Electric Cars

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38609043

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European Commission vice-president Teresa Ribera has warned China that the EU will not tolerate “dumping” of low-cost Chinese electric vehicles in Europe. And she rejected the idea that the EU should accept “cheap equipment” to help member-states to reach their decarbonisation goals.

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“There is this assumption that counting on cheap equipment could be good to boost the potential of new developments and new decarbonisation pathways in the European market that could be beneficial. And there may be truth on one side, but as you also know, it may be difficult in terms of how it could impact on the capacity to ensure a level playing field. So we cannot accept any type of dumping practices.”

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Trade figures on Monday showed that China’s exports continued to grow in June, jumping by 5.8 per cent compared to a year earlier, despite US tariffs of about 55 per cent on Chinese goods. China ended the first half of 2025 with a record trade surplus of about USD586 billion.

Analysts suggest that Chinese manufacturers have been front-loading exports to the US in case tariffs rise higher in the coming months. But exports to other parts of the world, including the EU, have also continued to rise.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38293116

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The electric-vehicle revolution has created a global rush for lithium, an essential component of EV batteries. Zimbabwe has one of the world’s largest lithium reserves and is the top supplier of the mineral in Africa. Its annual earnings from lithium exports surged from $1.8 million in total in 2018 to more than $80 million in the first quarter of 2025 alone, and experts still see untapped potential. Several of the country’s large lithium mines have been purchased or built by Chinese companies since late 2021.

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China has the world’s top EV industry and dominates the global lithium supply chain: About 70% of all lithium is processed there. As other nations race to catch up, Beijing has leaned into its long-standing role as a major investor in mining in Africa. In Zimbabwe, China’s relations with the government are particularly close, dating to when it backed eventual dictator Robert Mugabe’s guerilla faction during the struggle for liberation in the 1960s. Mugabe’s successor, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, has supported Chinese takeovers of lithium mines, arguing they will bring economic growth for a country where close to half the population lives in poverty.

But many residents in mining areas in Zimbabwe say the relationship with China is one of exploitation. The lithium boom has created little benefit for their communities, they argue, and in many ways has harmed them. Residents say they’ve been displaced from their homes by expanding operations at Chinese-run mines with little or no compensation. They say farmland has been degraded and water supplies contaminated. Some residents have complained that well-paying jobs in the mines are often filled by workers imported from China or Zimbabwe’s cities, while unions have criticized conditions and pay. Security crackdowns at the mines have resulted in arrests of illicit miners.

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Many Zimbabweans feel left out. “A lot of people who live near lithium mines would expect to benefit from this resource,” Grasian Mkodzongi, a senior researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute who focuses on natural resources and the energy transition, recently remarked. “Currently, local people are the losers.”

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Six women [said] they had been sexually assaulted while working illegally at the mine — a problem that predates Sinomine’s acquisition, but which, four of the women said, had worsened under its ownership. All of the women said they were sexually assaulted by security guards, while two said they had been assaulted by fellow miners. One woman, a single mother who asked not to be named, said she was introduced to illegal lithium mining in 2019, at age 17, when she was in desperate need of work. She recounted being sexually assaulted by a security guard when the mine was still under its previous ownership. Sexual assaults became more common, she said, after security measures increased under Sinomine. “It was [more] difficult to enter when the Chinese came, and that is when the abuses intensified, because we had to pay our way into the mine,” the woman said.

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Six villagers [said] they lost access to land they’d previously used for their homesteads, to farm, or to raise animals, when the mine expanded. Residents are being assisted by Zimbabwe’s Human Rights Commission to negotiate compensation, Mudhe said. Some residents who are still able to grow food and raise livestock told Rest of World they worry the mine may eventually displace them too. Residents also told a local news outlet that because of the slime dam, the walk to fetch drinkable water was now 4 kilometers (6.5 miles).

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Some of those who do find jobs in Zimbabwe’s lithium mines have reported problems with working conditions. Labor unions have raised concerns about safety standards across the sector, with Justice Chinhema, general secretary of the Zimbabwe Diamond and Allied Minerals Workers Union, warning of a “disturbing trend” of accidents. Chinhema told Rest of World the union has received reports of accidents at Bikita Minerals as well. Across the country’s mines, however, many cases go unreported, he said, “making it very difficult to give correct statistics.”

