have more credibility if the Republican justices hadn’t recently ruled that Trump has broad immunity from prosecution if he uses the powers of the presidency to commit crimes. This concept of presidential immunity appears nowhere in the Constitution, and it certainly has no place in American legal tradition — among other things, why would President Gerald Ford have pardoned former President Richard Nixon for crimes Nixon committed in office, if Nixon were immune from prosecution?

The Court, in other words, appears determined to remove legal obstacles that might have deterred federal officials from behaving illegally in the past — regardless of what the law or legal traditions might dictate. And it removed important obstacles right before the United States took a dangerously authoritarian turn.

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A boathouse at an old Boy Scouts of America camp in Milton, New York, in 2017. | John Carl D’Annibale/Albany Times Union via Getty Images

Summer camp. It’s where kids go every year to make friends, find their long-lost twin, or even evade a slasher wreaking havoc on the campers and counselors. At least, that’s what pop culture would lead you to believe: For the outsized space they take up in our consciousness, going to camp for the summer isn’t actually all that common.

“It has never been the case that the majority of American children went to summer camps,” says Leslie Paris, an associate professor at the University of British Columbia and author of the book Children’s Nature: The Rise of the American Summer Camp.

“The first camps were founded by urban middle-class men,” she told Vox. “They were concerned about white boys who they saw as not getting enough outdoor adventure and the kind of manly experiences they would need to be — in the minds of these adults — the nation’s leaders for the next generation. They were worried about the effects of urbanization, and they were nostalgic for an earlier day when more boys had grown up in rural places.”

How did camp begin to be available for more kids? And if so few people actually attend, then why does summer camp have such lasting cultural influence? Those are just a few of the questions we posed to Paris on the latest episode of Explain It to Me, Vox’s weekly call-in podcast. Below is an excerpt of the conversation with Paris, edited for length and clarity.

You can listen to Explain It to Me on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get podcasts. If you’d like to submit a question, send an email to [email protected] or call 1-800-618-8545.

How did camp expand beyond the audience it was originally created for?

The YMCA movement became involved, and by the turn of the century the movement started really ramping up. Not only because more YMCA camps were founded, but because different organizations got involved and more groups of American adults thought this camp idea would be great.

By the turn of the century, you’ve got small numbers of women leading groups of girls out into the wilderness. Many of the women who started camps were college-educated and saw leading girls and giving them adventures as a kind of passion.

Then there were urban organizations that began to say, “This would be great for impoverished working-class kids who never get out of the city at all,” and began sending groups of kids out into the country, often for shorter stays than at private camps.

In the early 20th century, you’ve got a bunch of new movements: the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, the Campfire Girls. And then there are different ethnic and religious groups: Jewish Americans, Catholic Americans, who think, Let’s start camps for our own kids, and they do that as well.

By the early 20th century there’s a bevy of different kinds of camps organized for a wider variety of kids to give them an experience of the outdoors.

You write in your book that “this triple nostalgia — for the American past, for camp community, and for individual childhood experience — is critical to understanding why camps have figured so influentially in American culture and in former campers’ lives.” I’d love for you to talk about that a little bit more.

One of the things I talk about in my book is that camps were a place where children learned nostalgia, that camps taught them a version of the American past. I think many of us are familiar with a use of Indigenous cultural practices that was often quite superficial, but that was meant to introduce non-Indigenous children to one aspect of the American past. Camps were often a place where children were exposed to ideas about what the American past had been, and then as more generations of children attended camps, they themselves brought those kinds of nostalgic memories with them, throughout their lives.

When they had a chance, many of those former children sent their own kids to camp. So this became a kind of a nostalgic cultural practice that for many adults reminded them of the first time that they had an adventure away from their parents, away from their families.

It’s so interesting you talk about Indigenous culture and how that’s been used at camp. It makes me think of that scene in [Addams Family Values] where Wednesday’s at camp. Why does camp feature so prominently in pop culture if so few of us went?

You could ask, Why are so many children’s novels premised around an orphan? I think the fact that the kid is an orphan in these novels allows them to go off and have adventures and do things that many kids raised in families would not necessarily be at liberty to do.

And I think camps have often represented that space, a space that’s at least ostensibly protected, where kids have more free play and can have exciting adventures and develop peer relationships that are outside of the norm. And that piece lends itself really well to popular culture.

Camp is so specific. How did you choose this as an academic subject?

I knew that I wanted to work on American childhood, which was still a pretty small field in the 1990s, when I started this project. There wasn’t a major scholarly book about the history of summer camps at the time and it seemed like a wonderful way to write about something that would be fun to work on. One of the things that I look at in my book is how camps illuminate the ways in which childhood was being transformed in the late 19th and early 20th century.

That’s so interesting. I imagine that changes at summer camp also reflect changes in American childhood overall. I’d love to hear in broad strokes about some of those changes. How have we seen camp and therefore childhood change over time?

One of the main changes that I look at is the rise of the idea of protected childhood. That childhood should be a time apart and children should be protected from the adult world. The late 19th, early 20th century is the same time when you see laws restricting children’s labor. There’s an emphasis on child protection that’s emerging during this period, and camps are one of the early sites of this new idea that children are deserving of spaces apart, time apart, and also that they’re deserving of vacations.