In one 2024 incident at a mine in the town of Bindura, a Chinese manager was caught on video tying two Zimbabwean workers to the bucket of a front-end loader by their hands and raising them into the air. This was the most glaring in a series of violent altercations between Chinese nationals and locals, which the Zimbabwe Miners Federation has called “a stark reminder of the need for stricter regulations and oversight of Chinese companies operating in Zimbabwe.”

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The reasons for the ultra-low prices of Chinese electric cars are complex. They are not limited to cheaper labor or generous state subsidies that violate the rules of fair competition. Often the cost of products is also reduced by ignoring labor standards, using forced labor, as well as monopoly control over key components, especially rare earth metals. China, as the largest supplier of these strategically important resources, is consciously using them as a geopolitical tool of influence.

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The economic aspect is only part of the problem. Concerns about security, data privacy and technological sovereignty are growing. Modern electric cars are equipped with dozens of sensors, are constantly connected to the Internet and have functions for remote software updates, transmission of telemetry or even control of certain vehicle functions in real time.

In the case of Chinese electric cars, these capabilities become potential tools for espionage, collection of sensitive data or, in extreme cases, remote sabotage. American intelligence agencies and European cybersecurity experts have repeatedly warned about the possibility of collecting personal information through Chinese-made “smart” cars, including GPS routes, camera and microphone recordings, user preferences, mobile device connections and even access to home Wi-Fi networks.

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The real shock comes from the fact that some Chinese electric cars are capable of receiving commands directly from servers located in China. This means that in the event of political tension or a hybrid attack, the car could theoretically be stopped or even cause an accident by changing its behavior. In a worst-case scenario, these cars could become remotely controlled weapons - without any input from the driver.

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Behind the cheapness of such cars are not only marketing and technology, but also a whole complex of risks - from ethical to strategic. Before buying the next “affordable” electric car, every consumer must ask themselves the question: am I willing to pay with my own safety for this “bargain” purchase?

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/37887067

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According to a report by Telex, more than 100 employees could soon be laid off at the CATL factory in Debrecen, the result of a top-down corporate decision. The round of layoffs is already underway. One affected worker said the reason was that in the “current market environment,” the company needs more Chinese professionals than Hungarian ones.

The terminations began last week, initially affecting employees still on probation. This week, the cuts extended to those with permanent contracts. Some of them had been with the company’s Hungarian subsidiary for over a year. The layoffs are impacting not just factory workers, but office staff, skilled labourers, quality inspectors, and process engineers as well. Chinese management has not provided the affected employees with a reason for the decision.

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The company has struggled to attract workers. Resistance to battery manufacturing remains strong, and some employees leave shortly after being hired, spreading negative word-of-mouth and damaging the company’s reputation. These challenges may have led the Chinese leadership to stop recruiting locals for mid-level management and skilled positions. The immediate cause for the downsizing may be that CATL is no longer expanding production as previously planned. Construction on the second plant unit has been suspended indefinitely.

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In 2022, CATL announced plans to build a massive battery plant in Debrecen with an investment of HUF 3 trillion (EUR 7.5 billion), creating thousands of jobs in three phases and absorbing a large share of the local workforce. For now, only the first unit has been completed. Test production is set to begin this fall, followed by mass production in the winter. It’s still unclear how the current layoffs will affect the Hungarian government’s significant financial investment in the project.

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/3374968

Archived version

As the V4 states continue to attract Chinese electric vehicle and battery investments, differences are emerging between the interests of national elites and local communities chosen to host these manufacturing (and recycling) facilities. This can be seen in the case of local opposition in the small Slovak town of Šurany – selected to host a major battery production facility as part of a broader industrial park complex. With the opposition group’s environmental and social concerns echoing patterns seen in similar protests in Hungary, it is important to understand these “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) sentiments, which highlight the complex task of balancing economic growth and the green transition while upholding democratic principles such as public consultations.

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The NIMBY sentiments underscore notable discrepancies between EU and Chinese regulatory standards. These could be further leveraged – especially given the ongoing dilution of the EU’s Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) framework – against both national and EU-wide interests. At the same time, it is important to differentiate between various forms of these investments (including the nature and scope of activities involved) and their associated risks.

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While InoBat’s joint venture with Chinese battery producer Gotion High-Tech is seen as a form of Chinese investment that could facilitate (some level of) industrial upgrading, it has also sparked local protests ... battery manufacturing involves unfamiliar and potentially hazardous chemical processes, with the activists in Šurany citing concerns over substances like N-methylpyrrolidone solvents, which can affect fertility and cause vision, respiratory and other health problems, as well as worries about potential water contamination, soil erosion, high energy use, and pollution – all of which raise broader questions about environmental justice.

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The activists in Šurany have also drawn comparisons with other regional battery projects, notably CATL’s €7.3 billion plant in Debrecen, Hungary, which has attracted even larger opposition. These protests, however, were influenced not only by Chinese involvement but also by prior controversies surrounding South Korean battery investments, indicating broader concerns over lax ESG [Environmental, Social and Governance] practices facilitated by a government that prioritizes economic development and profit maximization over local concerns and corporate sustainability – regardless of investor origin.

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With Slovakia having the EU’s third-highest trade exposure to China and the highest final demand exposure among the V4, the country remains deeply exposed to potential Chinese economic coercion in both direct and indirect terms. On top of this, concerns about regulatory arbitrage – where investors exploit laxer national regulations – are rising, particularly around ESG enforcement,

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/37465853

Archived

• BYD has reportedly sued 37 influencers in China, claiming they have made defamatory comments.
• The manufacturer has a News Anti-Fraud department where people can send tips about possible defamation and get rewards.
• Companies suing influencers for potentially damaging their image is far more common in China than it is in the West.

The relationship between automakers and the people who create content with their vehicles can sometimes be tense. However, it seldom results in legal action taken against them, and requests to change or remove content are usually about as extreme as it gets.

But not if you’re covering the world’s fastest-growing automaker over the last few years, BYD, which is reportedly taking 37 influencers to court over things they said that it deems defamatory.

CarNewsChina says BYD has also added 126 content creators to an internal watch list, and they will be monitored in the future, potentially also facing legal action from the automaker if they say something that the company sees as damaging to its image. The carmaker created a “News Anti-Fraud Office” a few years ago and it’s encouraging people to send tips about potentially damaging content.

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To encourage tip-offs about potential smear campaigns, BYD is offering substantial bonuses—50,000 to 5 million yuan ($6,900 to $690,000)—for credible leads. The source lists several examples of why BYD sued influencers. In one instance, a person accused the company of manipulating content creators to say negative things about rival brands.

The court concluded that the influencer was required to make a public apology and pay a fine of 100,000 yuan (around $13,800). Another influencer was fined after making claims that BYD was financially unstable and on the verge of bankruptcy.

All of these fines pale in comparison to the August 2023 lawsuit launched by Nissan Dongfeng against an influencer who had posted over 50 videos on TikTok denigrating the automaker’s vehicles. He was asked to pay 5 million yuan in reparations to the manufacturer. In 2022, Tesla also took a Chinese influencer to court, demanding 5 million yuan in reparations, but eventually settled for a lot less.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/37455372

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Carmakers and salespeople in Brazil are up in arms at the arrival of a giant cargo vessel carrying thousands of cheap Chinese electric vehicles.

The world’s largest car-carrying ship – one of a number deployed by BYD, China’s biggest carmaker – is said to carry the equivalent of 20 football fields of vehicles. It finished its maiden journey to dock at Brazil’s Itajai port late last month. But not everyone is happy about its arrival.

BYD, China’s top producer of EVs and plug-in hybrids, is offering Brazilian car shoppers relatively low-priced options in a market where the green-car movement is still in its infancy. But Brazilian auto-industry officials and labour leaders fear the vast influx of cars from BYD and other Chinese carmakers will set back domestic auto production and hurt jobs.

Calls for immediate 35% tariffs after flood of EVs

The late-May shipment was the fourth of the Chinese carmaker’s ships to dock in Brazil this year, totalling around 22,000 vehicles, according to Reuters calculations.

BYD, the world’s top producer of electric and plug-in hybrid cars, is the largest among several Chinese brands targeting Brazil for growth. China-built vehicle imports are expected to grow nearly 40% this year, to about 200,000, according to Brazil’s main auto association. That would account for roughly 8% of total light-vehicle registrations.