Although many of the elite kids who attended more expensive private camps were certainly going to have vacations whether or not they went to summer camp, some of the working-class kids at the turn of the 20th century who attended summer camps had never been on a vacation outside of the city.

Summer camp has become this huge business these days in the United States, $3.5 billion annually. How did that happen?

The camp industry has had to be nimble and change over time, especially since the 1970s, which was a time when many camps struggled and a number failed.

The camping industry underwent some structural changes. One of these was the rise of specialty camps: Basketball camp, computer camp, gymnastics camp, dance camp, theater camp — camps that were focused on a really specific interest emerged in the late 20th century.

Another issue was that many families who could afford private camps were starting to juggle more different opportunities. The cost of travel by plane was going down, so more families were thinking, Maybe at some point this summer we’d like to take the kids on a trip. There was also a rise in [divorce] and families had to negotiate custody. So even camps that used to have a nine-week schedule increasingly considered moving to a two-session schedule.

Modern summer camps have retained many of the same elements as some of the earliest camps, but they’ve also adjusted to the increasing complexity of some of their clients’ lives, and in that way the camp industry has continued to be able to thrive.

And there’s another issue, which is that camps have also always provided child care, and this has been important for parents since the very beginning. It’s been a boon for parents who could relax knowing that their kids were away, especially families trying to juggle complicated child care arrangements in the summer when there was no school.

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President Donald Trump delivers an address to the nation accompanied by Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth from the White House on June 21, 2025. | Carlos Barria/Getty Images

President Donald Trump is now the most unpopular he has been during his second term.

More than half of American adults disapprove of the job he is doing, and he’s underwater on nearly every important issue of the day.

The polling averages show this net disapproval clearly: On the economy, he’s down 13 percentage points. On inflation, he’s down 20 points. Even on immigration, he’s down 2 points. (Those negative marks include foreign policy, though it’s too soon to say how the public is reacting to Trump’s decision to join Israel’s bombing of Iran.)

Still, Trump’s popularity decline has been a dramatic development: After entering office with a positive approval rating and popular support for his agenda, he’s squandered much of it away through various political fights, policy decisions, and public spectacles.

That reversal has come in fits and starts, yet also demonstrated a curious trend in Trump’s popularity. When Trump is at the center of the news, using his bully pulpit and making high-profile efforts to pursue his agenda, his popularity falls. When he recedes into the background, and the public is focused elsewhere, his popularity somewhat recovers.

In short, the more people pay attention to Trump, the less they like him — which creates a kind of conundrum. Trump, who’s uniquely capable of capturing the limelight, has shown he’s also incapable (or unwilling) to do anything quietly.

Immigration policy is the latest example of this trend. Public opinion turned sharply against Trump’s response to protests in California over raids by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Views of his deployment of the National Guard and a few hundred US Marines to the West Coast have similarly been resoundingly negative. And overall views of Trump’s immigration policy, as a result, have fallen to their lowest point this year, per tracking polls by YouGov.

Beyond any one policy, these trends in public opinion suggest that Trump is turbocharging two features of modern presidential politics. The first is the idea of negative polarization: that members of one political party are bound together and mobilize against an opposing political party or movement more strongly than for their own side. And the second is of the electorate as operating a thermostat: preferring the opposite opinion or direction to whatever the president, or party in power, says.

These shifts matter. They tell us a lot about Trump-era politics and about how modern American politics might exist after him. And they offer a clue as to how the public might react to American military involvement in the Middle East. Presidents tend to see a public boost — a rally-around-the-flag effect — when America gets involved in military conflicts. Will Trump’s popularity rebound? Or will this be yet another example of Trump being different?

Does the American public actually prefer inaction?

A quick scan of the last six months of Trump’s job approval shows something remarkably consistent: Almost every time Trump makes a big policy move or announcement, the public recoils in disapproval.

This dynamic is most pronounced in three sharp spikes in disapproval: after Elon Musk and the so-called Department of Government Efficiency rampaged across the federal government, after the rollout of tariffs, and as Trump picked a fight in California over ICE deportations.

DOGE kicked off the downward slump in his approval rating and popular support for his policies, in mid-March. As Trump reined in Musk, and DOGE faced more obstacles and public scrutiny, it began to fade from headlines, and Trump’s approval rating began to recover.

Then the cycle repeated. As Trump mulled a trade war and signaled he would implement a new tariff regime in late March and early April, views on his handling of inflation, trade, and the economy began to nosedive. Disapproval of his trade and tariff approach, in particular, spiked during the late-March to mid-April period when “Liberation Day” tariffs were being announced and the stock market was roiled with instability and distrust.

Since Trump ratcheted down his policy and softened his public entrenchment on tariffs, his ratings have stabilized, and even recovered a bit, according to an average of polls maintained by the pollster Adam Carlson.