Industry and labour groups say China is taking advantage of Brazil’s temporarily low tariff barriers to ramp up its exports rather than investing to build Brazilian factories and create jobs.

They are lobbying Brazil’s government to accelerate by a year a plan to increase Brazil’s tariff on all EV imports to 35% from 10%, rather than gradually phasing in higher levies.

“Countries around the world started closing their doors to the Chinese, but Brazil didn’t,” said Aroaldo da Silva, a Mercedes-Benz production worker and president of IndustriALL Brasil, a confederation of unions across six industrial sectors. “China made use of that.”

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/37394400

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For all the Chinese government’s efforts to prevent price cuts by market leader BYD Co. from turning into a vicious spiral, analysts say a combination of weaker demand and extreme overcapacity will slice into profits at the strongest brands and force feebler competitors to fold. Even after the number of EV makers started shrinking for the first time last year, the [Chinese] industry is still using less than half its production capacity.

Chinese authorities are trying to minimize the fallout, chiding the sector for “rat race competition” and summoning heads of major brands to Beijing last week. Yet previous attempts to intervene have had little success. For the short term at least, investors are betting few automakers will escape unscathed: BYD, arguably the biggest winner from industry consolidation, has lost $21.5 billion in market value since its shares peaked in late May.

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Auto CEOs were told last week they must “self-regulate” and shouldn’t sell cars below cost or offer unreasonable price cuts, according to people familiar with the matter. The issue of zero-mileage cars also came up — where vehicles with no distance on their odometers are sold by dealers into the second-hand market, seen widely as a way for automakers to artificially inflate sales and clear inventory.

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The pricing turmoil is also unfolding against a backdrop of significant overcapacity. The average production utilization rate in China’s automotive industry was mere 49.5% in 2024, data compiled by Shanghai-based Gasgoo Automotive Research Institute show.

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The Chinese electric vehicle (EV) boom has turned into a dramatic shakeout with 400 Chinese EV companies ceasing operations between 2018 – 2025 [...] China’s EV startup explosion was fuelled by generous subsidies, tax breaks, and easy access to local production licenses between 2015 and 2019. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), this led to an overcrowded market of more than 500 ventures, many lacking core technology, supply chains, or scale.

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[Chinese EV manufacturer] BYD is facing growing challenges from an intensifying price war and a change in supplier payment regulations in China, raising market concerns about the company’s financial stability.

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BYD executive vice president Stella Li told Bloomberg in an interview on June 12 that the “very extreme, tough competition” in the Chinese EV market is unsustainable.

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Last October, the European Union imposed tariffs ranging from 17% to 35.3% on Chinese EVs (BYD: 17%, Geely: 18.8%, SAIC and others: 35.3%). China suggested setting minimum prices for the EVs it ships to the EU. Both sides are still negotiating the matter.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35814201

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Years were spent on agreeing rules to hold companies accountable for their environmental and social impacts, including the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), and more. The European Commission's ‘simplification’ agenda was supposed to streamline rules and reduce the administrative burden on companies. Instead the numerous Omnibus proposals have gone beyond this, weakening sustainability rules instead.

The rules are good for all the reasons associated with protecting human rights and combating climate change. But they also give European companies a distinct advantage over rivals. Car makers have been at the forefront of this and are set to be the big winners. Many have invested in complying with the rules requiring them to identify and mitigate negative impacts on human rights and the environment within their operations and their supply chains. Mercedes and Volkswagen are good examples as the only two companies that currently publish stand alone raw materials reports, with detailed and disaggregated information on the tracing and due diligence conducted into a wide range of raw materials to ensure standards are met.

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Chinese manufacturers are ramping up sales in the EU market - until now mostly through imports, and increasingly via local production in Hungary, Spain and beyond. Yet many of these companies are falling short of EU sustainability requirements. This poses not just a regulatory challenge, but a competitive one: under the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, companies face consequences for non-compliance - including potential fines of at least 5% of annual turnover. If these rules are now weakened, we risk letting in lower-standard competition through the front door while failing to reward those who have played by the rules.