The same cycle would play out again when Trump turned his attention to immigration policy, historically his best issue. Views of his approach to immigration and mass deportations have been much more volatile since late March and mid-April, when high-profile arrests and detentions of foreign-born students and immigrants began to dominate the news. It was around this time that the legal showdowns over Kilmar Ábrego García’s deportation to a Salvadoran prison dominated headlines, and public opinion over Trump’s immigration approach began to turn negative.

For most of the period from his inauguration to April, Trump had enjoyed positive ratings on immigration. His mass deportation pledges were still popular with most Americans. But hunkering down on those mid-spring decisions resulted in the public turning against Trump’s position. His immigration ratings saw a dive, which only began to recover once Trump backed down and turned his priorities on Congress and his legislative agenda.

Like a switch, public opinion on immigration policy began to get more positive during a time when Trump wasn’t really creating that much news around the topic, until ICE raids began to pick up steam and small protests began to erupt in Democratic cities. His aggressive response — federalizing the National Guard and sending Marines to Southern California — has again triggered a collapse in public views. According to YouGov, approval of Trump’s handling of immigration is now the lowest it’s been this year, and it is lower than it was at this point during his first term.

It’s all a bit confusing: Trump is doing what he repeatedly promised to do during his campaign — the same campaign that won him enough popular support for a second term in the White House. The public, however, is punishing him for it.

Trump isn’t the first president to deal with a reflexive public

This weird seesaw of the public reacting negatively to big policy decisions Trump makes is a defining characteristic of modern politics. He isn’t the first president to deal with a reflexively reactionary public, as both Joe Biden and Barack Obama experienced this during their presidencies. Both Democratic presidents saw drops in public support once they began to implement their agendas, be it the Affordable Care Act beginning in 2009, or Biden’s legislative packages and Afghanistan withdrawal in the summer and fall of 2021.

And so Trump’s two terms seem to fit this pattern, what some political scientists call the “thermostatic” model of public opinion. This basic idea — that public opinion shifts in the opposite direction of whatever direction the government takes — is a powerful predictor, but it doesn’t fully explain Trump’s second term.

Just like you’d turn a thermostat’s temperature up or down depending on the feeling in a room, the public reacts positively or negatively depending on the actions taken by a president and party in power.

Plenty of political research demonstrates this thermostat in action: the public supporting spending cuts when the government begins to spend more, the public growing more liberal on social issues when a conservative president seizes on it (as on immigration and racial justice during the Trump years), support for the Affordable Care Act rising when Republicans try to cut it. These anti-incumbent shifts then suggest future political advantage for the political party or movement out of power.

But just because the public is cooling on Trump, that doesn’t mean it, so far, is warming to Democrats — or even to liberal policy positions.

Public views of the Democratic Party are still resoundingly negative: a little more than a third of Americans have favorable views of the party or of Democrats in Congress, both lower than views of Republicans. Democrats only enjoy a slight advantage in generic polling ahead of midterms next year. And views toward immigration in general, for example, are still much more negative than they’ve been at any point since 9/11, per Gallup tracking data. The pro-immigrant shift the country saw during Trump’s first term hasn’t materialized this time.

Will this trend hold?

With the US now embroiled in a highly fluid, quickly evolving conflict with Iran, it’s not at all clear if this thermostatic trend is holding: There hasn’t been enough time to definitively poll those views, and it’s likely that many people are still forming their opinions.

According to a weekend snap poll conducted by YouGov, more Americans disapprove of US bombings of nuclear sites than approve, but about 1 in 5 are withholding forming an opinion as of now. That poll was conducted after Trump announced the military strikes but before Iran carried out its own wave of missile launches against US bases in Qatar and Iraq. And whatever kind of escalation or deescalation comes next will influence how public opinion shifts.

Still, there are reasons to think the anti-Trump trend will hold. Military action against Iran was already unpopular before the US got involved. Plenty of Americans were wary of Israel’s preemptive strikes earlier this month as well. And many Republicans opposed US involvement in military conflicts in the Middle East before this weekend. Of course, many of those Republicans will likely sort themselves to align with the position of their party leader. But how long that holds is another question.

Any kind of rally-around-the-flag effect that might result from this conflict also doesn’t seem likely to be durable, as of now. Presidents have tended to enjoy a small bump in approval when the US conducts highly visible military operations: It happened for both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush during the Gulf War and 9/11, and for Obama after the killing of Osama bin Laden.

But as the Democratic strategist Dan Pfeiffer has pointed out, these poll boosts have been getting smaller over time as the effect of polarization has grown. And Trump is already massively unpopular, meaning any boost he gets isn’t likely to get him a majority of the country’s support.

This news story seems likely to get bigger, particularly if Trump chooses to respond to Iran’s retaliatory strike. And that will feed the key determinant of this public opinion trend: Whatever position Trump takes becomes the defining, totalizing news story of the day. For now, all other news stories seem to have taken a backseat to this military conflict. And when Trump dominates the news, this trend becomes clearer.

Of course, other things could happen. It will take time for the public to process these developments. And more domestic news will be coming in the months ahead, as massive tax, health insurance, and public assistance cuts included in Trump’s reconciliation bill (the “big” and “beautiful” one) have yet to become law and receive the same public scrutiny other Trump policy moves have. So there’s a lot more to come. But for now, it seems like the public thermostat is working overtime.

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From Vox via this RSS feed

President Donald Trump with Chief Justice John Roberts, at the US Capitol on March 4, 2025. | Win McNamee/Getty Images

In a short, one-paragraph order, the Republican justices ruled on Monday evening that President Donald Trump may effectively nullify a federal law and an international treaty that is supposed to protect immigrants from torture. The Court’s order in Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. does not explain the GOP’s justices’ reasoning, although Justice Sonia Sotomayor responds to their silent decision in a 19-page dissent joined by her two Democratic colleagues.

The Court’s order is only temporary, and will permit Trump to send immigrants to countries where they may be tortured while the D.V.D. case is fully litigated. It is possible that one or more of the Court’s Republicans could reverse course at a later date. But it is hard to know what arguments might persuade them to do so because the justices in the majority did not explain why they decided this case the way they did.

Federal law requires that the United States shall not “expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” This statute implements a treaty, known as the Convention Against Torture, which the United States ratified over three decades ago.

Trump’s lawyers, however, claim that they uncovered a loophole that permits the Trump administration to bypass these laws, at least with respect to some immigrants.

Typically, before a noncitizen may be removed from the United States, they are entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge. The immigration judge will inform the person facing deportation which countries they might be sent to, allowing the noncitizen to object to any countries where they fear they may be tortured. If the immigration judge determines that these objections are sufficiently serious to trigger the Convention Against Torture’s protections, the judge may still issue an order permitting the immigrant to be deported — but not to the nation or nations the immigrant raised objections about.

The D.V.D. case involves noncitizens who have already been through this process. In their case, an immigration judge determined that they may be deported, but not to specific countries. After the hearing process was complete, however, the Trump administration unexpectedly announced that it would deport the D.V.D. plaintiffs to other nations that were not previously under consideration.

That means that no immigration judge has determined whether these immigrants may be sent to those particular nations, and the immigrants have not been given a meaningful opportunity to object to the new countries where they are about to be deported. Using this loophole, the Trump administration seeks to deport them without a new hearing.

The Trump administration, moreover, appears to have intentionally selected countries where the noncitizens are likely to be unsafe. It wishes to deport many of these immigrants to South Sudan, for example, a country that was recently in a civil war, and where an uneasy peace appears to be collapsing. Others are slated for removal to Libya despite the fact that, according to Sotomayor’s dissent, they “would have landed in Tripoli in the midst of violence caused by opposition to their arrival.”

The Trump administration, in other words, appears to have created a deadly trap for immigrants who fear torture in their home nations. These noncitizens may object to being sent home under the Convention Against Torture, and an immigration judge may even rule in their favor. But the Trump administration may still send them somewhere else even more dangerous.

If you are interested in the specific legal arguments Trump’s lawyers raised to justify this trap, I summarized them here. But, again, it is not possible to determine which of these arguments persuaded a majority of the justices because those justices did not even bother to explain their decision.

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An Iranian cleric stands next to a scale model of an Iran-made surface-to-surface missile, which is displayed during an anti-Israeli protest at Palestine Square in downtown Tehran, Iran, on April 9, 2025. | Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images

President Donald Trump has framed his strikes on Iran as a costless triumph. The president is not asking Americans to accept sacrifices in service of destroying the Iranian nuclear program — only to applaud his already successful destruction of it.

“Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated,” Trump declared Saturday night. “Iran, the bully of the Middle East, must now make peace. If they do not, future attacks will be far greater and a lot easier.”

It’s possible that Trump’s war will unwind as advertised. The Iranian regime finds itself in a state of profound weakness. Israel has gutted its air defenses and flies largely unharried through its skies. Iran’s nuclear facilities are badly damaged, while many of its top atomic scientists and military leaders lie dead. Its most fearsome partner militias — Hezbollah and Hamas — are badly degraded. Its longtime allies in Damascus have been deposed. Its friends in Moscow seem to have too much on their own plates to lend much of a hand.

From this precarious position, the Iranian leadership might conclude that it can ill afford an escalating conflict with the world’s greatest military power. Perhaps, it will follow the same basic playbook it did following Trump’s assasination of its military leader Qasem Soleimani in 2020: Back then, Iran responded with face-saving strikes on US military bases in Iraq — but ones that it heavily telegraphed, enabling American soldiers to take cover and retain their lives, which in turn allowed Trump to call things even and end the conflict. Iran’s strike on a US base in Qatar on Monday could be interpreted as fitting this mold: The US said that it had advanced warning of the strike and that there were no American casualties.

What’s more, it is even possible that the Iranian regime could conclude that its nuclear program is more trouble than it’s worth and sheepishly return to the bargaining table, now ready to accept more stringent restrictions on its freedom to enrich uranium or build ballistic missiles.

But such rosy outcomes are far from certain. And if things do not transpire as Trump hopes, his war could impose significant costs on the American people — in terms of money, blood, and nuclear security.