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A survey by We Are Europe shows business leaders see the EU regulations on disclosure and transparency as a potential geopolitical asset for Europe with 90% endorsing it. The European Central Bank has also pushed back against the Omnibus bill, warning it would cut disclosure for 80% of companies and increase financial and greenwashing risks by allowing smaller firms to report selectively.

Despite these warnings, mistaken beliefs persist - including from Germany’s new Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron - that Europe needs to scrap its sustainability regulation in order to be competitive. This is a short-sighted view that makes no sense in the current environment where countries, most notably the US, are also moving to protect their industry.

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If Europe really wants to boost competition it should accelerate company guidance on how to interpret the rules, so those that have a competitive transparency advantage can use it quickly. Creating a central handbook to help companies comply with supply chain rules - like the Batteries and Deforestation Regulations - is a smart move. But simplifying reporting must not be used as an excuse to reopen and weaken the rules we've already agreed on.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35408692

The firm says the layoffs will mainly impact office-based positions in Sweden, representing about 15% of its white collar workforce.

Last month, Volvo Cars, which is owned by Chinese group Geely Holding, announced an 18 billion Swedish kronor ($1.9bn; £1.4bn) "action plan" shake-up of the business.

The global motor industry is facing a number of major challenges including US President Donald Trump's 25% tariffs on imported cars, higher cost of materials and slower sales in Europe.

The chief executive of Volvo Cars, Håkan Samuelsson, pointed to the "challenging period" faced by the industry as a reason for the layoffs.

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crosspostato da: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35203087

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This is an op-ed piece by Katharina Osthoff, Senior Policy Advisor at Friedrich Naumann Eurooe Foundation, and Sam Goodman, Senior Policy Director of the China Strategic Risks Institute, the co-Founder and co-Chair of the New Diplomacy Project.

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While the growing influx of competitively priced and well equipped Chinese EVs may appear the superior choice for both consumers and policymakers in Europe, they bring with them substantial economic risks. These risks threaten the domestic automotive industry, which is outmatched by Chinese EV production as well as Europe’s ambitious environmental goals that rely on a substantial shift towards EVs. Yet, the implications extend far beyond economic or ecological concerns. Chinese EVs potentially pose new challenges when it comes to the EU’s commitment to data protection abroad and at home, as well as to upholding security and global human rights standards.

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At the heart of China’s EV production lie deliberate, state-controlled industrial policies: massive state subsidies, overcapacity, and strategic export orientation. This has enabled China’s EV manufacturers to produce high-quality vehicles at near-unbeatable prices, which facilitated companies like BYD, Nio, and Chery to scale-up production rapidly and flood global markets, including in Europe. [...] Today, Beijing holds influential positions across the entire supply chain: from raw material extraction to battery production and final assembly. The EU's commitment to a green transition, which heavily relies on increasing the market share of EVs, exacerbates this issue. This situation highlights a paradox where European liberal free-market democracies are seemingly outperformed by China's state-supported enterprises.

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[European] domestic manufactures are hamstrung by fragmented national policies and underinvestment. This imbalance risks creating a structural dependency on Chinese imports. Unlike past technological shifts, this dependency is not only commercial in nature but also geopolitical. China’s overcapacity is not a market accident but rather the product of deliberate policy choices , aimed at dominating critical technologies and global value chains. The implications for the EU extend far beyond industrial competitiveness. As demonstrated in past cases of economic coercion, most notably against Lithuania, Beijing has shown its willingness to use market access and trade ties as instruments of political pressure. A future in which China controls a large share of the EU’s EV market risks giving Beijing undue influence over European policymaking, including the ability to discourage criticism of its human rights record, military posture, or foreign policy behaviour.

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Driving a Trojan Horse? Data, Security, and Surveillance

Aside from the clear economic risks that Chinese EVs present to Europe’s automotive manufacturing, growing concerns about data privacy, surveillance, and cybersecurity cannot be sidelined. As the former head of MI6 aptly put it, EVs are not just cars but “computers on wheels.” European regulators should take seriously the data security risks this implies. Under the National Intelligence Law and China’s Data Security Law, Chinese EV manufacturers and their suppliers operate under a legal obligation to cooperate with the Ministry of State Security and are prohibited from disclosing this cooperation to foreign governments, raising serious cybersecurity concerns. Chinese Communist Party cells are required to be embedded within the corporate structures of these [EV] firms, making the firewall between commercial operations and the Chinese state increasingly porous. Additionally, many manufacturers rely on software and components from firms such as DeepSeek, which have already been flagged for their data practices.