How Trump’s war on Iran could impact the economy

For Americans, the most widely felt consequences of Trump’s war with Iran would likely be economic. Oil prices have climbed by more than 12 percent since the end of May, when Israel began threatening to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. An escalating US-Iran conflict could further elevate Americans’ energy costs.

The nightmare scenario here concerns the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s only waterway connecting the Persian Gulf with the open ocean. Each day, about 20 million barrels of oil — or about 20 percent of the world’s total supply — moves through the strait. Iran could plausibly choke off all shipping through the waterway if it wished to do so. And on Sunday, the Iranian Parliament reportedly approved such a course of action, although it remains up to the nation’s Supreme National Security Council to enact a blockade.

Were Iran to take that extraordinary measure, the price of oil could shoot up past $130 a barrel, according to industry analysts (as of this writing, a barrel is trading at $72). That would dramatically increase the costs of energy and transportation for US consumers. And since energy is an input into the production of more or less every good and service, a sustained blockade could push up prices more broadly. Faced with higher inflation, the Federal Reserve would likely scrap plans for cutting interest rates. In this scenario, Americans would see lower real wages and higher borrowing costs than they would have enjoyed in a world where Trump did not bomb Iran.

It’s worth saying that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely. Were Iran to pursue such a policy, it would effectively be sabotaging its own economy, which is heavily dependent on exporting oil via the waterway. Nevertheless, the threat of disrupting shipping through the strait is the regime’s greatest point of leverage over other world powers.

Iran could also disrupt global commerce in more modest ways. Tehran is allied with Yemen’s Houthi militia, which is already threatening to recommence its attacks on US ships in the Red Sea. Any disruption to Red Sea trade could increase global shipping costs, which would eventually bleed into US consumer prices.

Alternatively, Iran could strike oil and gas infrastructure in Middle Eastern countries allied with the United States. In a 2019 drone attack allegedly backed by Tehran, the Houthis bombed two major oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, temporarily cutting the country’s oil production in half and spiking crude prices.

At a moment when the president’s tariffs are already nudging up the cost of imports, any war-related disruptions to global trade could prove painful for American households.

Trump’s attack has put American soldiers in harm’s way

As Monday’s attack on US troops in Qatar demonstrated, Americans stationed in the Middle East face a far graver threat than more expensive gasoline. More than 40,000 US soldiers are serving on bases and warships in the region, well within reach of Iranian missiles.

Trump’s bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities represented a far broader and more destructive attack than his strike against Soleimani five years ago. It’s reasonable to fear that Tehran’s response will be proportionally more severe, and that Monday’s strikes at Qatar represent only the beginning of its retaliation. At least, this is what the regime is telling Americans to expect.

“Any country in the region or elsewhere that is used by American forces to strike Iran will be considered a legitimate target for our armed forces,” Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said Saturday. “America has attacked the heart of the Islamic world and must await irreparable consequences.”

Some of these “consequences” could transpire on American soil. Although Iran’s immediate targets will likely lie close to home. Years after the Soleimani strike, Iran allegedly orchestrated failed assassination attempts against former national security adviser John Bolton, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Donald Trump.

According to US officials who spoke with NBC News, Iran warned Trump at this year’s G7 Summit that it could respond to an American strike on its nuclear facilities by perpetrating terrorist attacks within the United States. The regime claimed to have sleeper cells in America ready and waiting to commit such violence.

Trump may have made an Iranian nuclear weapon more likely

Trump’s war with Iran may risk making all Americans poorer while getting some of us killed. But in his administration’s ostensible view, these potential harms pale in comparison to the threat posed by Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon — a threat that Saturday’s strikes greatly mitigated.

It is not obvious how much Americans actually have at stake in preventing Iran from developing atomic weapons. No serious analyst believes that the Iranian regime is suicidal. Tehran is not going to order a nuclear first strike against the United States or any other country. Rather, it almost certainly sees nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent against both foreign intervention and domestic challenges to its authoritarian regime.

Nevertheless, all else equal, Americans have an interest in preventing nuclear proliferation. Were Iran to acquire an atomic weapon, Saudi Arabia would be liable to pursue its own. And a nuclear arms race in the Middle East would increase the tail risk of a future atomic catastrophe.

And yet, it is possible that Trump’s strikes on Iran have actually made that nation’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon more likely.

Before Saturday’s bombings, Iran was engaged in negotiations over its nuclear program without the United States. And Tehran had previously reached an agreement to limit its enrichment of uranium in 2015, a nuclear deal that Trump tore up during his first term in office.

Now, all diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program appears dead. And Tehran may see a nuclear weapon as more indispensable for its security than ever before. After all, the regime’s conventional military defenses have proven grossly inadequate to deter or defeat Israeli and American incursions.

Already, Iranian officials are signalling that the nation will withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a move that would mean an end to the nation’s cooperation with United Nations inspections of its uranium enrichment. At present, the UN’s nuclear watchdog says it is uncertain about where Iran is storing the highly enriched uranium it has already produced. Tehran claims that, before Trump’s strikes, it had moved its uranium stockpiles out of the three sites that he targeted.