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Hidden Costs: Labour and Human Rights in the EV Supply Chain

At the same time, the EU cannot afford to ignore the human rights concerns associated with China’s EV supply chain. Beijing has secured a commanding lead in the supply chain for key battery materials with Chinese firms like BYD having established a strong presence in lithium mining and processing operations across Latin America and parts of Africa. [...] The growing scrutiny has already led to tangible shifts in corporate behaviour. Volkswagen’s recent decision to exit Xinjiang reflects growing pressure on European firms to sever ties with entities linked to systemic human rights abuses. While the company cited economic reasons for the sale, the move underscores the reputational and legal risks European firms face if they remain entangled with controversial actors in the Chinese EV ecosystem. Beyond supply chains, the ethical and legal implications of technology partnerships with Chinese firms demand closer examination. Several leading Chinese tech companies such as Hikvision and others have been implicated in surveillance activities and abuses, particularly in Xinjiang. Partnerships of this nature carry considerable reputational risks in liberal democracies and may expose European firms to secondary sanctions or consumer backlash.

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Such pragmatic policy solutions aimed at restoring the EU’s competitive edge should include:

• The EU should commit to reviewing the EU’s countervailing tariffs on Chinese EVs within the first year of the new EU Commission.
• The EU should review the EU’s current Foreign Direct Investment Regulation to focus on rules regarding joint ventures to look at local ownership requirements, data security requirements, and local content requirements.
• The EU should legally require foreign EV companies from a country where the EU does not have a data standards equivalency agreement to store data on European servers and to commit not to transfer the data overseas under any circumstances.
• The EU should negotiate economic security partnership agreements with value partners such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. One target under these partnerships would be to encourage joint ventures between European automotive producers and world leading Japanese and South Korea battery producers including Samsung, SK Innovation, Panasonic, and LG Energy Solution.
• The EU should investigate forced labour in Xinjiang, add the geographic region of Xinjiang to its forced labour risk database, and introduce guidelines for European businesses regarding the prevalence of forced labour goods in the automotive supply chain.
• European policymakers should expand tax incentives and other measures to encourage European automotive companies to work together to share research, development, and production costs for EVs.
• The European Commission should work with European Member States to coordinate Next Generation EU and Multiannual Financial Framework funds to support the development of the European EV sector, including encouraging matching private sector investment in the EV battery supply chain and EV charging infrastructure. This should serve as the frontrunner to an EU-wide Green Industrial Strategy.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/33585024

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/33584974

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British firms working for the UK’s military or intelligence services are advising staff not to connect their mobile phones to Chinese-made electric cars over fears that Beijing could steal sensitive national security data.

Executives at two of the nation’s leading defence giants have told The i Paper that the entire sector is taking a “cautious” and “belt and braces” approach to the possibility of the Chinese state spying on staff via the country’s electric vehicles (EVs).

The security clampdown within the UK’s highly secretive defence sector follows revelations from The i Paper that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has banned cars relying on Chinese technology from sensitive military sites across the country. In some cases, the MoD has asked staff to park their EVs at least two miles from their workplace.

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The latest disclosure of security worries relating to Chinese EVs could also raise concern among some EV buyers, who are increasingly turning to brands like BYD because of their affordability and longer range.

The role of Chinese companies and equipment in critical infrastructure was brought sharply into focus after the government was recently forced to take control of British Steel from its Chinese owner, Jingye Group, to prevent it from closing blast furnaces at the country’s last virgin steelmaking site.

It is understood that the UK’s leading military production groups, including BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, and Raytheon, as well as US defence giant Lockheed Martin and French defence and cyber security firm Thales, are among those firms that have taken precautions against the potential for Chinese EVs to spy on their staff.

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cross-posted from: https://slrpnk.net/post/19380848

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Batteries are critical to mitigate global warming, with battery electric vehicles as the backbone of low-carbon transport and the main driver of advances and demand for battery technology. However, the future demand and production of batteries remain uncertain, while the ambition to strengthen national capabilities and self-sufficiency is gaining momentum.