American and Israeli bombing has surely undermined Iran’s capacity to produce weapons-grade uranium. Tehran has lost some of its top nuclear scientists and suffered massive damage to its enrichment facilities. But Iran retains both the technical know-how and raw materials necessary for building an atomic bomb. And the world may have now lost visibility into its nuclear activities.

Ultimately, it is impossible for anyone to know with certainty what America’s war with Iran will bring. But what we do know is that, in the immediate term, Trump’s strikes have made Americans less safe, while heightening the risks to our economy — all in service of a geopolitical goal that likely could have been achieved through peaceful means, and which was not necessarily advanced by Saturday’s violence.

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People march in Times Square during a rally calling for the Trump administration not to go to war with Iran on June 18, 2025 in New York City. | Adam Gray/Getty Images

Over the weekend, the United States bombed three nuclear facilities in Iran. Iran has been considered a political risk to America since the 1979 revolution, and President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that it cannot be allowed to possess nuclear weapons. The strikes mark yet another attempt in a long-running US strategy to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

But whether Trump’s strikes will achieve his stated aim of destroying Iran’s nuclear program is unclear. It doesn’t help that his plan around the attacks has felt haphazard. Trump said Iran had a two-week deadline before he would authorize a strike — then attacked only two days later. Even just before the bombs were dropped Trump was telling the press that targeting nuclear facilities may not even be an option, saying “I may or I may not do it.” Trump stated in his 2024 election victory speech that he was “not going to start a war,” yet he has now hinted on social media that regime change could be next.

Trump could be accused of simply being chaotic here. But this is a deliberate strategy. Trump has a history of being intentionally unpredictable when it comes to foreign policy, known as the unpredictability doctrine. Drawing from his experiences in his previous career in business, Trump says being predictable is bad. When the other side doesn’t know what you are going to do, you are in control. His plan is also about creating uncertainty. You make your opponent unsure of what they are facing and unable to make decisions in response, leaving you to take the advantage.

But foreign policy is not business, and a strategy that works with corporations may backfire on the world stage. While nobody knows exactly what will happen next, what can we work out about the implications of Trump’s actions now given what has worked (or hasn’t) before in terms of nuclear arms control?

Strikes now, problems later

Countries may consider military strikes on nuclear facilities when they feel that the other side  won’t cooperate in negotiations. For example, Israel, believing that Iraq would never be serious about a diplomatic solution, bombed an Iraqi enrichment facility at Osirak in 1981 to stymie the nuclear program. The preventive attack did serious damage to the facility, and Israel claimed they had disrupted Iraq’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon by destroying the facility before it became functional. A similar aim was likely a factor in Trump’s thinking on targeting Iran.

Yet military strikes are rarely as clear-cut as they look on paper. They may seem like a simple solution to a dangerous problem by stopping a nuclear program in its tracks. They also deliver results faster than diplomatic options, which can take a lot of time and do not come with any guarantee of a solution.

But while Trump may like to think that a few strikes will do the job, using bombs now could create problems for any future US strategy toward Iran — whatever that strategy turns out to be.

The first problem is that we do not yet know whether the strikes were entirely successful in taking out the targets. To work properly, a military attack should completely destroy the target facilities to ensure they cannot work. If a facility is even partially functioning after a strike, that state can still run a nuclear program, albeit a reduced one. While Iraq did not go on to develop nuclear weapons after Osirak, it still had sufficient resources to maintain a plan. In fact, some experts argue that the attack only encouraged Iraq to pursue this.

While there is evidence of physical damage after Trump’s strikes, whether this is enough damage to undermine Iran’s nuclear capability remains uncertain. Trump is saying that the three targeted facilities in Iran were “obliterated.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has also reported that the attacks have “devastated the Iranian nuclear program.” Iran, however, has downplayed the extent of the destruction. The fact that Trump’s former aide, Steve Bannon, can’t even pronounce the name of one of the facilities, Fordow, properly doesn’t exactly build confidence in the administration’s assessment.

It’s also unclear how many nuclear facilities are left outside of the three that were bombed. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently cautioned that there could be clandestine facilities that we just do not know about. Trump himself has claimed there are “many targets left,” which indicates that Iran still has at least part of an operational program.

And now, any future efforts by Iran would also likely be even more secretive and underground, making it more difficult to detect and target in potential future strikes.

Even if the US has destabilized the nuclear plan, Iran can still rebuild. In 2010, America tried to disrupt the Iranian program in a cyberattack using a computer worm called Stuxnet against the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. The virus caused the reactors there to slow down and crash. The attack did a lot of damage but — as the current situation shows — Iran was able to continue the program.

So it’s possible that the recent bombings could slow down Iran’s progress, but it won’t eliminate the overall and long-term risks. It also will not affect Iran’s ability to retaliate with conventional weapons.

A second problem is that the bombings could now attract such a retaliation. Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has already said that the US “must receive a response to their aggression.” Iran has also publicly stated that it is considering a “proportionate” responses. This could potentially look like a repeat of Iran’s response to the 2020 assassination of General Qasem Soleimani in which Trump ordered a drone strike against the Iranian leader. Trump said the killing was to prevent a terrorist attack against a US embassy. Responding to Soleimani’s death, Iran launched a retaliatory attack against two US air bases in Iraq.