Reseachers by Germany's Fraunhofer Institute now published a study that assessed Europe’s capability to meet its future demand for high-energy batteries via domestic cell production. They found that demand in Europe is likely to exceed 1.0 TWh yr−1 by 2030 and thereby outpace domestic production, with production required to grow at highly ambitious growth rates of 31–68% yr−1. European production is very likely to cover at least 50–60% of the domestic demand by 2030, while 90% self-sufficiency seems feasible but far from certain.

To support Europe’s battery prospects, stakeholders must accelerate the materialization of production capacities and reckon with demand growth post-2030, with reliable industrial policies supporting Europe’s competitiveness, the study says.

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If lower production capacity materializes and domestic production remains limited, it will likely pose high economic risks for Europe and imply less European battery sovereignty and setbacks for rapid climate change mitigation, according to the study.

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Beyond mere domestic production capacity and self-sufficiency, the company’s origin is relevant in the context of accessibility and technology sovereignty. While the corporate landscape was nearly 100% Asian in the early 2020s, the share of European companies is projected to increase substantially. In 2025, around two-thirds of the materialized production capacity is likely to result from Asian-affiliated companies and more than one-third from European companies (Extended Data Fig. 2). By 2030, European companies are projected to hold the largest share (45–55%), while the share of Asian companies is expected to decline (40–50%) with US companies anticipated to capture modest shares (3–8%).

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Expressing the European battery demand in terms of required raw material quantities reveals that the cumulative demand for key materials, namely, nickel, cobalt, graphite, lithium and manganese, is projected to increase substantially by 2035, with expected 9-fold (cobalt) and 12–15-fold (nickel, manganese, graphite and lithium) increases relative to the quantities required in 2025 [...]

While Europe will rely on raw material imports until 2030–2035, three factors indicate a strengthening position as the study says:

• First, and in relation to expected demand, substantial domestic reserves of manganese and natural graphite are available, with possibly lower prospects for lithium and nickel, but primary cobalt is scarce.
• Second, existing self-sufficiency assessments [...] indicate progress in building European value chains, however, ramp-ups must be extremely quick. While cobalt and nickel imports (all grades) are likely to remain necessary for domestic processing, it is likely that major shares of lithium and most of the manganese can be sourced and refined domestically. Natural graphite (all grades) is likely to require both local sourcing and refining as well as imports. However, global supply diversification is anticipated to also lower general dependency risks36,37.
• Third, emphasizing the circular economy and recycling, as proposed in the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act38 or incentivized by the US Inflation Reduction Act35, is likely to reduce dependency and further improve sustainability within a comprehensive battery ecosystem, also securing material availability even beyond 2050.

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2144668

After an investigation revealed alleged violations against workers at the Chinese company BYD’s factory in Bahia, northeastern Brazil, the company installed cameras in the administration and the construction areas and put up posters prohibiting photographs in these spaces.

According to the research, a computer program that creates a digital watermark with each employee's name was also installed to identify from which machine information was shared externally.

BYD sent an email on December 18, 2024, informing employees of the changes.

In the message, the company explained that the installation was implemented by the ”Department of Information Technology of China,” and that ”this watermark registers the name of the user logged into the device, device name, and the current date,” adding that ”this measure aims to prevent possible information leaks.”

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All these changes began to be implemented shortly [after the investigation] revealed [that Chinese] workers [...] were being subjected to poor working conditions and living in dirty, crowded, and poorly lit accommodations.

According to information gathered [...] Brazilian workers were not affected. The Brazilians explained that Chinese workers have great difficulty filing any complaints since they do not understand Portuguese, just as the Brazilians cannot speak in Mandarin, Cantonese, or any other languages spoken by the Chinese workers.

Based on personal accounts, images, and videos, the story published [...] showed that many Chinese employees were working without personal protective equipment, subjected to shifts of 12 hours per day, and suffering physical violence if they did not follow orders or meet deadlines.

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In the note, BYD did not explain why it only began to adopt such ”industrial protection measures” [installed by Department of Information Technology of China] shortly after the complaints about mistreatment of Chinese workers, given that the company began operating in Bahia in March 2024.