The incentive for Iran to retaliate is even greater this time. The US has not just taken out a key leadership figure but directly threatened the state itself and its nuclear program at a time of intense conflict with Israel — and the US, where Trump is seen as having entered the war as a result of the weekend strikes. There is now an even higher chance that Iran will fight back this time because it is already fighting, and it could use that war as an opportunity to target the US.

Upping the game by using bombs will also encourage escalation by the US. This may be exactly what Trump wants. Yet it is also the case that the situation makes it difficult for him to do anything else. If Iran doesn’t show signs of giving in and continues its nuclear ambitions, Trump may be forced to take further action. If he doesn’t, it would look like Iran has won, even with three facilities destroyed.

Diplomatic options still on the table?

So what’s next?

While suggesting that regime change could be in the cards, Trump has also talked about a diplomatic solution, and this is what many other states would prefer. Using diplomatic negotiations instead of bombs has proven effective — at least partially — in the past, as seen by international agreements to control the global proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Negotiations have also convinced countries, such as Ukraine, to give up their nuclear arsenals. Trump has even relied on diplomacy with states that he has tense relationships with, like North Korea, although some analysts question how effective this has been, not least given that North Korea still has nuclear weapons.

If Trump is serious about diplomacy, then the bombing will make this difficult at best, impossible at worst. Trump was clearly hoping that the attacks might soften Iran up for negotiations if he decided to go down that road. He said the attacks should be taken as a sign for Iran to “make peace” or face “far greater” attacks in the future. This strategy isn’t working so far.

When Trump initially threatened strikes, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warned that such a move would “undoubtedly be accompanied by irreparable damage” to US-Iran relations. Iran has now repeated this line, saying the impact of the strikes will have “everlasting consequences.” There’s no evidence that Iran would allow itself to be forced into negotiating through threats alone. The solution in Ukraine worked because it was based on a peaceful and collaborative process, not because it was done under duress.

It is also worth remembering — as Iran certainly will —  that Trump is the one responsible for the failure of a previous diplomatic solution. He was the one who walked away from a nuclear deal called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This agreement — between Iran and the US, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and Germany — aimed to restrict Iran’s nuclear ambitions through demands, such as getting rid of its medium-enriched uranium and not build heavy-water reactors. In return, these countries would reduce their economic sanctions on Iran.

Trump said this was a “one-sided deal” that “didn’t bring peace, and it never will” and pulled out in 2018. Whatever misgivings he had about the deal, it means the US will find it hard to introduce new diplomatic measures now. Trump’s perceived lack of commitment reduces the chance that Iran would be willing to talk cooperatively with the US and its allies. While Iran was clearly willing to work diplomatically before, why would it now sit down with someone it feels can’t be trusted to stick to an agreed solution? This is especially the case when that someone has just bombed them and is now talking about regime change.

Whatever Trump has planned next, his decision to carry out strikes has radically limited both his options and the chances of de-escalation. Based on what we’ve seen in previous attempts at arms control and conflict resolution, Trump may have unnecessarily inflamed the conflict, left the US open to Iranian retaliation, ruined the option of future diplomacy, and provoked Iran into developing a nuclear weapon. This is a strategy that has a high chance of exploding at some point — if not now in terms of an Iranian escalation, then in the future in the form of a revitalized nuclear program.

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A puma, or mountain lion, seen by a motion-sensing camera near the border wall. | Courtesy of Ganesh Marín

The border wall between the US and Mexico is, of course, a barrier meant to prevent human migrants from crossing into America as they seek work, family, or refuge from violence.

It’s also a significant barrier to ranging wildlife.

The border wall, a centerpiece of President Donald Trump’s agenda, cuts through a rugged, unique ecosystem home to hundreds of native species, from jaguars and pumas to black bears and deer. These animals often need to move to survive, whether to find a source of water or a mate.

We know the wall is impassable for many species, potentially lowering their chance of survival. How exactly the border affects this rich ecosystem, however, has largely been a mystery.

A new study, among the first of its kind, finally offers some answers — by essentially spying on animals near the border. For the research, ecologist and lead author Ganesh Marín, then a doctoral researcher at the University of Arizona, set up 85 motion-sensing cameras in northeastern Sonora, Mexico, along and south of the US border in Arizona and New Mexico. Throughout the course of the research, when animals walked by, the cameras began recording.

Over roughly two years, from 2020 to 2022, the cameras captured hundreds of hours of footage, including more than 21,000 clips with mammals, said Marín, a National Geographic Explorer and postdoctoral scientist at the nonprofit Conservation Science Partners.

“This place is so special because you see these tropical species, like ocelots and jaguars, at the same time as beavers and black bears,” Marín told me earlier this year when I was reporting on borderland jaguars.

Some of the recordings are pretty incredible. In this clip, for example, a young puma, or mountain lion, makes a chirping sound, likely calling for its mother.

Courtesy of Ganesh Marín

Or check out this jaguar approaching the camera. This particular cat is known as Bonito. Scientists first detected this cat in 2020 and can identify him by his markings.

Courtesy of Ganesh Marín

Marín’s cameras detected another jaguar, as well, called Valerio. He was seen by cameras multiple times in a protected area known as Cuenca Los Ojos just south of the border in Sonora.

Courtesy of Ganesh Marín

The camera traps caught black bears and their cubs…

Courtesy of Ganesh Marín

Courtesy of Ganesh Marín

…bobcats and coyotes…

Courtesy of Ganesh Marín

Courtesy of Ganesh Marín

…and even an ocelot, an elusive predatory cat.

Courtesy of Ganesh Marín

Analyzing the videos ultimately revealed several important details about wildlife in the borderlands. Marín found that large mammals, such as black bears and deer, as well as some smaller herbivores, spend less time near the border than in other, more remote stretches of his study region. That suggests these animals avoid border infrastructure.

Other species, like the pronghorn, which have been seen on the US side of the border, didn’t appear in his cameras at all. That may be because they have trouble crossing a highway that runs roughly parallel to the border in Sonora, according to Marín and his co-author, John L. Koprowski, a biologist at the University of Wyoming.

Meanwhile, smaller common predators like coyotes and bobcats appeared more tolerant to human activity: They were more likely to use habitats with cattle, cars, and dirt roads, according to the footage.

The study adds to a growing body of research showing that the border and infrastructure around it is disrupting wild animal communities.

“Amazing wildlife is present in the borderlands due to the binational efforts to protect and restore the flow of life between both countries,” Marín said in an email. “We should not define this beautiful region and the creatures that roam by the existence of an imposed division.”

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Unrecognizable female friends celebrate and drink red sparkling wine.

There is a lot of advice out there about how much alcohol one should drink. There is research suggesting that drinking could be dangerous, and research that indicates drinking is good for you.

Which is it? Obviously, too much drinking is bad for one’s health — and drinking to excess can destroy the human body. But is moderate drinking good — or, at least, fine?

Dylan Scott, Vox’s senior health reporter, has been looking into this matter for some time, and I recently asked him to sum up what he’s learned. Here’s what he had to say:

You’ve done some reporting on alcohol recently and whether it’s safe. Is it?

There is widespread agreement that heavy drinking is not good for you — doctors and scientists have known for literally centuries that a lot of drinking is dangerous.

And the more you drink, the greater your risk. Your risk starts to increase pretty exponentially once you’re having more than one or two drinks at a given sitting, especially if you’re drinking every day.

There is still a lot of debate about the safety of drinking small amounts of alcohol and whether it can have very small health benefits. On that front, studies can seem to contradict themselves.

I talked to one scientist who has published some research documenting cardiovascular benefits from drinking a little bit of alcohol, and I also recently talked to the author of a 2017 statement from the leading cancer physician medical society, which was basically intended to be a wake-up call to the public that alcohol is a carcinogen.

Yet those two people, despite appearing to be on opposite sides of the debate, would basically be in total agreement, about the negative consequences of more than one drink for a woman every day or more than two drinks for a man every day.

Alcohol is a carcinogen?

Yes, but let me take a step back.

What has stuck out to me in reporting about alcohol is that the problem isn’t so much the substance itself as it is widespread misunderstanding about what moderate drinking means.

That’s 12 oz. of a 5 percent beer, 1.5-oz. glass of 80-proof liquor, and 5 oz. of a 12 percent glass of wine.

There’s a trope among doctors that most people think they’re moderate drinkers but aren’t thinking about those numbers as they drink. I might pour a glass of wine and think I’m having one glass of wine, but a doctor would see two glasses of wine if it’s a really generous pour.

Coming back to your question, if you didn’t know alcohol is a carcinogen, you’re not alone. I learned in my reporting that only 40 percent of people know alcohol is a carcinogen, which shows there’s still a lot of work to do in educating people about the health risks.

Public health experts told me that they want to be more vocal about some of alcohol’s risks, especially about it being something that builds a dependency. Between that, and alcohol being a carcinogen, you can start to see why knowing what levels of drinking are actually moderate is really important.

That’s interesting, and it makes me wonder about those headlines that claim a new study has found a glass of red wine a day is the key to longevity or something like that. Is there anything to those?

After my reporting, I do think there is some room for debate about whether a very modest amount of alcohol consumed in a very particular way might confer some small cardiovascular benefit.

That said, even the doctor I talked to who’s authored studies finding some benefit, said, “This is not an elixir*.*” He was clear that his work shouldn’t be read as saying, “Alcohol is going to reduce your chance of diabetes, improve your heart health, or what have you.”

So, you’re saying I shouldn’t start drinking, hoping it will make me a healthier person.

Yes. The doctors I’ve spoken to have said things like, “I would never tell somebody to start drinking because it’s not going to help you.”

The basic thing to remember, though, is if you’re a light drinker, any potential problems caused by alcohol aren’t something worth worrying about.

People should be aware of the risks but shouldn’t panic about them. Really, my two big takeaways on alcohol are: Heavy drinking is dangerous, and it’s easy to drink too much. Those are the things to watch out for.

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