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BYD's measures to monitor employees in an attempt to prevent further leaks of possible wrongdoing stands in direct contrast to the company's public messaging since the allegations of labour comparable to slavery were made public.

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This accident could be a scene in a horror movie.

I'm not a Tesla fan by any measure, but I edited the headline for this post. The original headline made it seem like a specific feature of the Cybertruck trapped the victims, but then the article explains it was really that the battery was burning so fiercely that the police just couldn't free them. ~~The deadly feature of the accident was the lithium battery, which is common to many makes and manufacturers of EVs.~~

UPDATE: the battery fire obviously didn't help, but according to new reporting it turns out that the Cybertruck really did trap the victims inside.

"It does suck, because everybody kind of makes fun of the Cybertruck. To the outside person, it's kind of weird, it's ugly, whatever. Once you actually get in it, drive it, you realize it's pretty frickin' cool," he says. "It's kind of been sad, because I've been trying to prove to people that it's a really awesome truck that's not falling apart, and then mine starts to fall apart, so it's just... Yeah, it's kind of unfortunate and sad."

Archived

In the background of the EU’s potential mood shift toward China, President of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association Ola Kallenius made a suggestion last month. Speaking to the Financial Times, he said the tariffs the EU imposed on China’s electric vehicles, or EVs, last October could be replaced by encouraging Chinese carmakers to open more plants inside the EU.

For anyone concerned about climate change, that might seem like good news, given the EU’s current stance nakedly prioritizes economic competitiveness over the fast rollout of vehicles that can reduce catastrophic carbon emissions.

But even if the idea came to fruition, there’s a catch. Around 85% of China’s total lithium reserves, which power both the batteries and the entertainment systems in the EVs, are thought to sit in Tibet. And even Chinese factories located in Europe would source their lithium from there — as BYD (比亞迪) and non-Chinese Tesla currently do.

[...]

Mining lithium involves salt-rich brine being pumped to the Earth’s surface and allowed to evaporate. This process consumes large amounts of water, can make water undrinkable and can destroy traditional farmlands and nature reserves. In 2016, the Liqi River was contaminated, destroying the local water supply and killing livestock and fish. The process can also pollute sacred grasslands.

“Tibetans actually don’t benefit from the mining. They experience negative effects of mining including environmental degradation, loss of land and displacement,” renowned Tibet researcher Gabriel Lafitte told a recent Institute for Security and Development Policy online event.

“Mining is often very bad for local water resources,” Martin Mills, chair in anthropology and director of the Scottish Centre for Himalayan Research at the University of Aberdeen explained. “Mines involve the release of and use of a wide variety of very nasty chemicals that … often render areas infertile and create high cancer rates, poisoning rates. Animals can’t live there so that’s a local problem [too.]”

[...]

The effects are not only localized, though. The Tibetan Plateau (sometimes known as the Earth’s “Third Pole”) is home to permafrost which stores vast amounts of carbon dioxide. Alongside existing climate change and increased solar radiation, which are the dominant factors, mining of the mountains around the permafrost, and damming of the Tibetan rivers, exacerbate the thawing of permafrost.

[...]

“The world seems to have opted for the rather simplistic assumption that anything and everything that reduces our carbon emissions is the magical solution,” Gabriel Lafitte said.

“[A] lot of environmentalists actually argue that China is the key and maybe now that we have a President Trump they may even more strongly embrace China as the world’s great hope for a simplistic tech solution to the climate crisis … and so [they believe] if Tibet is to be sacrificed well you know that’s very unfortunate but it may be necessary.”

[...]

Treating places like Tibet as places to grab resources and ignore the consequences.

“We’re moving into a political domain in which people understand you need to grab resources — food resources, mineral resources — and you need to create a hinterland and you need to control those hinterlands and Tibet is part of that,” Mills explained.

[...]

“The truth of the matter is the shift to green technologies is going to damage the environment just as much as fossil fuels will do because the question is not what technology we’re using, it’s how much energy and resource we are consuming across the board,” Mills summarized.

[...]

Thoughts? I live in a wintery biome so having awd gives me a bit of peace of mind

Looks like Toyota is coming in HOT into the electric car market